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Given the need to compete for sponsored research funding, do university faculty 
believe they retain the freedom to research what is of most interest to them?  The 
higher education literature frequently asserts that faculty research agendas are being 
subjugated to the demands of sponsors.  An alternate perspective, from the science 
studies literature, posits that academic science itself is changing as some research 
faculty adapt to a transformed environment for knowledge production that involves 
new working relationships with sponsors.   
However, this transformation produces an altered conception of academic 
science that moves away from traditional normative systems such as those proposed by 
Robert Merton.  The literature shows that academic scientists can deviate from 
traditional norms of research practice, but it is not known to what value systems they 
are gravitating.  This question requires conceptualizing academic science as a social 




organizing frameworks for science as they integrate conflicting values and experience 
ambivalence regarding their research demands.   
Based on an original survey collecting data from more than 1200 faculty at 
doctoral/research universities, the study has two areas of foci concerning academic 
science.  The primary question addresses concerns that, owing to the need to locate 
extramural sponsorship for research, university faculty are losing the ability to 
determine their own research agendas.  Following analysis of multiple conceptions, 
levels of perceived control in different contexts reveal complex patterns of adaptation 
and negotiation in relation to external circumstances.  A more nuanced understanding 
of control emerges.   
The second question examines the value systems present in academic science—
such as those proposed by Merton’s norms—in relation to alternate views to determine 
whether faculty would view different academic values as legitimate or even necessary 
to perform research.  The findings reject the notion of conventional values being 
predominant, and discrete types within the typology being tested were not supported.  





CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
 Traditionally, universities have been viewed as cultural institutions, providing 
general contributions to national and economic development without specific and 
concrete purposes (Gumport, 2000).  Advancing knowledge through research is viewed 
as one of the principal functions of universities (Geiger, 1986, 1993; Kennedy, 1997) and 
is also viewed as the primary vehicle for advancing individual institutional prestige 
(Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2002; Rosovsky, 1990). University research is also viewed as 
a public good held in high regard by society as part of the unwritten social contract 
between institutions and society.  This relationship has produced an expectation from 
government that science should provide a return to society for the public investment 
made, while institutions enjoy relative autonomy from government (Duderstadt, 2000a; 
Frodeman & Mitcham, 2000; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Rothblatt, 1995).   
 An alternate view is much more utilitarian regarding academic science and 
considers universities to be public service institutions with concrete social, political, and 
economic goals (Branscomb & Keller, 1998; Braun & Merrien, 1999a; Newell, 1985; Sutz, 
1997).  Governments fund university research with an expectation that, in addition to 
new knowledge, many benefits will accrue to society through a continual flow of 
discoveries and innovations that can be converted into new products, medicines, or 
services that will not only solve problems but have an economic benefit (Duderstadt, 




 Certainly research and development activity at U.S. universities is now an 
integral part of technology-based economic development nationwide. In FY 2005, 
universities and colleges reported Research & Development expenditures of $45.8 
billion, 5.8% more than in the previous year ($43.2 billion) (NSF Division of Science 
Resource Statistics, 2007).  The sheer volume of research and related activities have 
prompted states and regions to view contributions to economic development through 
services like workforce preparation, extension/technical assistance, and research 
partnerships with industry as part of the mission of higher education (Tornatzky, 
Waugaman, & Grey, 2002).  Universities make their contribution to economies in many 
ways; however, since 1980, the complex assortment of activities that comprise 
technology transfer, development, and commercialization have been a growing 
resource for economic development (Palmintera, Hodgson, Tornatzky, & Lin, 2005).  
 The array of academic science in universities has been expanding in recent 
decades, resulting in more research projects conducted with some level of emphasis on 
applied outcomes, as well as changes like university partnerships with industry, greater 
scrutiny of institutions from government agencies, and increased competition among 
institutions for research funds (Branscomb, Kodama, & Florida, 1999; Feller & Roessner, 
1995; Seashore-Louis & Anderson, 1998).  However, this trend has been criticized as the 
commercialization of academic research (Bok, 2003; Buchbinder, 1993), a turn of events 
that undermines the ideal of the university (Giroux, 2003; Rosenstone, 2001).  As these 




research has changed is often raised (F. Newman & Couturier, 2001; Press & Washburn, 
2000; Shils, 1997b).    
 To be sure, the current environment for university research is being dramatically 
altered by the social, political, and economic demands placed on universities (Dill & 
Sporn, 1995b; Gumport & Pusser, 1999).  Frequently, this shift is identified in the higher 
education literature as a market or industry emphasis on research (L. Cohen, McAuley, 
& Duberley, 2001; Gordon & Whitty, 1997; Gumport, 2000; F. Newman & Couturier, 
2001), in which institutions engage in sponsored research to acquire funds.  Such 
changes are perceived as undermining institutional autonomy and institutional missions 
(Beck, 1999; Kurasawa, 2002) because of the fear that institutions will be beholden to 
the interests of the funding providers, and because of the potential for knowledge to be 
recast as a commodity to be sold (Berg & Roche, 1997; Kelsey, 1998; Rosenstone, 2001).   
 Observers of research universities, both within and outside higher education, are 
concerned that the demands of this environment are forcing universities toward the 
production of practical benefits through applied research.  This is seen by some critics as 
supplanting basic or pure research—that which is undertaken to produce knowledge 
without regard to its immediate societal benefits—and causing institutions to serve the 
interests of the providers of their research funding, to the detriment of the greater 
public trust (Buchbinder, 1993; Hicks & Hamilton, 1999; Press & Washburn, 2000; 
Shenk, 1999; Shils, 1997b; Sommer, 1995).  Such critiques accuse institutions of 
succumbing to the commercial pressures of the marketplace (Bok, 2003; Giroux, 2003), 




(e.g., Clark, 1998; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), which force them to move away from their 
responsibilities to fundamental research as they strive to become more self-sustaining 
(Bridges, 1998; Rhoades & Slaughter, 1998).   
 Concurrently, other literature from science studies contradicts this point of view, 
contending that the traditional viewpoint associated with the Vannevar Bush model of 
linear innovation flows from universities outward to society is outmoded.  Recent 
critiques of the linear model (Branscomb & Keller, 1998; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; 
Stokes, 1997) have emerged as science scholars see other methods for collaboration 
between universities and society.  Indeed, the transformation of research can be 
approached from several perspectives (Delanty, 2001b; Jacob & Hellström, 2000).  One 
method could include the traditional, cultural critique regarding the purposes of the 
university (Readings, 1996; Shils, 1997c; Soley, 1995).  A more complete approach would 
consider how academic science is becoming more integrated with society as universities 
conduct research in a globalized environment (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000a, 1997; 
Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001). 
   Writings in this literature share a common theme of university research having 
the ability to accommodate both academic and market values (Slaughter, Archerd, & 
Campbell, 2004).  This viewpoint argues that entrepreneurial activity comes from the 
economic contribution universities can now make to their societies (Etzkowitz, Webster, 
& Healey, 1998b; Sutz, 1997; Tornatzky, 2000).  From this vantage point, universities are 
encouraged to be more creative and proactive in their use of intellectual capital, 




(Goldstein, Maier, & Luger, 1995; Gray, 1999).  This external engagement presupposes 
that innovation is now a globalized process and globalization challenges the policy idea 
that there are self-contained national systems of innovation (Branscomb & Florida, 
1998).  There is a growing belief that research universities will need to look and function 
differently in a society that assigns both economic and intrinsic value to knowledge 
(Birch, 1988; Delanty, 2001a; Duderstadt, 2000b; Jarvis, 2000, 2001; Smith & Webster, 
1997).   
The Problem 
 Pinpointing the specific effects of globalization upon universities is difficult 
because any evidence of difference has to be observed at the micro-level, either within 
research units or among individual faculty (Laukkanen, 2003; Tuunainen, 2006).  While 
the arguments surrounding these issues are complex, this study will focus on the 
circumstances of individual faculty members—the control they exert over their research 
agendas.  For this study, that means the processes used by university faculty to select 
research topics, including the values associated with the work. 
 The primary objective of the study is to learn how adaptation to this 
environment is influencing the values faculty associate with academic research.   Faculty 
from different disciplines within universities may feel the competitive environment for 
funding research is inhibiting their ability to determine their own research agenda—that 
is, to conduct research in the areas of inquiry most of interest to them—while others 




This study will attempt to ascertain the extent to which faculty believe they can 
negotiate these changes and retain control over their research (Anderson & Seashore-
Louis, 1991).  Defenders of curiosity-driven research argue that market or regulated 
systems of research would not yield the same broad portfolio of research that the 
current system for basic research does (Strandburg, 2005).  
 If academic science is truly being transformed, then is there evidence that the 
values associated by faculty in various disciplines regarding what qualifies as good 
science differ?  Testing for disciplinary differences is important as faculty situated in 
different contexts may have dissimilar perspectives (Braxton, 1986; Fishman, 1978).  The 
perceived norms perpetuated in those environments could either replicate traditional 
research practice, push faculty toward modern models of research, or support faculty 
regardless of chosen methods.  More specifically, we should know what evidence exists 
that there are different narratives regarding academic science amongst faculty, either 
within or across disciplines.    
 The purpose of this study is to determine whether faculty believe they retain the 
freedom to research what is of most interest to them.  However, our understanding of 
what it means to control one’s research agenda may be altered by the changing nature 
of academic science.  Thus, it becomes important to know whether the traditional 
norms and values regarding what constitutes proper academic science still frame the 
understanding of research faculty.  Given this consideration, the secondary purpose of 
the research is to know whether academic scientists hold traditional or alternate value 




Thus, the research questions for two primary components of this study will be:  
1) To what extent do university faculty feel the process for obtaining research 
sponsorship is compromising their ability to control their own research agenda?  
2) Is there evidence to suggest the existence of alternate normative/ value systems 
among faculty regarding what constitutes academic science that differ from 
traditional ones?  
Theoretical Perspectives 
 The idea of “control” is important in two respects for this study because it is at 
the heart of the theories used for this research.  First is the question of whether faculty 
retain control over their research, or whether it has become subject to “dispersed 
influence” (Anderson & Seashore-Louis, 1991).  Essentially, this is an academic freedom 
issue, with autonomy being the primary factor.  Although this autonomy is present at 
the level of academic departments and disciplines through mechanisms such as peer 
review, this study is focused at the level of individual faculty.  Subject to compliance 
with ethical and scientific norms, faculty are generally free to direct their own research 
programs.  The notion of dispersed influence refers to the external factors that have 
come to influence faculty, including governments, industry, interest groups, regulatory 
agencies, as well as academia itself.   
 Control is important in a second way in relation to the scientific norms 
mentioned above.  The academic profession exerts some social control over faculty 
through an expectation of compliance with the norms of science (Braxton, 1986, 1990, 
1993).  Conformity has been a subject of study for decades (e.g., Hagstrom, 1965), as 




knowledge.  The normative structure of science (Merton, [1942] 1973) is an important 
issue in the field of the sociology of science, and the examination of those norms will be 
a critical component of this study.   
 Regarding control in this manner, the first theoretical perspective informing the 
study is institutional theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; W. R. Scott, 2001) and theories 
concerning social conventions, traditions, and accepted practices, as well as how such 
institutions adapt.  According to Scott (2001), institutions are “social structures that 
have attained a high degree of resilience” (p. 48).  Institutional theory posits that 
practices and behaviors become embedded over time as systems that define social 
thought and action.  Performance in accord with these social systems provide legitimacy 
to actions and new entrants, producing isomorphic tendencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991a, 1991b).   
 The current study will use the conception of academic science as an institution—
a set of processes agreed upon through convention and tradition—and examine the 
values faculty exhibit in practice.  In particular, the institution is the normative structure 
of science as conventionally understood, since it has such a large influence over current 
notions of academic science—perhaps existing as a governing ideology (Mulkay, 1976).  
Given its design, this study is not attempting to isolate instances of institutional change, 
but will attempt to uncover evidence of new institutional forms and evidence of 
difference that may already be in existence.   
 Any differences uncovered in the norms of science could be attributable to the 




the shifts resulting from globalization as context, this area of study is concerned with 
the transformation of knowledge production and academic science, which parallel wider 
transformations in society (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkowitz et al., 1998b; 
Gibbons et al., 1994; Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 1996; Nowotny et al., 2001).  
Globalization creates new roles for university researchers and affects the manner in 
which they conduct research and interact with colleagues to pursue knowledge.  
Universities become important to the knowledge economy as the boundaries between 
actors, sectors, and disciplines become less relevant.   
 Rather than explaining the changing organization of knowledge production (e.g., 
Clark, 1998; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), these theories attend to the changing processes 
for creating new knowledge—apart from any particular organizational structure—and 
consider the impacts globalization is having on the contexts for innovation.  In 
describing a “socially distributed system of knowledge production”(Gibbons et al., 
1994), “non-linear systems of innovation”(Etzkowitz et al., 1998b), and a “dynamic 
model combining understanding and application” (Stokes, 1997), this literature presents 
important implications for the sociology of science and its consideration of norms.   
 This study will build on work by Jason Owen-Smith and Walter W. Powell (2001), 
who proposed a typology of faculty views of academy-industry relations (see Table 1 
below & Figure 3, p. 105).  This model was derived from a qualitative study of faculty in 
the life sciences, but has not been applied to other disciplines.  While a fuller 
explanation of the model will be provided in the literature review and methods sections, 




tensions articulated in the debate concerning traditional vs. (post)modern academic 
science.  It conveys the complexity with which the research environment is negotiated, 
outlining the “old school” (traditional) and “new school” (modern) positions on 
academic science, while also discussing “hybrid” responses and acknowledging that 
there are faculty who bridge the gap between the extremes (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2001).  Through this model, traditional notions of academic science, as embodied in the 
Mertonian norms of science (Merton, 1942/1973), can be contrasted with perspectives 
on the transformed environment for science (Ziman, 1996).  The hybrid positions 
outlined in the model could be evidence for new institutional forms.   
Table 1:  Typology of Academy-Industry Relations 
  COMMERCIALIZATION OF RESEARCH 
  Threatens Academy Does NOT Threaten 
ACADEMIC & 
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE 








Note: Adapted from Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001. 
 This study will test the model proposed by these authors to determine whether 
it can be used to describe variations in values about academic science amongst faculty 
from different fields.  Specifically, the test will focus on the authors’ idea of hybrid 
positions located between the extremes on the spectrum and whether distinct values 
and practices can be attributed to those positions.  Tests for the existence of such 
positions are required before we can determine the extent to which science is truly 




Context for the Problem 
Globalization as Opportunity for Transformation 
 A full consideration of globalization is beyond the scope of this document, but is 
mentioned here because it is bound up with the transformations of society discussed in 
the literature on the changes to knowledge production.  Authors critical of alterations to 
university research argue the globalization of the political-economy is to blame for 
compromising academic science because it undermines the nation-state, which supports 
and legitimizes universities (Burbules & Torres, 2000; Currie & Newson, 1998).  
Globalization—it is argued—results in less political will for government financing of 
institutions, a greater demand for commercialized knowledge to generate productivity 
and wealth, and the rationalization of higher education (Ball, 1998; Braun & Merrien, 
1999b; Dill & Sporn, 1995b; Henkel & Little, 1999; Neave, 1995, 2000).   In this view, the 
reduction of government provisions creates market-like circumstances (Slaughter & 
Leslie, 1997), where the continual need to locate new research funding has the potential 
to compromise the research agenda of institutions and their faculty, thereby 
compromising the public good (Kezar, 2004). 
 Certainly, part of the transformation of society resulting from globalization is 
that knowledge and information, rather than labor, materials, or capital, have become 
the key resources for advancement and growth (Drucker, 1994).  The restructuring of 
the economy towards a “postindustrial society” (Bell, 1999) foregrounds new science-
based and professional service industries in which knowledge workers rely on technical 




(Barrow, 1996; Brint, 2001; Castells, 2000).  However, the idea that globalization is only 
about economics and markets (e.g., Ball, 1998; Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002; Rhoads, 2003) is 
a misconception common in the education literature.  There are contentions that higher 
education has been colonized by the market (Kurasawa, 2002), that the state is exerting 
power mechanisms of steering and evaluation to drive institutions towards economic 
ends (Braun & Merrien, 1999a; Whitty, 1997), and that higher education is being forced 
down a “single path” method of neoliberalism globalization (Newson, 1998).   
 While the economic dimension is certainly important, considerations from the 
broader social sciences argue that what makes globalization a transformative force are 
its effects in other realms of our lives (Appadurai, 1990; Giddens, 2000; Held & McGrew, 
2003).  Peter Scott has recently said “globalization is more than market-led techno 
phenomenon.  It is bound up in the larger development of a knowledge society, and also 
intimately linked to changes in knowledge production” (P. Scott, 2003, p. 212).  As one 
globalization theorist notes, it is impossible to truly understand globalization using the 
simple lenses of either economic or technological determinism.  Science, technology, 
and capitalism evolve together in the system of globalization.  Viewing globalization as 
simply the imposition of neoliberalism and the logic of capitalism on all parts of the 
world fails to see the transformations the scientific and technological revolutions are 
producing (Kellner, 2002).    
 Both in concept and reality, globalization refers to the collection of forces that 
make the world seem a smaller place, primarily due to the integration of national 




connected and interdependent in these capacities.  Societies are integrated and become 
transformed as individuals are influenced by these changes and integrate new attitudes, 
values, beliefs, and practices into their lives (Brawley, 2003; Friedman, 2000; Levin, 
2001; Sklair, 1999). 
 One aspect of globalization particularly important for this research is the idea of 
localized agency—or “localism”, which is supported by several theories of globalism.  
Robertson’s (1992) conception includes the idea of the shrinking world but also touches 
on the human awareness of the phenomenon, while Waters (2001) highlights the 
growing consciousness that people have about their globalizing world as a key to their 
understanding how transformation occurs around the world (Robertson, 1992).  
Reflexivity is a key component of the social changes resulting from the development of a 
knowledge-based society.  Because knowledge is generally empowering, people can use 
their increased access to knowledge to shape all aspects of their lives.  In addition, they 
use knowledge to acquire more knowledge and gain expertise in multiple contexts 
(Giddens, 1990).  Closely related to reflexivity is the concept of relativization (Robertson 
& Chirico, 1985) in which individuals can place themselves in a larger context and be 
self-reflective on their situation.   
 As applied to higher education, universities and individuals within them have 
agency regarding their increased integration into society.  As knowledge institutions, 
universities are uniquely positioned to stake out their futures.  Marginson & Rhoades 
(2002) offer a heuristic for understanding this circumstance, recognizing that 




existing in all three domains simultaneously.  Their glonacal-agency heuristic combines 
the three levels while also recognizing the concept of self-directed action, or agency.  
Their model allows for the multiple flows of information and influence on institutional 
decisions.   At a local level, faculty members exhibit agency to adapt their research, for 
instance, to the transformed knowledge production process (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2001).  The review of literature on the transformation of science will discuss this further.   
 The concepts of localism, local agency, and reflexivity are important for the 
analysis of how faculty negotiate the new research environment and make choices 
regarding the manner in which they direct their own research agendas.  If there are 
indeed different value systems among faculty, decisions by individual faculty, perhaps 
reinforced by different research support structures, could be causal factors explaining—
to some extent—the existence of other value systems for science.   
Significance 
 The primary importance of this study is that it will empirically examine an issue 
that is typically assumed away in the higher education literature—that university 
research professors are losing their ability to pursue the lines of inquiry of most interest 
to them because the process of locating external funding, and the providers of that 
funding are either limiting or directly controlling the research agenda.  Also, the study 
explores the larger question of the changing nature of academic science through the 
examination of faculty values, attitudes, and practices within these circumstances.  
Through this study, we will learn more regarding how research faculty are balancing 




Overview of the Study 
Following this introduction, the literature review discusses modifications  to the 
scientific ethos as academic science undergoes a transformation, summarizes the effects 
this has on faculty values including control over their own research, and outlines how 
the institutional theory can be a means for understanding how faculty adapt to the 
altered environment.   
The methods chapter presents the primary and secondary research questions, 
along with the sub-questions the study will also address.  The research design and 
analytical model are introduced, and the variables of the study are put forward with 
their accompanying research questions.  The chapter also outlines the data collection 
procedures, the analysis plan for each research question, some preliminary analysis and 
data manipulation, and a description of the respondents.  
The results chapter first presents a summary of the independent variables from 
the survey, and then moves into an analysis of the variables associated with the faculty 
typology used for this study.  Following that is an analysis of the concept of control over 
research agendas in two different capacities.  First is a consideration of four potential 
scenarios or outcomes between faculty and their sponsors.  The second consideration is 
the primary dependent variable for the study: control over research as measured by a 
multi-item scale.   
The final chapter presents findings and conclusions about the questions asked 
and the variables studied, as well as the methods and theories that were used in the 




CHAPTER  II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of the literature will encompass several theoretical and empirical 
areas that are important for understanding the rationale for this study, the questions 
asked, and the variables used.  There are three primary sections, followed by a synopsis.   
The first section will discuss academic science from the perspective of the 
sociology of science and what it reveals about the normative structure and values 
associated with research practice.  The contrasting viewpoints will be discussed, the 
transformation of academic science is posited, and the idea of these norms as 
institutions will be introduced.    
The next section will examine the effects of the transformed environment for 
academic science on university faculty.  The section will consider the academic freedom 
issues in the primary research questions about controlling one’s research agenda vs. the 
influence of sponsors, and will introduce topics that will be used in the examination of 
the norms of science and the dependent variables.  There is also a consideration of five 
common issues that will be used in the analysis of faculty value systems.   
Finally, the third section will consider institutionalism, or institutional theory, 
and what that perspective offers regarding stability and change within organizations 
such as universities.  Specifically, the section will focus on how individual actors possess 




established social structures.  Institutionalism offers a conceptual explanation as to how 
alternate value systems could exist for faculty to employ.   
The synopsis presents concepts that emerge as important for the two main 
components of the study: the concept of control as related to faculty research agendas, 
and the examination of normative systems of values regarding academic science.   
The Scientific Ethos 
Traditional Norms of Academic Science 
 As stated in the introduction, part of this study will ask faculty about the 
traditional norms of academic science as compared to ones developed more recently, 
such as entrepreneurialism.  Although there are other theoretical areas concerning the 
normative structure of science, these two areas are the most developed and are most 
often discussed in opposition in the literature (Slaughter et al., 2004).  Generally, the 
debate is undertaken within the sociology of science, which is a field of inquiry focused 
on the norms associated with the processes of research activity.  This field is separate 
from science as a body of organized knowledge, investigatory techniques, or even from 
the sociology of knowledge (Barber & Hirsch, 1962; Merton, 1957b; Storer, 1966; 
Whitley, 1972).   
 The sociology of science can be traced back to the work of Robert Merton 
([1938] 1973, [1942] 1973) and Talcott Parsons (1951), who were recognized as early 
leaders in the sociology of science (Barber & Hirsch, 1962).  Our understanding of what 




(Braxton, 1986; Hess, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1990) was developed by Merton, 
Parsons, and others (Barber, 1952; Storer, 1966).  These early writings share a related 
set of values about what constitutes scientific inquiry, how scientists should approach 
their work, and what criteria should be used to evaluate science.    
 In its early development, the sociology of science was viewed as primarily 
concerned with the internal functioning of the community of scientists, and not with the 
relation of science to society as a whole, although some early writings (e.g., Merton, 
[1938] 1973) that serve as the foundation for the field did address the relationship 
between the two.  As the field developed, the interrelations between science and 
society became more prevalent as a topic for inquiry (Kaplan, 1964), but the emphasis 
on science as a social system was the initial focus.  The field differentiated between the 
technical norms and the moral norms of science.  Technical norms involve the scientific 
method; moral norms discuss the role of individual researchers in the larger social 
system of scientific inquiry and what behaviors are appropriate for that role.  These 
moral norms comprise what is referred to as the scientific ethos—a system of practice 
for academic scientists (Fishman, 1978; Randazzese, 1996). 
 Indeed, a study by Hagstrom (1965) called The Scientific Community, examined 
the socialization of academic scientists by their peers, and found that colleagues had the 
most influence upon one another in how basic research was conducted.  “Community” 
meant regulating activity through social norms, controlled through the motivation of 
peer recognition.  Barber (1952) considered science as a social activity emerging from 




organization of science,” discussing it as a “moral enterprise” (p. 122), in which the 
authority of the individual scientist is derived from the moral authority of science as a 
whole.  Storer (1966) asserted that science is best viewed as a social system concerned 
with extending empirical inquiry that is guided by a set of shared norms that define the 
relationships among its practitioners.  
 The social context for the scientific ethos is critical to understanding its logic. 
Owing to the time of their development, the early theorists share a perspective of an 
oppressive state, signified by the totalitarian regimes of the Third Reich and the Soviet 
Union.  These governments were hostile to science because they demanded the 
subordination of all institutions, including science, to the state.  Merton’s theory, in 
particular, is important because it outlines how the social institution of science functions 
within the open cultural mores of democracy, while defending the autonomy of science 
with respect to other social and political institutions (Richardson, 2004).  In all these 
theories, the practice of science was seen as compatible only with certain type of 
cultural conditions, namely a liberal democratic social order.  Science and modern 
society become mutually supporting (Barber, 1952; Merton, [1938] 1973, [1942] 1973).     
 Writing about threats to science in 1938 during the rising threat of the Nazi 
state, Merton was concerned about science at a time when it was coming into question.  
He outlined how science cannot be judged according to political or religious authority, 
but must instead retain its purity, autonomy, and impartiality.  Purity is science pursued 
for it own sake, and not for any utilitarian ends.  Autonomy ensures that the scientist is 




impartiality holds that scientists should neither be concerned nor responsible for 
applications of scientific discoveries.  However, some aspects of impartiality are 
paradoxical and have implications for continued support of science; some application of 
science is necessary for continued public support, as the public will not support science 
continually on faith alone.  However, a sole focus on methods and pure knowledge can 
lead to disregard for the social implications of certain applications of science, which 
could undermine public support (Merton, [1938] 1973).     
 In trying to articulate the place of science in the social order, Merton viewed it as 
a moral enterprise incompatible with the ascendant political ethic.  Merton wanted to 
outline a scientific ethos that would judge theories based on logic and facts, rather than 
use irrelevant political considerations.  Emphasizing the cultural structure of science, 
Merton said, “The ethos of science is that affectively toned complex of values and 
norms which is held to be binding….The norms are expressed as prescriptions, 
proscriptions, preferences, and permissions.  They are legitimized in terms of 
institutional values.  These imperatives, transmitted by precept and example and 
reenforced by sanction are in varying degrees internalized by the scientist…” (Merton, 
[1942] 1973, p. 268-9). 
With the goals of understanding larger institutional structures that govern 
science, Merton offered four “institutional imperatives” (p. 270) as comprising the ethos 





 The norm of universalism refers to the absence of bias and emphasizes that 
findings not be judged using pre-established personal criteria.  Objectivity, rather than a 
particularistic focus on the personal qualities of the researcher or the tenets of certain 
creeds, is required.  This norm is also extended to the careers of scientists themselves; 
inclusion into the realm of science must be based on competence alone and not 
immutable characteristics or pre-existing social status (Merton, [1942] 1973).  
Communality (Communism) 
 The term communism here is concerned with the common ownership of the 
products of science, and is generally replaced by the term “communality”.  As findings 
are products of social collaboration, they belong to the community of scientists.  The 
intellectual property of the individual scientist is defined as recognition, credit and 
esteem among peers for discovery, known as “priority”.  Open communication among 
scientists through publication is required for the furtherance of knowledge; secrecy is 
antithetical to the sense of shared heritage and cumulative knowledge embraced by 
scientists.  Thus, patenting and exclusivity present a conflict (Merton, [1942] 1973). 
Disinterestedness 
 The reputation of science is dependent upon scientists carrying out their 
activities with integrity and refraining from exploitation of their work for personal gain.  




Accountability in science comes from mutual policing performed by peers (Merton, 
[1942] 1973). 
Organized Skepticism 
 Science requires that established ideas, authorities, and institutions be subjected 
to detached scrutiny.  In this process, the researcher must suspend judgment pending 
receipt of all the evidence.  This norm often places science in conflict with many aspects 
of society, as scientific questioning can be perceived as undermining that which is 
studied (Merton, [1938] 1973, [1942] 1973).  
 These norms have come to be called “Mertonian”, a term also descriptive of a 
particular type of science conducted in accordance with them.   The mores and norms 
were not valued simply because of the efficiency with which the methods derived from 
them produce valid results and reliable predictions, but because they were believed to 
be right.  Merton also linked these norms to the reward system in science, indicating 
that those who adhered to these norms would receive the most peer recognition 
(Merton, 1957b). 
 Parsons focused on science as an occupation and discussed the scientist as a 
professional with specialized knowledge; he outlined the norms for scientific knowledge 
and the role of scientists.  In the Parsonian view, science is based on occupational values 
including universalism, affective neutrality, specificity, and achievement-orientation.  
However, the most important consideration for scientists is the value of collectivity-
orientation, also known as an “other-orientation” (Parsons, 1951, p. 144).  This is 




any scientist with simply a true self-orientation could interfere with the public interest 
given the potential power of any knowledge discovered, were it to be held apart from 
society.  Furthermore, a self-oriented scientist could monopolize scientific knowledge 
and hinder the work of others.  Two other critical and related values are tentativeness 
and the acceptance of evidence, which have parallels with organized skepticism.  
Together, these values stipulate that all findings must be treated as provisional until 
sufficient evidence is presented to prove them, and that scientists are obligated to 
accept findings as valid once such evidence in presented (Parsons, 1951).   
 Barber also wrote about the relationship between science and modern society, 
claiming that, similar to Merton, certain cultural values are required for science to 
flourish (Barber, 1952).  More to the point of values governing scientific activity are 
several values shared between science and society as well as some particular to science.  
Convergence with other normative systems is again evident.  First is the scientific value 
of emotional neutrality.  This should not be misconstrued as excluding conviction or 
passion for science, but does enjoin scientists to refrain from emotional involvement 
that leads to deception or distortion of scientific activity.  Second, universalism 
emphasizes merit as a criterion for achievement or assertion of scientific truth rather 
than immutable characteristics such as race or gender.  Third, individualism expresses 
self-reliance and the responsibility to judge scientific validity based on one’s conscience 
rather than the dictates of formal, organized authorities.  Adherence to the discipline of 




 Those values that are more apiece with science include communality, or what 
Merton called communism.  Again, it describes a value at-odds with a society that 
prefers private property rights; communality requires only the absolute minimum of 
secrecy necessary to ensure credit and priority of discovery.  Beyond that, all intellectual 
products are viewed as contributing to the common store of scientific knowledge.  A 
value also not shared by society at large is disinterestedness, similar to what Parsons’ 
“collectivity-orientation” (1951, p. 144).  This value compels scientists to serve one 
another and the greater scientific process, thereby facilitating the community regarding 
scientific innovations (Barber, 1952).    
 These sociological writings outline a scientific ethos that, although embodied by 
Merton’s norms, is inclusive of all the values discussed.  The ideal scientist is perpetually 
objective, neutral, disinterested in results, and has only the joy of discovery and the 
needs of society as motivation.  This traditional conception of science continues to drive 
how the science as a profession should operate, how individual scientists should 
approach their work, how the community of scientists interact with and police one 
another, and how society should look upon scientists and their work.  
Theoretical & Empirical Criticisms of Mertonian Science 
 A critical treatment of Merton’s norms may begin with Merton himself, who, in 
later writings (1957a, 1963), focused on the academic reward system—in particular, the 
notion of priority of discovery—and the potential value conflicts it presents to academic 
scientists.  By the early 1960s, Merton described a phenomenon called ‘sociological 




In academia, this has an effect on the actual practice of and relations between 
scientists; the cognitive dissonance generated by this ambivalence forces them to 
combine competing values into consistent action.  However, before finding the proper 
course of action, it is normal for scientists to exhibit behaviors that deviate from the 
ideal ones (Hess, 1997; Merton, 1963).  Given the potential for any number of scientists 
to deviate from the moral norms at various times, conformity to the norms may exist at 
the scientific community level but not necessarily among individual scientists (Hagstrom, 
1965).   
 The Merton-Parsons-Barber system of values has been criticized as assuming the 
norms to be unchanged since their 17th century origins, insisting they were universally 
applicable, and accepting them without sufficient empirical verification (Fishman, 1978; 
Hess, 1997; Kaplan, 1964; Knorr-Cetina, 1991).  Other sociologists of science have held 
that when science expanded into its larger, modern form, the traditional norms perhaps 
became less applicable as science became more accountable to society (W. Hirsch, 
1968; Richter, 1972).   
 Rather than seeing science or its norms as universal, or the advancement of 
knowledge as a purely intellectual pursuit, Sklair (1972) asserts science must be viewed 
as a social activity.  He criticizes the notion that science can only function in liberal-
democratic states, since the ideology of pure science is violated by Western states 
through regulatory restrictions—such as human subjects review—on certain aspects of 
scientific activity.  Violations of other norms result from secrecy via national security or 




Merton’s view on the priority of discovery, saying that if the perpetuation of science 
depends on each person receiving credit for originality, then we would expect scientific 
activity to cease if proper credit was not given.  Sklair says Merton’s theory falls down in 
two respects: that the competition for priority is not universally critical to the 
advancement of science, and to the extent that it is, it reinforces the concept of science 
as a social institution.   
 Other empirical research has failed to prove the existence of Merton’s norms, or 
widespread compliance with them in total.  Indeed, the attempts to verify the existence 
of the norms have often resulted in substantial deviation from the norms in practice.  In 
one early study, based on interviews with 57 faculty in several science disciplines at one 
university, considerable deviation from the ideal of “no exception” to the norms was 
discovered (West, 1960).  Despite the small and restricted sample, the author concludes 
that the idea of a firm consensus regarding scientific values may be a myth.  Other early 
studies found no pervasive influence of the norms in totality; instead, particularistic and 
situational norms were applied by scientists and academic departments.  For instance, 
the norm of universalism was shown to be violated in studies of status attainment in 
academe (Crane, 1965; Reskin, 1976), revealing that advancement and recognition 
accrued to those scientists with a more prestigious institutional affiliation, rather than 
with higher levels of productivity.  Pre-doctoral research productivity was also shown to 
be less important to departments hiring candidates for initial positions than the prestige 
of the degree-granting institution as well as who recommended them (Long, Allison, & 




 The Mertonian norms have also been criticized for producing a vision indicating 
that science functions as a non-problematic set of tools that all users can apply with 
equal objectivity and quality to all questions (Whitley, 1972).  Having the sociology of 
science focus solely on relations among individuals and how they practice their craft 
divorces it from the sociology of knowledge, which objects to a unified view of 
knowledge or methods for inquiry. This leads to a “black-box” vision of science, in which 
we can only study the applications of norms among producers of knowledge, not the 
actual process of knowledge creation itself.   
 Mulkay questioned the extent to which Merton’s norms represent the true 
nature of the process for discovery (1969).  Directly contrary to the early sociology of 
science, he asserted that the true normative structure of science lay in its technical, 
rather than moral norms, and that theories and methods of inquiry govern the social 
activity of scientists.  As evidence he cites the general lack of conformity to the social 
norms, as well as the notion of substantial resistance to innovative discoveries by 
scientists.   The socialization of science indeed occurs in scientists’ training, and this 
produces resistance to innovative ideas in various fields by scientists that cling instead 
to disciplinary conventions.  Also, the social norms are criticized as lacking any 
consideration of the relationship between the technical processes and methods of 
science and its structure of social roles (Mulkay, 1969).   
 Picking up on Merton’s concept of ambivalence, an important early study that is 
often cited (e.g., Braxton, 1986; Etzkowitz, 1989; Ford, 2000; Mulkay, 1976) provided 




norms (Mitroff, 1974).  Based on a series of four interviews each with 42 scientists on 
the Apollo moon project over three-and-one-half years, the study presents a substantial 
amount of first-hand, empirical evidence to demonstrate that scientists do in fact use 
variations of the traditional norms in their daily work.  In fact, Mitroff asserts that there 
are two sets of norms required for science to advance. The subjects in the study 
emphasized the deeply personal commitment required to produce quality scientific 
work, and that the idea of completely objective, impartial, and impersonal scientific 
work does not comport with reality.  Furthermore, some level of secrecy is needed to 
protect priority of discovery and to prevent others from borrowing unpublished ideas 
and methods or anticipating results with similar studies.   
 In summarizing the results, Mitroff proposes a set of counter-norms.  Emotional 
neutrality is offset by emotional commitment that allows for long-term dedication to 
solving difficult problems.  Universalism is countered by particularism, which 
acknowledges that scientists do have networks of sources and colleagues whose work 
they regularly consult because of a belief as to its quality, thus allowing for personal 
knowledge of the individuals as a factor.  Communality is balanced by solitariness or 
secrecy, which allows findings to be held for a reasonable amount of time to protect 
priority, or to assure that findings are complete and reliable before publication.  
Disinterestedness is offset by involvement or interestedness, allowing for scientists to 
achieve satisfaction through service to communities of interest in particular subject 
areas.  Finally, organized skepticism is balanced by organized dogmatism.  This states 




the intellectual work of others that serves as the basis for one’s own work must be 
clearly identified and differentiated so that error and credit can be properly assigned 
(Mitroff, 1974).  In summary, Mitroff believes that a balance between these norms is 
required and that none be used exclusively: “…each norm is restrained and if any were 
unrestrained, science would probably collapse” (p. 593). 
 However, even the idea of norms is not universal.  In a discussion of scientific 
norms, Mulkay (1976) disputes the claim that the moral norms or counter-norms of 
science are institutionalized in any way, contending that they are instead an ideology.  
He sees them as vocabularies of justification, or a narrative, that scientists have used to 
justify and evaluate scientific work to obtain public support.  Asserting that neither the 
academic reward system nor the practice of collaboration within scientific networks 
imposes an institutional structure, the gradual professionalization of science from the 
mid-19th century through the 20th required a view of science both worthy of 
government support and deserving of freedom from government interference.  Only a 
narrative presenting values such as independence, objectivity, and universalism could 
convince the lay public of these needs.   
 More recent examinations of Merton’s norms in the literature from the 
sociology of science also reveal deviations by individual academics and institutions.  A 
thorough review of the literature on Merton’s norms in academia (Braxton, 1986) found 
that “social control by the community of the academic profession is, at best, loose” (p. 
310).  The review found evidence of deviations based on the competition for priority of 




addition, the review revealed selective violations of universalism—conditional upon the 
level of paradigmatic development in various fields—instances of the Matthew effect, 
which describes cumulative advantage to individuals and departments already having 
prestige, and confirmations of violations of universalism in academic hiring and 
recognition.  
 Two later empirical studies by Braxton (1990, 1993) use data from the 1977 
Survey of the American Professoriate to examine deviancy from Merton’s norms, as 
reported by faculty.  Both studies use deviation from each of the norms as four 
dichotomous dependent variables and control for the academic discipline and research 
emphasis of the faculty member’s institution.  The earlier study, using a sample of 795 
faculty who were still active in one of seven chosen disciplines at that time, examines 
control theory (internal regulation of professional conduct by a community) as a basis 
for upholding the scientific norms.  Results indicated that one’s personal internalization 
of norms and perception of collegial conformity to the norms each had an independent 
effect on deviation from all four norms.  Each effect had inverse effects on deviation, as 
less internalization and less collegial conformity led to greater deviation.  That the effect 
of these two forms of control had a greater influence than either academic discipline or 
research emphasis of the institution is cited as support for control theory (Braxton, 
1990).   
 The more recent study (Braxton, 1993) examines anomie theory (Merton, 1938) 
as an explanation for deviation from scientific norms.  Anomie theory holds that groups 




believe they cannot achieve group goals by socially legitimate means or adherence to 
the norms, they will deviate from the norms, experiencing the perceived injustice as 
alienation from the group system.   
 Again using the four dichotomous deviation variables while controlling for 
academic discipline and research emphasis of the institution, the effect of a measure of 
alienation is tested, based on a scale of items from the 1977 Survey of the American 
Professoriate.  The alienation scale represents a set of beliefs that people advance in 
academic careers on criteria other than merit, thus causing alienation from the rewards 
system.  Results showed support for anomie theory as an explanatory factor for 
deviation for three of the norms—the exception being organized skepticism.  The 
potential explanation for this exception is based on the notion that organized skepticism 
governs individual behavior more so than it does relationships with colleagues (Braxton, 
1993).   
 Recent discussions of the institutional sociology of science (Bucchi, 2004; Hess, 
1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1991) seek to recognize the contribution of Merton and this 
tradition to the study of the sociological structure of science.  However, there is also a 
recognition that the field has moved beyond the structural-functionalism of this 
literature.  This movement—variously called the “new sociology of science”, “the 
sociology of scientific practice”, “the sociology of scientific knowledge”, “science and 
technology studies”, or simply “science studies”—has sought to include what the 




 In the modern sociology of science, research models focus on “interest, conflict, 
and interaction” (p. 524) in scientific conduct (Knorr-Cetina, 1991), based on the belief 
that the cognitive aspects of science—the technical components that Merton and 
Parsons divided from the morals and values of science—are critical to understanding the 
substance of science. In the modern sociology of scientific knowledge, the entire 
“content” and “context” of science is open to study.  This includes “how social factors 
shape or permeate relatively technical questions such as design choices, methodologies, 
theories, the interpretation of observations, and decisions about what to observe in the 
first place”  (Hess, 1997, p. 52).   Scientific research is recognized as simultaneously 
belonging to many social groups, including intellectual communities, academic 
disciplines, institutions, as well as cultures, social classes, and political ideologies 
(Bucchi, 2004).  This notion of socially constructed science will serve as a jumping off 
point for the development of a modern view of the scientific ethos.  
Toward a Modern Ethos for Academic Science 
The question of what should constitute academic science is bound up with the 
contested terrain regarding the legitimating idea of the university.  Much of this debate 
deals in abstractions, focusing on theoretical constructions of what universities should 
be.  These debates can be summarized within three general traditions: idealism, 
functionalism, and rationalism.  However, rather than viewing them as competing, 
mutually exclusive visions, these traditions can be represented as different layers of 
organizational forms.  The idea of layers is useful because it represents the reality that 




themselves of previously existing ones; new expectations are added to the old ones.  
The three organizational forms conceive of the institution as a public agency, a cultural 
institution, and a corporate enterprise (see Bleiklie, 1998).  This discussion is important 
for understanding how the changing nature of academic science serves to make the role 
of the university more complex, rather than just implementing wholesale change.  
 Idealism, which views the university as a public agency, is a tradition grounded in 
the British and German universities of the 19th century in which teaching and research 
were revered and often critiques the modern incarnations of the university against the 
idealism from an earlier time.  It celebrates the autonomy of the individual institution, 
academic freedom, and freedom from state interference.  The role of the state is to act 
as protector and guarantor.  In terms of research, the idealistic tradition holds that the 
knowledge produced by university research is important in its own right and needs no 
practical outcomes to justify it.  Thus, globalization and its attendant policies are forcing 
universities to undertake practices that undermine their true missions (Bleiklie, 1998).  
However, even the idealistic tradition fails to possess a unifying idea.  Cardinal 
Newman’s original idea of a university (1982) favored liberal education over research 
and discovery, saying that other institutions should conduct scientific research because 
it wasn’t the place of universities to pursue useful knowledge.  In contrast, the modern 
research university was shaped by the 19th century German tradition of universities and 
the philosophies of Wilhelm von Humboldt.  It was Humboldt who believed institutions 
should be places of scientific and scholarly research and, through the unity of teaching 




the modern organizational and professional beliefs about how institutions should 
operate were established through this process, including the dependence of universities 
on the nation-state for its support and legitimacy (Shils, 1997a). 
 Lord Ashby wrote in his treatise on the development of higher education in 
former colonial nations that universities must do two things to ensure their long-term 
survival: they must remain true to the ideals of their founding and remain relevant to 
the society that supports them (Ashby, 1966).  This balancing act is complicated as 
institutions develop closer ties with society.  Recent critiques fault higher education for 
lacking clarity of purpose or priorities and accuse universities of being confused 
regarding their intellectual identities (Bérubé & Nelson, 1995; Bloom, 1987; Lucas, 
1998).  While such criticisms are certainly not without merit, it may also be the case that 
higher education has reached the point where there can no longer be a single 
legitimating idea for the university.  Delanty  (2001a) argues that the modern university 
exists in a society in which knowledge exists outside the university and is no longer 
considered an end in itself, owing primarily to the pervasiveness of communications 
technology.  People outside of the institution have access to information and knowledge 
that, in an earlier time, would have been contained only within universities for the use 
of selected elites.  This requires a reevaluation of institutional purpose.   
 Under functionalism, tradition regards the university as a cultural institution, 
with different organizational forms used to meet whatever societal needs are 
expressed.  The state is still a guarantor and protector, but also assumes a more active 




adapt as society becomes more complex.  Regarding research, the state can act 
strategically to stimulate research through varying departments and organizational 
formats with a slightly more utilitarian outlook; knowledge for its own sake produces 
higher quality research which yields more applicable results than simple problem-
oriented inquiries (Bleiklie, 1998).   
 As Kerr (2001) points out, while writers were idealizing the traditional university, 
it had in fact already evolved beyond that form, becoming more complex, assuming 
roles never before imagined.  His concept of the multiversity contributed to our 
understanding of this complexity, as did his description of the federal grant university.  
Flexner (1930, 1994) wrote about universities as institutions pursuing knowledge and 
how their modern complexity, with departments and specialists, had rendered the 
vision of Newman an antiquated idea.  However, his observations also contained 
criticisms of institutions such as Harvard that they were straying from what he 
considered the central idea of a university by having such schools as business, 
journalism, and other professional programs.  Pelikan (1992) has challenged and 
updated Newman’s philosophical basis for the university to include the advancement of 
knowledge through the sciences, on the principle that teaching and research could not 
be separate functions.  Still, the university is a preserve of culture.  
 But this cultural role is said to be under assault by the political and economic 
forces leading universities toward market-oriented behavior.  Readings (1996) declares 
that universities have lost their historical function of providing cultural unity as they are 




universities are viewed as social institutions (Gumport, 2000), their contributions to 
society are not measured in market terms and pure research is valued.  The functionalist 
tradition is highly critical of what it sees as the corporatization of higher education.   
 The last tradition, rationalism, considers the university as a corporate enterprise, 
advocating a more centrally-planned and managed research program with a systematic 
exploitation of resources to serve society’s social and economic needs.  In this view, the 
spontaneity inherent in pure research is a waste of resources because it is unplanned; 
government acts on society’s behalf to produce more coordination of research 
outcomes, thereby deemphasizing institutional autonomy (Bleiklie, 1998).  The 
university has always been in a patron-client relationship, first with church, then with 
the state, now with industry, and has at critical junctures become the transformative 
element in society.  The role of the university must be understood within the context of 
economic and social change writ large (Benjamin, 2003).  Universities are uniquely 
positioned to participate in the postindustrial economy as they are in the business of 
creating and disseminating knowledge.   
Although universities were founded on the academic principles of truth-seeking 
and knowledge creation, there has always been an interest on the part of the nation-
state that universities should provide a benefit to society.  As universities developed, 
there was a societal demand that they should extend the benefits of education to a 
wider proportion of the population, and use their research capability to solve social 
problems.  The response of service established the idea that a university was not only 




boundaries of the government that supported it (Hoeveler Jr., 1976, 1997).  Since they 
were established by government, universities owed some measure of service to it and 
going forward, “the university carried with it two great forces: science and nationalism” 
(Kerr, 2001, p.9).   
 The rationalist perspective advocates that universities be responsible for quality, 
excellence, and efficiency (however those come to be defined in a particular system) 
and that institutions have obligations to external stakeholders to manage themselves in 
such a manner that they contribute to economic development (Bleiklie, 1998).  This 
economic contribution is entrusted to institutions with an expectation that they will 
become more effective in achieving it (Alexander, 2000).    
 Understanding that these different visions for universities and academic science 
can coexist is critical for understanding the changing nature of faculty research work.  As 
the processes of academic scientists become studied as social activities, we can see how 
new forms of science come into being that do not necessarily replace old ones.   
The Transformation of Academic Science 
 The first step towards analyzing the transformation of academic science is to 
understand that academic scholarship itself has become more global (Ziman, 1996) as a 
result of the end of the Cold War and the continued internationalization of the academic 
profession (D. W. Cohen, 1997).  Similar to the way in which global problems have arisen 
that are beyond the scope of any one nation to solve (Woods, 2000), Cohen makes the 




one another and with non-academics to address these problems, and that these lead to 
new fields.   
 The global flow of knowledge also creates more competition for scholars in any 
given nation (Skolnikoff, 1994).  While researchers in Western higher education systems 
typically have access to the work and findings of those around the world, scholars now 
increasingly have access to the science produced in those nations with advanced 
research programs.  This asymmetry allows other nations to ‘catch up’ to the more 
advanced nations more quickly.  The globalization of research is not about one idea of 
science, but rather, occurs through the interconnections among scholars in their own 
localities (Stichweh, 1996).  The diffusion of knowledge through the differentiation of 
individual communities is the true cause of global science:  
The globalization of science is not the result of one scientific community of 
scientists with a shared set of normative and cognitive presuppositions 
emerging.  Instead it is the incessant proliferation of ever-new communities of 
scientists with progressively restricted jurisdictions, which organizes the social 
and cognitive space in a way which is incompatible with the boundaries of 
national scientific communities (p. 332).  
 Universities participate in regional development through “the social context of 
innovation” (Mitra & Formica, 1997, p.10).  Entrepreneurship and innovation emerge 
through a combination of collaboration, support from government, and various degrees 
of networking.  For universities, becoming a network organization means first, forming 
relationships with industry, policymakers, funding providers, cultural organizations, and 
with the public at large, and second, participating in the formation of a regional research 




 For individual faculty, being part of a network of scientists is increasingly seen as 
a legitimate part of their work.  Faculty in the life sciences participate in networks with 
other academics and scientists from biotech firms, with the work organized around 
projects and the structure of the organization defined by the interactions and 
connections among those involved.  The boundaries between formal organizations 
become permeable as persons form relationships, share information, and collaborate on 
projects.  The academics involved come to accept this as a legitimate component of 
doing science (Smith-Doerr, 2005).   
 The traditional sociology of science has, perhaps, an idealized vision of the 
academic scientist.  This notion of science is also bound up with the way innovation has 
been perceived in modern America.  The traditional notion of innovation from 
universities is based on models of linear knowledge flows, with ‘demand pull’ or 
‘technology push’ assumptions.  This model has developed from the vision of Vannevar 
Bush regarding the relationship of science between basic science and technological 
innovation.  Bush realized the commercial value of products created through university 
research (COGR, 2000; Guston & Keniston, 1994), and outlined his idea of academic 
technology transfer in a report entitled Science: The Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945). This 
process of technology transfer was built on a foundation of basic research, which is 
distinguished from applied research.  Basic research is traditionally viewed as making 
problem solving possible as it leads to the development of sound theories (Kodama & 




historically been seen as requiring freedom from external or financial interests 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000a).  
 In the US, the research policy of the federal government following WWII had two 
primary elements.  First, basic science would be supported without regard to practical 
ends.  Thus, the federal government would support research in basic science in a 
decentralized manner, with federal agencies all supporting a proportionate share 
through competitive grants as reinvestment in the basic research which led to the 
technology the agencies needed.  This was a “pipeline model” of science, in which it was 
assumed that the basic research funded would support a private competitive economy 
of firms investing in innovations and applied research that would benefit them 
(Branscomb & Keller, 1998; Bush, 1945; Geiger, 1993; Stokes, 1997).   
 The second element of the federal policy was that the technology created 
through the federal agencies would flow to industry through a “spinoff” process, which 
the government presumed would be automatic and cost-free. In this model, 
government, industry, and academia operate in separate spheres and do not share 
functions or have formal ties.  Universities produce knowledge, disseminate it through 
publication, and transfer of knowledge and innovation is conducted through 
intermediaries (Branscomb & Florida, 1998).    
 Building on the notion that broader societal factors can influence the production 
of knowledge (Kuhn, 1962), new models for the transformation of academic science 
have been offered.  One label for this literature is entrepreneurial, (Slaughter et al., 




markets and find new ways to obtain funding and produce research.  This label is only 
partially correct, however; entrepreneurialism is a term that effectively describes 
organizational responses to an altered research environment, but it does not capture 
the complex reality of the transformations to academic science in a global context.  For 
that, models that address processes for producing knowledge must be considered.  
These perspectives resituate academic science within a global knowledge production 
process, and they can provide guidance for a modern sociology of science with 
associated norms for academic science.  That distinction will be drawn blow.  
Entrepreneurialism 
 Entrepreneurialism is viewed as a managerial response to an altered research 
environment.  Typically, its purpose is to make higher education institutions more 
opportunistic and self-sustaining, causing them to be both fully engaged with and more 
responsible to society (Neave, 2000).  This response is accompanied by new 
managerialism, a strategy applying management theories and techniques from the 
private sector to universities (Deem, 2001; Marginson & Considine, 2000).  To those that 
favor the traditional view of a university, this represents the introduction of a corporate 
culture that will lead to the corruption of higher education (Giroux, 2001; Williams, 
2001).  Regarding academic science, entrepreneurialism does present the opportunity to 
mobilize the university’s intellectual resources to benefit society, but also carries the 
risk that scholarly achievement will be measured only in financial terms, or that 
universities will compromise their independence (H.-D. Meyer, 2002; Soares & Amaral, 




 Proponents assert the entrepreneurial university is a new paradigm which 
complements the traditional mission of research by adding to it the importance of direct 
involvement in commercial development of research and a more proactive stance 
regarding regional development (Smilor, Dietrich, & Gibson, 1993).  Through greater 
engagement, there is the potential for universities to meet the knowledge needs of a 
diverse array of publics.  In this view, the work of the university is not diminished, but 
enriched through greater connections to diverse communities, producing, 
disseminating, and applying knowledge that contributes to the development of 
economies, peoples, and cultures (Walshok, 1995).  
 Although it can take many forms within universities, for the purposes of 
academic science, a concise summary of its forms was provided in a study of life 
scientists (Seashore-Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, & Stoto, 1989).  Five types of academic 
entrepreneurship were defined, presented in order of most to least consistent with 
traditional notions of academic science: 1) large-scale science, describing the reality that 
modern research involves big laboratories, operating multiple projects with large staffs; 
2) supplemental income, inclusive of faculty consulting, extension services, and royalty 
income; 3) industrial support for university research, which, in addition to money, also 
includes large-scale joint ventures and other collaborations; 4) patenting results from 
research, and 5) direct commercial involvement, including formation and management 
of startup firms based on research results.  Individual faculty can be involved in any or 




 Entrepreneurialism has been studied at the university level, with the goal of 
determining effects on the organization of academic units and systems.  In an important 
qualitative analysis, Clark (1998) studied how five universities became entrepreneurial 
and transformed how they organized research in an effort to recapture some of the 
autonomy lost from changing government support.  The state of flux in which 
institutions find themselves is termed the “demand response-imbalance” (p. 129) 
because the demands on universities outpace their capacity to respond.  Importantly, 
greater institutional advancement through innovative practices need not include any 
that are beyond the bounds of academic legitimacy in order to be effective.   
 The entrepreneurial university for Clark (1998) consists of five elements, three of 
which are relevant to the processes of academic science.  The expanded developmental 
periphery comprises new units that reach out to external organizations.  These outreach 
offices can work in technology transfer, industrial contracts, or intellectual property 
development.  They can also be project-oriented research centers that work with one or 
more traditional academic departments to help outside agencies solve practical 
problems in social or economic development.  The diversified funding base allows the 
institution to augment its declining support from national governments through 
competitive research grants, industrial contracts, local governments, and philanthropic 
foundations, as well as licensing and patent income from intellectual property.  This 
allows the institution greater autonomy by increasing its discretionary income, thereby 
ensuring it is not dependent upon any one source.   Finally, the stimulated academic 




institutions and that the key to transformation is having them become innovative 
inasmuch as they are able, helping them find their own ways to generate new income.  
It becomes a blending of new values with old traditions (Clark, 1998).   
 One limitation of Clark’s analysis is that his examples include primarily 
specialized and smaller institutions; in the analysis he notes that specialized institutions 
are better positioned to pursue entrepreneurial responses.  It remains unclear whether 
and how comprehensive institutions can follow the pathways laid down by this research 
(Soares & Amaral, 1999).  Deem (2001) is also critical of Clark for using only campus 
interviews and not engaging in a more layered case examination.  She says this leaves 
some doubt about the claimed success of the university programs because there was no 
independent verification.  However, the most important lesson to be gleaned from 
these case studies is that the universities all fashioned their own response to the 
demands they identified.  Their responses were steeped in their mission and identity of 
their institution, and each institution responded differently.   
 Clark does not discuss processes for academic science specifically; he limits his 
analysis to the organization of and strategic options for research units. Even so, the 
outreach actions described in the case studies regarding these three pathways of 
transformation provide examples of the types of engagement with local and regional 
actors that universities can undertake to expand the reach of their research enterprise.   
 Entrepreneurialism has also been examined as a market-driven phenomenon, 
with the modifications to knowledge production depicted from the perspective of 




employ resource dependency theory (see Bealing & Riordan, 1996; Hackett, 1990)—
which suggests that institutions seek greater social legitimacy in the hope of attracting 
additional resources—to explain emerging incentives that affect university behavior.  
The theory is based on case studies of four nations: the US, UK, Canada, and Australia.  
Their conclusions are based in part, on historical accounts of the higher education 
policies in the four nations, including government expenditures on higher education, 
and policies directed towards science and technology.  The authors conclude that the 
finance policies of block-grant reductions had the effect of inducing competitive 
behavior in institutions by forcing them to seek external funding, forcing institutions and 
faculty to enter a market.  National R&D policies became science and technology 
policies, concerned with technoscience, emphasizing product innovation at the expense 
of basic research (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).   
 Several items remain unsettled about the concept of academic capitalism.  Deem 
(2001), while saying the institutional effects of resource dependency are convincing, is 
less persuaded by the claims that these policies are changing the values of individual 
faculty.  She is critical of Slaughter and Leslie for making long-term policy claims using 
one set of interviews from faculty in only one of their four focus nations—Australia.  
Furthermore, the exclusive reliance on organizational theories such as resource 
dependency and isomorphism obscures other changes that are occurring via 
globalization.  Slaughter & Leslie offer no recognition that processes of scholarship are 




universities are themselves in competition for research monies and knowledge workers 
with other research entities in a regional or global environment (Nowotny et al., 2001).   
 In addition, their analysis that shifts in the global political economy are the result 
of neoliberal policies reveals that they are predisposed to reject theories of changes to 
knowledge production as causal factors.  For example, there is no consideration of 
government as a partner in research—only as an adversary in budget deprivation.  
Finally, their stark criticism of entrepreneurialism focuses on technology transfer, but 
does not consider it as part of a larger regional development strategy in which 
universities participate as a centerpiece of innovation.  And it is overstating reality to 
suggest that universities have become wholly defined by profit maximization, as 
academic capitalism suggests.  Institutions have many other means for connecting with 
regional partners than simply patenting research findings; there are still many functions 
that universities perform which are not related to market activity such as academic 
training, consulting, and service (Smilor et al., 1993; Walshok, 1995). 
Academic Science in the Global Context 
 Although the organizational models in the previous section provide some insight 
into organizational changes, they fail to provide a suitable representation of knowledge 
production in a global knowledge economy.  They remain focused on universities in the 
context of national systems (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002) and consider globalization 
primarily as an economic phenomenon, restructuring state and national finances away 
from social programs and education.  Importantly, they do not attend to the process of 




contexts for knowledge production.  The process models presented below are the best 
starting blocks for building a framework to represent the complete reality of university 
research in a global context.   
 Basic Science & Technological Innovation. One attempt to move the debate 
beyond the pipeline model or the clash between basic and applied research is Donald 
Stokes’ (1997) theory on the relationship between basic science and technological 
innovation.  Stokes contends that much of our modern science is based on a model 
concerned with both fundamental understanding and considerations for use, for which 
he uses Pasteur as one, but not the only example.  Areas of science that bridge these 
purposes include microbiology and its study of disease, earth sciences and the quest to 
predict earthquakes, and economics and the goal of eliminating poverty.  Scientists in 
these areas are invested in pure discovery of knowledge—not in spite of application—
but because they are interested in some aspect of the natural world.   
 As an alternative to the linear model of science and development, Stokes (1997) 
asserts that fundamental scientific understanding and technological application will 
proceed as two loosely-coupled trajectories.  This is because each can be advanced 
without intersecting the other, and that advancements in scientific knowledge or 
technical capacity can emerge as the trajectories influence one another. Thus, use-
inspired basic research leads to technological innovation, with the reverse also true.  
 Triple-Helix Model.  Another theory that attempts to explain the changes to 
science focuses on intersecting spheres of influence.   It asserts that the public, private, 




industry-government alliances and other innovation partnerships to create intellectual 
property, and that the once-separate functions are now being shared by the others.  
Coordination of these complex activities requires a better technology policy, with input 
from the state as well as academics and industry leaders to create solutions for national 
or multinational innovation policies for the 21st century (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; 
Etzkowitz, Webster, & Healey, 1998a).   
 This model also critiques the linear, traditional model of innovation as having 
zero-sum-game assumptions that view transfer functions as detracting from the 
missions of the institutions to only produce basic knowledge.  By contrast, the triple 
helix model recognizes overlaps between the institutional spheres; e.g., the securing of 
intellectual property by universities, while businesses identify research problems and 
disseminate knowledge.  Rather than the “endless frontier” of basic research as its own 
end, innovation now occurs through an “endless transition” model linking science and 
utilization (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000b).  The flows of knowledge in these trilateral 
arrangements are not linear, but are suggested as spiral in nature, with reverse flows 
from industry to academia, with government serving as a strategic partner for both.  As 
governments look to formulate local and regional development strategies, they look to 
the resources of academia and the potential of alliances with industry to stimulate 
wealth creation (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkowitz et al., 1998b).    
 The triple helix model is grounded in the capitalization of knowledge which, on 
an individual level, is similar to Slaughter & Leslie’s (1997) notion of academic 




model also has a societal level regarding the development of innovation policy and the 
utilization of these resources to stimulate growth and research.  There is a recursive 
property to the model, in that the outcomes will be mutually reinforcing: universities 
spin off technology that produces revenues for firms, while the income universities 
receive helps support the research enterprise.  The system ideally provides more 
support for basic research through the revenue generated (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 
1997; Etzkowitz et al., 1998b).   
 This last conclusion is regarded as an unfounded assumption by Slaughter & 
Rhoades (1996) who, based on their examination of political coalitions for support of 
research funding, fail to see these benefits.  They see increased industry ties and 
government partnerships as undermining academic labor and university values, and 
they express hope that a social movement will someday counter, destabilize, or reshape 
the current technoscience regime.    
 The crafters of the triple helix theory rebut claims that the model steers 
universities away from the public interest and towards that of the market and industry.  
The involvement of government with industry and academia produces a “quasi-public 
sphere” (p. 150) situated between government and private interests to replace the 
public sphere that is shrinking in terms of direct support for universities.  This helps 
correct for the corporatism that critics see emerging from industry alliances by making 
alliances more democratic as the government is involved to correct the market—




receive attention under the prior model with separate spheres of influence (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 1997).   
 Mode-2 Science.  A third theoretical area—Mode-2 Science—concerns not 
just modifications of scientific processes but the transformations to knowledge 
production as a whole.  The critical element for understanding Mode 1 v. Mode 2 
knowledge is the concept of a socially distributed system of knowledge production.  In 
this theory, globalization is drawing universities into a new system of knowledge 
production in which they will play a role very different than their traditional one.  The 
development of this system has a supply element and a demand element (Gibbons, 
1998).   
 On the supply side, the massification of higher education has created increasing 
numbers of educated people familiar with science and the methods for research—an 
international phenomenon that will not likely be reversed.  Many of these people are 
themselves equipped with specialized knowledge and skills in the research and science 
professions, and are actively engaged in research-based activities, bringing their 
intellectual resources to bear on a wide-ranging spectrum of problems that are unlike 
the ones they encountered in their university training.  The massification and 
internationalization of higher education means that there is an increasing number of 
places where research is performed, with a growing portion of it taking place outside of 
universities, in government labs, independent think-tanks, etc.  The irony of this for 
universities is that as higher education continues to educate people, it undermines its 




 Regarding the demand side, the need for firms to acquire specialized knowledge 
for the identification and solution of problems has led to the rise of the network firm 
with flexible and adaptive structures, and the proliferation of alliances, partnerships, 
and collaborations with universities.  Specialized knowledge is viewed as a continuously 
replenishable resource, unlike labor or capital, but is difficult for firms to capture in-
house.  The competitive pressure for these firms to innovate creates the continual 
demand for knowledge (Gibbons, 1998; Gibbons et al., 1994).   
 The ongoing expansion of knowledge producers on the supply side and the 
continual demand for specialized knowledge on the demand side creates a socially 
distributed system of knowledge production.  This distribution is assisted by global 
communications, helping to foster interconnectedness among a growing number of 
sites of knowledge creation.  This makes distributed knowledge production both cause 
and consumer of innovations that enable global information transmission (Gibbons, 
1998; Gibbons et al., 1994).   
 In Mode 1 knowledge production—typically associated with conventional 
academic models of discipline-based research—problems are identified and solved 
according to the norms, values, and methods of the academic community.  The process 
of knowledge production is primarily discipline-based, in terms of organizational 
structures and the frameworks utilized.  Also, there are limited options for quality 
control, usually occurring through peer review.  In Mode 1, the university is viewed as 
the primary, if not only, producer of knowledge, and academic careers are the only 




of the lone investigator persist, no matter how far removed they may be from the 
reality of modern research (Gibbons et al., 1994; Jacob, 2000).   
 In Mode 2, knowledge is said to be produced in the context of application.  This 
means that the knowledge is intended to be useful to someone and that those people 
are involved in negotiations regarding the research from the beginning.  Application, in 
this sense, means more than commercial product development and taking innovations 
to the market place.  It is about solving practical social, scientific, environmental, and 
political problems.  Thus, involvement could include conducting a project according to 
specifications of the user, or it could mean having the users, beneficiaries, and 
stakeholders integrated into the project (Gibbons et al., 1994; Jacob, 2000).   
 A more controversial aspect of Mode 2 science is transdisciplinarity.  Gibbons et 
al. contend that inquiry in Mode 2 is not performed according to the norms of any one 
discipline, but that it emerges out of the application and the disciplinary perspectives of 
those involved and thus may not resemble any one or a combination of disciplinary 
norms.  Also, this process is dynamic, so theoretical structures and research methods 
used in one application may or may not be used again (Gibbons et al., 1994).  The extent 
to which uniquely novel methods and norms are created vs. adapted from existing ones 
is called into question by Jacob (2000).  Also, in Mode 2, quality control can come from 
peer review, but also comes from social acceptability, cost effectiveness, and market 
competitiveness.  Finally, Mode 2 recognizes that universities no longer have a 




are important sources of knowledge.  It is these networks that come together to create 
research teams that solve problems, not institutions.   
 Mode 2 Science is not without criticism and has proved difficult to study 
empirically.   Delanty (2001) does not view Mode 2 as making science more socially 
accountable because of the intrusion of the market into research that it allows.  Rather 
than blurring boundaries between disciplines, it could be seen as blurring the 
boundaries between science and industry.  He also feels that the notion of Mode 1 
science presents a view of the university that is too simplistic and too stereotypical.  On 
this last account he is probably correct, but since the concept of Mode 1 and 2 science is 
a thought experiment more than it is an empirically-grounded model, its value lies in 
what it tells us about emergent processes for research rather than current ones.   
 Following up on their concepts of Mode 1 and Mode 2 science, Nowotny et al. 
(2001) address the concept of social accountability.  They argue that the new mode of 
knowledge production does not mean that science will proceed in a predetermined 
manner or that its methods will be uniform.  They contend that science is becoming 
contextualized as it is more integrated in society.  This linkage is characterized by the 
development of complexity and uncertainty in society—what they term “Mode 2 
society” (p. 11, 245).  In this society, there are not only more participants but greater 
opportunities and means for communication between them.  This breaking down of 
boundaries produces knowledge that is more socially robust.  Rather than being 
completely internally-directed by academics, industry, or government, the engagement 




the research process.  The continuous dialogue between participants allows for more 
openness in identifying problems, conducting research, and assuring quality.   
Summary 
 In concluding their study on changing and permeable faculty boundaries in 
research,  Slaughter, Archerd, & Campbell (2004) state “The status and prestige system 
that sustained the Merton/Bush model depended to some degree on the relative 
organizational autonomy of universities and science” (p. 162).  An updated 
understanding of academic science highlights several important ways this situation has 
changed.  Matters of causality are in dispute, with government resource restrictions and 
emphasis on intellectual property often cited, as is the globalization of scholarship and 
the potential for collaborations.  However, the idea of socially distributed knowledge is 
critical and not sufficiently discussed in higher education circles; universities are no 
longer the only source of knowledge creation, and more aspects of society have 
demands for knowledge that has uses for problem solving and practical applications.   
 In this environment, many organizations are involved with academia in 
knowledge production, and universities forge relationships with governments, industry, 
and other seekers and users of knowledge.  Actors, including faculty, become part of the 
social relations of knowledge production and thus, while boundaries of the past become 
less fixed, faculty acquire some degree of social agency to create new ways of 
conducting research.  Concurrently, partners in that research have specific needs and 
uses for knowledge, and thus forge mutually beneficial relationships. Each can 




construction of new modes of academic science is not fully understood; what we see in 
the meantime are the effects that this transition is having on the traditional work of 
faculty.   
Effects on University Faculty 
General Effects on Values 
 The contention that involvement in commercialization will compromise 
universities is grounded in a discussion of the two distinct cultures present within 
academia and industry (Bok, 2003; Rosenstone, 2001; Washburn, 2005).  Industrial and 
academic research has fundamentally different goals.  Industry seeks to convert new 
technologies and research results into some form of economic advantage over rivals.  
There are disincentives to sharing this knowledge before it is developed, thus the need 
for secrecy and patenting innovations.  In the view of academic science, secrecy and 
withholding knowledge are contrary to the mission of disseminating knowledge.  Faculty 
seek recognition through publication, and universities reward faculty with tenure and 
promotion for their scholarship (Geiger, 2004).  To use the language of Merton, research 
in industry violates the norms of communality and disinterestedness at a minimum.    
 As this study focuses on faculty, the effects of commercial involvement at the 
university level and by individual faculty require attention.  A focus on the micro level of 
individual departments and faculty is particularly important (Laukkanen, 2003; 
Tuunainen, 2006), especially since the stresses and pressures created by the 




findings are mixed on specifics such as faculty beliefs and altered research agendas.  A 
common thread identified (Slaughter et al., 2004) in many empirical studies is that the 
effects of commercialization are concentrated in a few disciplines, and alters values to 
only a modest degree.  For example, a recent review of the literature indicated that the 
effects of industrial collaborations are felt primarily by the involved faculty (Anderson, 
2001).  Seeking to dispel some prevailing myths about the subjugation of academic 
values to corporate ones in her literature analysis of university-industry relations, 
Anderson finds that industry partnerships are still largely concentrated in the sciences, 
and even then within particular departments or laboratories in some universities.  
Faculty outside those areas do not have a true picture of the benefits and costs of such 
ties.   
 Such findings are supported by other empirical research.  A study of faculty in 
the sciences in North Carolina found that entrepreneurial activities were undertaken by 
small percentages of faculty, and that most faculty did not anticipate altering their 
relationship with their institution.  The study attributed this finding to the differences in 
work values present in academia vs. commerce (Bird & Allen, 1989). Other research of 
life sciences faculty suggests that they are entrepreneurial at a modest pace, and that a 
small minority is actively engaged in this activity, but that no evidence indicates that 
such scholars are taking over academia (Seashore-Louis et al., 1989). More recent 
studies have also confirmed that faculty participating in collaborations have different 




more willing to tolerate ambiguity and negotiate potential conflicts of interest 
(Campbell, 1997; Campbell & Slaughter, 1999).   
 Additional support of this conclusion comes from Ylijoki (2003) in her results 
from a case study of three academic units in three universities in Finland.  Based solely 
on interviews, the study reveals that striking a balance between academic capitalism 
and traditional research is a reality in all departments, but that this balance takes 
differing forms depending on how close a department is to the market.  However, the 
author found no evidence to conclude that academic capitalism was displacing the 
traditional values and activities of the departments.  Faculty, it seems, are very resilient 
in the face of a changing academic funding and labor process.   
 One explanation for this could be the effect that increased university ties with 
industry has had on reshaping academic career paths.  The plethora of research centers 
that collaborate with industry that have sprung up since 1980 have made moving 
between academia and industry more commonplace (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005).  A study 
of the CVs of faculty in research centers with industrial ties found that nearly one in six 
jobs and nearly one in eight of their total career years had been spent in industry.  
Moreover, 20 percent took their first academic job five or more years into their career, 
belying the notion that beginning in industry forecloses academic career options. There 
are patterns quite different from the academics of even a decade ago.  Particularly for 
faculty associated with university research centers, there is a greater likelihood that 




creation of research centers with industry ties by governments since the 1980s has 
allowed faculty to have careers in each arena.   
 Evidence exists for differentiation in the way faculty approach commercial 
activity.  Meyer (2003) distinguishes between entrepreneurial academics and academic 
entrepreneurs.  The former may not necessarily be interested in working with a spin-off 
company full-time in the pursuit of growth and market share, as they typically may be 
more interested in science questions rather than business issues.  The latter is 
interested in business formation, including networking, developing leadership, and 
securing funding from non-research sources.  
 Proponents of academic capitalism identify institutional changes at the level of 
faculty labor, and in their research activities, in particular.  Academic capitalism is the 
engagement in market (for-profit) and market-like (competition for external funds) 
activity on the part of institutions and faculty to secure external funding.  In this view, 
the need for private innovation has altered faculty research, pushing it towards the 
market, while the reduction of resources from the state has forced institutions to 
restructure their organizations and seek money in other forms, especially for research.  
What a university has that facilitates resource generation is the knowledge possessed by 
its faculty.  Institutions and faculty increase revenues by competing for funds in 
sponsored research, thereby engaging in academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
One study of the alterations to faculty careers attempted to theorize how faculty 
balance tensions between academic and commercial roles  (Owen-Smith & Powell, 




sciences faculty, the authors examine the effects the transformations in academic 
science are having on faculty careers.  Their solution is based on the idea that it would 
be impossible to capture the complex array of positions that faculty occupy in a simple 
dichotomy—thus, they propose a four-category typology inclusive of hybrid types that 
share properties of the main types.   
The typology, shown in Figure 1 below, is based on comparisons along two 
dimensions: 1) whether the commercialization of research threatens or complements 
the academy and 2) whether academic and commercial science overlap or constitute 
distinct realms.  The resulting four positions represent two main positions, and two 
hybrid positions.  
 The positions on the main diagonal represent the primary dichotomy as 
discussed in the debate over the changing nature of academic science.  The “Old School 
(OS)” is characterized by beliefs that academic and commercial science are distinct areas 
and that the latter threatens the academic ideal of research.  This traditional viewpoint 
can be characterized by Merton’s ([1942] 1973) norms of science: 1) Universalism, 2) 
Communality, 3) Disinteredness, and 4) Organized skepticism.  Such faculty do not 






Figure 1: Typology of Faculty Positions 
Note: Adapted from Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001. 
 Opposing that viewpoint is the “New School (NS)”, which accepts the 
convergence of academic and commercial science and views them as complementary 
processes.  For these faculty, both types of research are seen as interdependent as each 
leads to success in the other.  Successful science requires collaborations across 
academic and industrial locations and resources, with a focus on discovery of 
innovations that solve real-world problems. Such faculty would have multiple patents, 
would be involved in translational research for start-up firms based on that technology, 
and could serve as technical adviser to such firms, all while retaining their university 




the values associated with the transformed nature of science put forth in the triple-helix 
and Mode 2 theories of science (Etzkowitz et al., 1998b; Gibbons, 1995).   
 The off-diagonal represents two hybrid positions that share elements of both the 
new school and old school types.  Because these positions straddle the conflict between 
the extremes, faculty experience tension in trying to resolve challenges and develop 
responses to issues that arise.  Their negotiations between the two worlds depend on 
situational and individual logics.  Those labeled “Reluctant Entrepreneurs (RE)” believe 
that commercialized science threatens the traditional notion of the academy, while also 
recognizing the overlap between the two realms of science. They adopt a pragmatic 
view that their best defense against the encroachment of commercial interests on the 
university and their research is to patent their findings through their universities.  Still, 
the idea of generating spin-off companies from these patents seems inconsistent with 
their duties.  Entrepreneurialism is viewed simply as a means through which their 
autonomy and the traditional norms of the academy can be preserved (Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2001).  
 The other hybrid position “Engaged Traditionalist (ET)” holds that academia and 
commercial science are distinct realms, but the two types of ventures can be pursued by 
the same individual without danger of threat to the academy.  These faculty believe 
their personal commitment to the traditional values of academia will enable them to 
pursue commercial ventures (and incentives) without compromise.  They can be seen as 
successful academics that also disclose inventions, hold patents, and consult with 




 This typology proposes values associated with each type in terms of what the 
faculty so-labeled believe to be true or acceptable in the practice of academic science or 
university research generally.  However, the typology has not been tested and the type 
constructs have not been applied to real populations of faculty to determine how robust 
the theory is.  For that reason, this study adapts the typology and operationalizes the 
constructs in a manner that allows for testing of them as a classification scheme.  
Influence on Research Agendas 
 Empirical studies of faculty concerning the potential for commercial 
opportunities to influence their status as scientific investigators is not plentiful, but 
there has been some research in this area.  The locus of control over faculty research 
was the focus of an extensive literature review analyzing changes in the university-
environment relationship (Anderson & Seashore-Louis, 1991).  The authors outline a 
trend away from self-regulation by faculty towards influence by many groups, caused by 
the shifts towards large-scale science, faculty consulting, the growth of industrial 
research, and increased regulation by the federal and state governments of research 
activity. Rather than having unlimited freedom to direct their own research programs, 
individual faculty are subject to a set of influences from groups external to the 
university.  The broader research community now includes disciplinary and professional 
associations, which set standards for accepted practice, as well as scientific advisory 
boards, that may have the ironic effect of constraining individual academic freedom by 




 Governments influence the locus of control through the decisions of funding 
agencies to awards grant monies, and legislative or administrative initiatives to either 
direct funding towards certain areas, restrict communication between scientists, or limit 
who can receive funding.  Industry has influence because of the access it provides to 
research funding, but value discrepancies with academia can cause problems for faculty.  
Finally, interest groups and other organized constituencies seek to influence research 
agendas through pressure on policy groups, universities, and occasionally, individual 
scientists.  In the end, the many ways these external bodies influence research has 
made the relationships between faculty and institutions and between universities and 
the public so complex that the traditional norms for faculty autonomy and self-
regulation are rendered less applicable (Anderson & Seashore-Louis, 1991).   
 Certainly, faculty have long been aware that they do not have unfettered 
autonomy to select research topics.  A study of faculty in three science disciplines nearly 
three decades ago found high percentages of respondents indicating the principle of 
autonomy no longer applied to problem selection (Fishman, 1978).  Considerations like 
disciplinary boundaries and peer evaluation were cited by 70 % of faculty as limiting 
factors, while the top three sources of limitations were reported as military institutions, 
government agencies, and corporate sponsors.   
 A qualitative study of faculty at seven community colleges found that faculty 
perceived their administrations and state governments to be pushing the colleges 
towards economic and business-oriented goals to gain favor with industry.  These 




conflict with those of the institution (Levin, 2006).  Participants in another study 
indicated that their “research topics are selected to meet the preferences and needs of 
external financiers” (Ylijoki, 2005, p. 564), but since it was a qualitative study focused on 
personal and collective narratives, there was no additional details provided about any 
particular instances of external influence over topic selection. 
 The claim that industry sponsorship undermines academic freedom was not 
supported in a study of graduate students from engineering departments at six US 
universities.  Students rated the relative influence of different actors (themselves, 
faculty advisor, other committee members, and the research sponsor) in three areas of 
their research experience (direction/emphasis of the research, methods, and 
interpretation of results.  Across all three aspects of their research, students indicated 
they themselves had the most influence, followed by faculty and committee members, 
with sponsors generally having the least influence.  The only significant differences were 
between students with university sponsorship and those with industry sponsorship on 
one item: those sponsored by university funds reported less influence from their 
sponsor (Behrens & Gray, 2001). 
 Blumenthal et al (1996) performed a comparison of respondents from two 
surveys conducted 10 years apart of faculty in non-clinical life science disciplines (see 
Blumenthal, Gluck, Seashore-Louis, Stoto, & Wise, 1986) to determine the effect of 
industry funding on topic choice.  The populations were similar with respect to the 
issue.  In 1985, 30% of those with such support and 7% of those without indicated that 




commercial applications.  In the 1995 sample, these values were 30% and 14%, 
respectively.  
 A small-scale qualitative study in Finland yielded mixed results on the tensions 
faculty perceived from university-based commercial involvement.  While the faculty 
were aware of the potential for challenges to scientific neutrality, the subjects views 
differed as to whether the research format was always structured by the sponsor versus 
having some degrees of freedom to study questions of interest to the academic unit.  
Although the faculty in this study did not indicate outright opposition to corporate 
partnerships, they did object to a mixing of roles in which academic and private goals 
were integrated (Laukkanen, 2003).     
 The difference between being bought by industry or selling to industry may 
depend on how dependent each individual faculty member is on industry funding for 
the continuation of their research. In a study of clinical and non-clinical faculty, clinical 
faculty, who most often engage in research having commercial potential at the later 
stages of entrepreneurial activity—such as the development of product, devices, or 
procedures through trials—were more likely than non-clinical faculty to indicate that 
their choice of topics was affected by the commercial potential of the results.  The 
distinction between the types of research these faculty conduct may mean that clinical 
faculty can be co-opted by industry while non-clinical faculty could be persuaded to sell 
their ideas to move them closer to commercialization (Seashore-Louis, Jones, Anderson, 




 At the departmental level in universities, academics try to balance their 
university activities with private commercial development, as their work entails 
theoretical, experimental, and applied components.  Still, faculty achieve this balance 
within the current university structure, making it more permanent than either 
advocates for change or traditionalists would have us believe (Tuunainen, 2006).  
Renault (2006) based the first proposition in her study on the notion that even within 
the norms and informal rules of the university, faculty have choices over whether or not 
to collaborate with industry, how to evaluate funding opportunities, and whether or not 
to publish results.  
Common Issues  
 There are several issues that recur in the debate concerning academic and 
commercial science which are important because they cut across much of the literature 
and address topics of concern.  These issues are 1) the debate concerning basic and 
applied research, 2) sources of funding and the effects of government/public agency 
grants vs. private contracts with industry; 3) Publishing and patenting, including 
restrictions on publication and matters of intellectual property; 4) Conflicts of interest or 
commitment; and 5) Criteria for success and what methods are generally accepted to 
indicate quality science and success as a researcher.  
Basic v. Applied Science 
 The notion of “pure science” is long-established among academics.  In an address 




Henry Rowland (1883) called for the concentration of science resources in only the most 
prestigious universities in the country, while insisting that any work concerned with 
application or invention had no place in the realm of pure science.  Writers in the middle 
of the previous century also discussed this prevailing sentiment regarding basic or pure 
science; society was criticized for valuing “inventors”—as applied scientists were 
labeled—more than scientists (Conant, 1952).   
 Research in the sciences has surveyed firms about collaboration and the 
potential problems for universities (Blumenthal, Gluck, Seashore-Louis, & Wise, 1986), 
and used qualitative techniques to conclude that the boundaries between university 
and industry—or  even between basic and applied research—are being redrawn by the 
faculty involved in this work (Slaughter et al., 2004).  Faculty in that study discussed how 
the traditional distinctions are no longer as relevant; what is more important now was 
that the topic is interesting, and there is a greater understanding that basic research 
could be recast as applied or entrepreneurial, which is also attractive.  The wall between 
basic and applied research is being torn down.  
 A recent qualitative study examined the cultural narratives senior researchers in 
three academic departments associated with academia in light of macro-level changes 
in higher education in Finland.  Subjects expressed ‘academic nostalgia” in the view of 
the author, manifested as a collective yearning for academic freedom and autonomy.  
For instance, those faculty in a high-tech department expressed loss regarding an 
unspecified earlier time that allowed them to conduct more basic research and have 




setting discussed how they were formerly able to combine personal academic pursuits 
with those of their financiers, which the schedules and requirements of externally-
funded research now prohibit.  The author concludes this collective nostalgia is 
evocative of core values in conflict with a more diversified type of academic work that 
requires new skills such as management and networking, thus causing researchers to 
experience an identity crisis (Ylijoki, 2005).   
Funding 
 The issue of research funding presents problems for academic science.  Almost a 
half-century ago, Barzun (1959 [2002]) decried the involvement of philanthropic 
organizations seeking to donate money to universities.  The problem, he contends, is 
the funds are encumbered for specific projects as identified by the giver, and are not 
provided to the institution.  The outcome of this is that universities tend to value the 
attraction of money for projects, and the science produced may be of value only to the 
foundations providing the funds, and not society as a whole.  Moreover, this causes a 
drive toward homogeneity of research, as “projectism” tends to demand research that is 
“in line with current programs” and “widely acceptable” (p. 189).   
 Funding agencies were cited by over 90 % of the faculty in Fishman’s (1978) 
study as a source of limitation on faculty autonomy regarding selection of research 
problems.  Having external reviewers and boards evaluate the importance of one’s work 
for financial support reflects the reality of increased competition and the high cost of 
conducting science.  Still, these faculty accepted it as part of the environment.  Indeed, 




universities.  While the funds are needed to support many essential activities, the 
acceptance of them for specific purposes like economic development may threaten 
academic integrity and scientific norms (Geiger, 2004; Stein, 2004).  Part of this concern 
stems from what type of research is done by faculty getting funding from different 
sources.  Faculty who have spent substantial percentages of their career in industry 
secure more funding from industry and have greater rates of patent activity than those 
who have not, and more commercial activity overall, although their publishing activity is 
less (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005; Gluck, Blumenthal, & Stoto, 1987).   
 One of the few studies to use survey data presents mixed findings.  Highlighting 
perhaps the blending of basic and applied research, a recent study in Norway found 
significant relationships between faculty stating they received industry funding and 
claims that their work was applied.  However, faculty with industry funding also claimed 
to a greater extent that their contract research brought them new and interesting 
research topics and were less concerned about threats to autonomy than faculty with 
no external or industry funding.  The authors also concluded there were no significant 
associations between commercial outputs like patenting or spin offs and academic 
publishing (Gulbrandsen & Semby, 2005).   
 Formerly, the type of funding obtained was indicative of the type of research 
being conducted, with a definite hierarchy in place; the collapsing boundaries of 
academic science may also be placing this hierarchy in doubt. Faculty involved in 
entrepreneurial science recognize that the distinctions between government grant 




becoming less clear.  The notion of “grantsmanship” has come to mean supporting the 
research, regardless of whether that is with government agency funds, corporate 
contracts, or other monies.  Faculty can gladly accept industry funds if an 
entrepreneurial approach to their topic affords them the opportunity to advance 
interesting research.   
Patenting/Publishing 
  Many of the debates regarding this issue center on the effects of the value 
differences between industry and academia discussed earlier.  Discussions of shifting 
boundaries and ethical dilemmas involving restrictions on publication are common, and 
while faculty are moving away from traditional positions concerning issues of secrecy, 
access, and intellectual property, the difficulties suggest that faculty still have concerns 
to address (Slaughter et al., 2004).   
 Typically, the turning point in industry relations is the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the 
long-term effects of which are in dispute.  Recent examinations of American universities 
patenting and licensing activity since the Bayh-Dole Act concluded that little evidence 
exits of any significant shifts away from fundamental research toward that which might 
be more easily patentable (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2004).  Moreover, the 
fact that the activity has been concentrated in a few disciplines means that any effect 
would be narrow in scope.   
 However, other recent work (Washburn, 2005) documents specific problems 
that have occurred at many universities, particularly in the fields of medicine and 




evidence of how academic science leads to innovations, and that universities are 
actually inhibiting science by applying for overly-broad patents that protect not just 
inventions but entire scientific processes, datasets, and fields of inquiry.  She 
recommends revision of the Act and greater federal oversight and regulation of 
patenting.   
 In a survey of 2052 clinical and non-clinical life science faculty, Blumenthal et al 
found that those faculty with industry support had more recent publications, were more 
involved in administrative/service activities in their departments, and were more 
commercially active.  However, the amount of industry funding faculty received was a 
critical factor.  Those with more than two-thirds of their support from industry had 
lower numbers of publications, less service activity, and less publication influence than 
those with moderate or low levels of industry funding (Blumenthal, Campbell, Causino, 
& Seashore-Louis, 1996).  Entrepreneurial activity has a positive influence on publishing, 
but does not appear to affect teaching or service (Seashore-Louis et al., 2001). 
 Still, faculty substantially involved in sponsored research activity with industry 
have been shown not to profess goals for their academic careers different from 
colleagues that are not so engaged (Allen & Norling, 1991).  Items such as publishing, 
advancing pure knowledge, and problem solving were similarly ranked as most relevant 
across faculty types, while items such as establishing a firm, increasing personal income, 
and applying knowledge for social benefit were consistently ranked as irrelevant to their 




 Evidence from a study in Belgium (Van Looy, Ranga, Callaert, Debackere, & 
Zimmermann, 2003) suggests that entrepreneurial activity and scientific performance in 
academia do not hinder one another.  Although this was a study at one university, it 
does sample faculty in 14 departments across the disciplinary spectrum.  The authors 
found that faculty engaged in contract research did not publish at any significantly 
different levels from those not conducting such research.  Furthermore, faculty 
conducting contract work did have more publications concerning applied technology, 
but did not have significantly fewer publications of a basic science nature. Thus, their 
increase in applied publications does not come at the expense of basic science 
publications.  Also, as the total number of publications is higher overall for those faculty 
in contract research, there is a compounded Matthew effect.   
Conflicts of Interest/Commitment 
 Regarding potential conflicts of interest and commitment, the financial ties 
faculty have with sponsors of their research are certainly of much scholarly interest.  
Washburn (2005) concludes that there are too many cases of faculty having stakes in 
their own companies or those companies providing them with funding to let the 
practice continue.  Certainly, this can place faculty in multiple roles simultaneously, 
forcing them to create new strategies to juggle their responsibilities and obligations 
(Slaughter et al., 2004). 
 The policy incentives offered by universities can influence the decisions of faculty 
to disclose inventions and pursue patents.  In some cases, review of financial ties 




2000).  However, some research indicates that individual beliefs are still the most 
important factor.  Conflicts of interest and commitment inhibit faculty from engaging in 
more entrepreneurial activity, but university tenure and promotion policies that fail to 
give sufficient consideration to disclosures and spin-off formation produce greater 
restrictions.  In a mixed-methods study of faculty across university types, age, and 
disciplines, Renault (2006) found that individual beliefs about the role of universities 
partnering with industry to commercialize technology were the single largest predictor 
of their actual behavior in collaborating with industry, patenting findings, and 
establishing a spinoff company. Personal beliefs were more important than university 
policies regarding technology transfer such as revenue sharing, or demographics such as 
the age of the faculty member.  Moreover, although the beliefs were self-reported, 
subjects claimed that their personal beliefs were consistent over the course of their 
career, having been formed in graduate school.   
 Allen and Norling (1991) conducted a survey of 398 faculty from forty four-year 
institutions in Pennsylvania.  Their goal was to determine whether faculty involvement 
with industry compromised institutional priorities, teaching and service, or created a 
desire for faculty to leave their institution. Their study found little difference in 
involvement in important campus activities such as teaching and service between 
faculty types. Even faculty who were “supercommercial”—that is, involved in client-
based research, consulting, and start-ups—tended to devote similar amounts of time to 




 Asserting that academics who engage in industry opportunities such as 
entrepreneurship and spin off companies do so in search of profits is too simplistic.  
Returning to Meyer’s (2003) contention that there is a difference between 
entrepreneurial academics and academic entrepreneurs, the former are not classic 
entrepreneurs and thus are not typically growth-oriented or focused primarily on the 
business side of their venture.  Two of four cases studied in the US and Europe exhibited 
this slow-growth, research-based orientation by surviving primarily on public research 
grants in business incubators while their founders continued to work in universities.  The 
spin offs also failed to accomplish necessary business tasks like creating a board, 
accessing business development funds, or establishing networks of business partners.  
There are thus academics who form spin offs with the primary motive of utilizing results 
to raise funds for continued research (M. Meyer, 2003).   
 A survey of graduate students and post-doctoral fellows (Gluck, et al) revealed 
that participants believed benefits from industry support outweighed potential 
problems, but evidence of noteworthy risks was found.  Direct industry support was 
associated with fewer publications, constraints on discussing research results, as well as 
expectations of service to a sponsors’ industry as a condition for funding (Gluck et al., 
1987).   
Criteria for Success 
 This item is included primarily because of the discussion in the entrepreneurial 
science literature about the changing criteria for evaluating what counts as good 




discipline conducted according to the accepted paradigms, theories, practices, and 
methods used in a given specialization (Ziman, 1996).  In addition to peer review, 
models like Mode 2 science introduce the concept of social accountability, in which the 
science is also evaluated for its effectiveness, competitiveness, and social acceptability.  
Since the research is conducted by or in affiliation to a network of social actors involved 
in identification of problems, setting of research priorities, and interpretation and 
diffusion of results, quality control is also conducted according to criteria important to 
these groups (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001).   
Summary 
 The challenges presented to faculty by the transformation of academic science 
underscore the shortcomings of the traditional normative structure of science.  
Whereas before, as shown in this study, the norms were violated, ignored, or even 
challenged, the new organizational realities of academic science are making them less 
and less relevant to the daily work of faculty, even as an ideal.  The effects described 
above outline the transitional nature of the current practice of academic science, and 
how faculty are having to invent innovative ways of doing their work, as they seek to 
straddle areas previously thought to be incompatible.  The creation of new strategies for 
practice despite organizational inertia of tradition leads to a consideration of how 
change can occur in the face of such substantial resistance.  The following section begins 





 The contention within the higher education literature that academic science is 
being pulled in a direction that is challenging to—or even inconsistent with—what 
academic research scientists should be doing seems based on the premise that the 
traditional model of research (basic v. applied, linear dissemination of innovation) is an 
ideal not to be challenged.  While there is some historical debate regarding the original 
nature of university research (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000a; Newfield, 2003), the 
conventional model is firmly entrenched as the baseline (Benner & Sandstrom, 2000; 
Bok, 2003; Buchbinder, 1993; Shils, 1997b).  Part of the analysis required is to determine 
whether faculty values and research practices are consistent with the traditional model 
or whether they indicate divergence.  Evidence of divergence could indicate the 
existence of different institutional logics concerning academic science.  This requires a 
brief review of institutionalism, in particular how the theory explains deviations from 
established patterns of activity.  
Intellectual Foundations 
 A classic problem in sociological inquiry is the emergence of social order, or the 
question of why society is generally structured, predictable, and exhibits shared 
patterns of behavior.  Social order is generally viewed as a stable system of social 
structures and practices which are shared by society and define norms for behavior 
(Hechter & Horne, 2003).  Institutions, as understood in social science, emerge from this 




ordered (J. H. Turner, 1997).  Institutionalism is a concept studied across the social 
sciences (W. R. Scott, 2001), particularly of late in economics, political science and 
sociology (Hall & Taylor, 1996).   
 The concept of institutions in social science is a qualitatively different construct 
than the common use of “institution,” as being synonymous with organization”(Selznick, 
1996).  Whereas that term refers to real, formal organizations such as businesses, 
groups, and schools, the study of institutions in the social sciences is concerned with the 
abstract nature of social order.  Organizations are collective entities having an internal 
structure, but can also be subject to institutional constraint or an institutional 
framework that governs the interactions of those comprising the organization (Knight, 
1992).  Institutionalization is the process whereby social practices become sufficiently 
regular and continuous to be considered as institutions (Eisenstadt, 1968a, 1968b).   
 Theorizing and research on institutions has a long intellectual history with 
foundations in many lines of scholarship (Koelbe, 1995; W. R. Scott, 2001).  The tradition 
as developed in sociology is of most interest for this research, as it deals with the norms 
and values embedded in social structures.  Explanations for the perpetuation and 
stability of institutions are rooted in classical accounts of the social order.  Social 
philosophers such as Comte, Spencer, and Rosseau asserted that social phenomena 
must be studied as givens, with external, observable properties similar to natural 
phenomena (Giddens, 1972; Knight, 1992).  Building on this, Durkheim (1895) believed 
that analysis of the social order could not begin with studies of individual actors, but 




building blocks of society that become manifested in social forces which persist beyond 
and across individuals because of their obligatory and coercive properties (Giddens, 
1972; Nee, 1998).  These properties are observable due to sanctions imposed upon 
individuals for violating social facts, such as moral obligations.   
 Another important foundation of social institutions is the concept of legitimacy 
established by Weber.  Social order is possible, in the theoretical tradition of Hobbes, 
because individuals agree to transfer certain rights and liberties to the state in return for 
guarantees of safety and protection.  Weber was concerned with how a state could 
maintain order since it could not be done with only policies (Hechter, Friedman, & 
Kanazawa, 2003).  Weber wrote extensively about what made it possible for human 
beings to accept the authority of other human beings to rule over them.  His answer lay 
in the concept of legitimation (Lassman, 2000).  Legitimacy refers to whether people, 
collectively, accept a particular social order or set of rules as valid. The legitimacy exists 
in the abstract, separate and apart the performance of the entity under consideration.  
For example, the idea of a government must be accepted before any particular 
government can come to power.  Legitimacy is also important because it removes 
authority and validity from individuals and places it in the rule of law, procedures, and 
societal expectations (Lassman, 2000; Scaff, 2000).  Weber’s prime example of this 
manifested in institutions is bureaucracy, a social system distributing power based on 
hierarchy and positions, in which interactions between individuals are governed by 




Bureaucracy as an economic institution transformed the way society performs work 
(Swedberg, 1998).  
Evolving Views of Stability 
 The study of institutions in social science has generally been concerned with two 
fundamental issues: seeking explanations for the similarity and persistence of 
institutions, while more recent scholarship has sought to understand the mechanisms 
producing institutional divergence.  The line of inquiry traditionally undertaken in 
theorizing and analysis seeks to explain the similarity and persistence of social practices, 
structures, and organizations across time and space.  Early writings on institutions 
actually predate the study of organizations, as the early scholars did not study 
organizations, theorizing instead from considerations of broad social system or local 
interactions (W. R. Scott, 2001).  Also, this scholarship sought to understand the 
collective nature of institutions and how they represent something beyond individual 
actions.  Economists such as Thorstein Veblen understood that individual actions were 
motivated by habits and relationships with others.  He also saw that these motivations 
had some degree of permanence when he noted that institutions were “settled habits 
of thought common to the generality of man” (Veblen, 1919, p. 239).   
 Hughes (1936) referred to institutions as social phenomena that established 
collective behavior, had observable focal points of activity, and achieved relative 
permanence through setting and satisfying social expectations. Also in the 1930s, 
Talcott Parsons saw the need for a social theory of institutions as critical; he conceived 




understood that conformity with the rules and values does not necessarily follow simply 
because they may be shared, but that an organized system of incentives and 
punishments should exist to encourage conformity (Parsons, 1990 [1934]).  Robert 
Merton (1949) maintained that social structures could constrain behavior or present 
opportunities for social action.   
  This notion of stability has remained in modern considerations of institutions. As 
used in the social sciences, institutions are considered as social practices or conventions 
that achieve some sort of regularity through repetition, become legitimated by 
adherence to social norms, and contribute to the social structure (Eisenstadt, 1968a, 
1968b).  Based on his historical study of social institutions, Turner refers to institutions 
as “a complex of positions, roles, norms, and values lodged in particular types of social 
structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to 
fundamental problems…” (J. H. Turner, 1997, p. 6).  Institutions represent standardized 
patterns for social interaction (Jepperson, 1991).   
 What is commonly referred to as “old” institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991a; Selznick, 1996) views social reality as constructed by the social interactions of 
humans.  Selznick (1949; 1957) believed that organizations become institutions as their 
function attains a value higher than the work performed.  The organization achieves a 
distinctive character and is identified with a particular competence (Selznick, 1996). 
Participants wish to see it continue to preserve those values.  The old institutionalism 
was concerned with the formal structure of the organization and with local influences 




center of the process (W. R. Scott & Meyer, 1983).  Old institutionalism uses social 
evolution to explain the formation and development of institutions, as individual 
activities become mores and blossom into institutions (W. R. Scott, 2001).  Selznick 
emphasized how the history of the organization, environment, and particular 
adaptations shaped institutionalization over time.  Old institutionalism focused on 
norms, values, and attitudes that participants internalized as they became socialized 
into the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a).  Social actions become constrained by 
this context. 
 Institutional theory has moved away from this evolutionary concept over the 
past thirty years.  Institutionalism as currently discussed in sociology diverges from the 
viewpoint of Selznick to embrace a broader theory that attempts to explain institutions, 
including how they arise and then persist in non-localized contexts (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991a).  In many ways, it harkens back to the early writings on institutionalism that 
focused on social norms.  Building on Durkehim’s notion of methodological holism (Nee, 
1998), “new” institutional thinking is an attempt to move beyond the approaches which 
viewed institutions as the collective of individual actions and failed to consider the social 
context (March & Olsen, 1989).  New institutionalism, as discussed from the sociological 
perspective in the study of organizations, considers “larger environmental factors such 
as culture, social norms, and conventions” (Koelbe, 1995, p. 231).  It is meant to counter 
the notion that organizations are shaped by technological or economic determinism by 
asserting they are influenced by the other social institutions in their environment (W. R. 




 New institutionalism is concerned with “the embeddedness of social structures 
and social actors in broad-scale contexts of meaning” (Jepperson, 2002, p. 229).  This 
intellectual movement, starting with the work of Meyer & Rowan (1977), Dimaggio & 
Powell, (1983), and Zucker (1977), viewed society as comprised of institutions—each 
consisting of social structures constructed within broad frameworks—in which 
individual actors are embedded.   At its core, the institutional tradition is concerned 
with the development of normative systems that govern human activity (W. R. Scott, 
2001).  Institutionalization begins with the habitualization of human activity, meaning 
that situations and activities can be experienced and repeated without having to be 
redefined each time.  These repeated interactions come to produce shared meanings 
and stable belief systems among persons, forming the process called institutionalization.  
Social formations become transmitted to others and across generations as they become 
historical institutions (Berger & Luckman, 1967).  Regular patterns of organization and 
interaction in life can be explained as taken-for-granted social relationships and actions 
located in social structures that are self-sustaining (Zucker, 1977).    
 Building on the Weberian explanation of legitimacy, in particular the legitimacy 
of rationalized formal structures (Lassman, 2000; Nee, 1998), institutionalized structures 
are based on an understanding of social reality that is widespread and thus deeply 
embedded in the social structure.  Institutionalization involves individuals taking 
normative obligations into account in social processes, so much so that they “come to 
take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 




routines, and procedures are shared and understood by members of the community or 
society at large (March & Olsen, 1989).  This differentiates institutionalism from 
individual actor theories, as norm-based models prescribe rules which may or may not 
be in the logical best interest of the individual actor, but which prescribe action 
nonetheless (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Knight, 1992).  New institutionalism asserts 
there are scripts and rules that exist outside of any particular organization.  This expands 
the explanations of how individual actions are similarly influenced.  Whereas previous 
institutional theories proposed that people act only out of either personal interest 
(regulative), or out of duty or social expectations (normative), new institutionalism 
added the cultural/cognitive dimension.  People are socialized into the organization or 
particular routines and beliefs because of learned patterns of behavior (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991a; W. R. Scott, 2001).   
New Theorizing on “Choice-within-Constraints”  
 While the explanations for stability have been long-established in institutional 
theory, explanations regarding divergence have been more difficult to formulate.  
Moreover, this line of theorizing has led to reconsiderations of the entire line of 
scholarship and reflections on the theory as a whole (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; P. M. 
Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Selznick, 1996).  Critiques of the new institutionalism call for 
a greater emphasis on the mechanisms producing divergence, since a focus on the 
macro-level (Zucker, 1991) can distract from differences occurring despite powerful 
isomorphic and environmental constraints (DiMaggio, 1988; Powell, 1991).  The claims 




problematic by the understanding from earlier sociological writing that individuals have 
agency to make choices (P. M. Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Nee, 1998; Selznick, 1996).  
DiMaggio & Powell (1991a) discuss at great length the differences between the old and 
new institutionalisms, with the focus primarily on their critiques of rational choice and 
behavioral theories that were used in the old institutionalism. Diverging from the notion 
that institutions could be formed through the aggregation of individual preferences or 
actions, or that institutions could be designed intentionally by individuals, new 
institutionalism in sociology viewed individual action as not only constrained but 
dependent on such macro factors as society and culture (Koelbe, 1995).   
 Viewpoints from other scholars and disciplines critique this position.  Other 
disciplines like political science (March & Olsen, 1989) still view rational choice as 
essential, insisting that institutions affect choices but do not determine them.  Theories 
within economics consider how institutions structure and regulate transactions, but 
assert that individual actors can still exert rationality within the constraints imposed by 
institutions (Brinton & Nee, 1998).  Jepperson (1991), in discussing how institutions are 
reproduced, asserts that institutions do not just constrain—they also empower 
individual actors with a freedom to act within certain frameworks.   
 This line of thinking concurs with other new institutional thinkers, looking to 
expand the theory.  New institutionalism recognizes that while there are exterior norms 
producing patterns that shape activity, institutions must also have an internal, cognitive 
order.  While new institutionalism recognizes that institutions organize human activity, 




meaning into activity.  The reproduction and perpetuation of an institutional order 
comes not just from the organizational structures and rules that govern activity; those 
structures and rules must have some meaning to individuals for people to carry them 
out in an effectual manner (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  Institutions are not simply 
templates that organizations implement passively. Actors can view an institution as 
legitimate, but this becomes complicated because organizations face complex and 
differentiated environments, from which courses of action can be strategically selected.  
These multiple environments suggest many degrees of legitimacy, with varying levels of 
support or opposition (W. R. Scott, 1991). 
 Returning to some of the foundational ideas of institutions can be helpful.  
Building on the concept of roles from phenomonology, institutions are comprised of a 
diverse array of roles that are recognizable to outsiders (Berger & Luckman, 1967; 
Jepperson, 1991).  However, institutions are not given and unchanging forms.  People 
create or adapt institutions, not just respond to them.  Role theory allows for people to 
role “make”—not just role play.  Thus changes in social practices can create new forms 
and modify existing ones (Eisenstadt, 1968a, 1968b; W. R. Scott, 2001).  The choice-
within-constraints perspective (Nee, 1998) is reinforced by a theory also used in the 
study of social order—structuration (Giddens, 1984).  Social practices are based on rules 
that are shared by persons connected through meaningful, shared communications.  
Rules structure action; society is predicated on people acting in accordance with 
expectations, while working within structures and following predictable routines gives 




 In situations where rule-based actions are uncertain, individuals are free to 
choose from the knowledge of rules in their possession.  This leads to the duality of 
structure: enacting rules enables structural reproduction but also provides opportunities 
for new forms.  People exhibit agency when enacting structures; invocation of 
structures is also an opportunity for adjustment, since people can modify rules as 
appropriate.  This is the recursive property of human activities (Cassell, 1993; Giddens, 
1984), which contrasts with the view of some new institutionalists that institutions do 
not require active, collectivized action for reproduction because the mechanisms to 
encourage or discourage activities and interactions exist within the institutionalized 
patterns (Jepperson, 1991).   
 Rethinking social activities, structures, and institutionalism in this way is the 
project of theorists looking to reconcile the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ institutionalisms (Brint & 
Karabel, 1991; Nee, 1998; Selznick, 1996).  Although some writers use the terms neo-
institutionalism and new institutionalism interchangeably (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a; 
W. R. Scott, 2001), others have made the specific point to utilize “neoinstitutionalism” 
as a term for this reconsideration of the theory as a whole (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
P. M. Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997).  The reconciliation seeks to build bridges between the 
theories focusing on building structures through individual agency and those explaining 
action as determined by institutional structures.   
 Focusing on how new institutional forms arise and change occurs within 
institutions is a method for finding the link. New patterns of activity can be caused by 




regulations to dramatic changes in law, technology, or public demands.  Also, 
institutions differ in their stability; institutionalization occurs in differing degrees, which 
can be conceived as how vulnerable the institution is to social intervention (Jepperson, 
1991).  Under certain conditions, either internal or external to the institution, sustained 
behaviors and practices can become susceptible to dissipation, rejection, or 
displacement (Oliver, 1992).   
Applications to Universities & Academic Science 
 Institutionalism can be used to study how universities respond to their changing 
environment (Anderson & Seashore-Louis, 1991).  As legitimacy is desired by all 
universities, for instance, functions inconsistent with socially-defined activities threatens 
their success (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977) since a high degree of institutionalization 
prescribes that conventional practices should be maintained (Zucker, 1991).  In higher 
education, social phenomena like academic tenure and the academic discipline can be 
considered institutionalized patterns where supporting and reproducing structures and 
practices exist to sustain them (Jepperson, 1991).    
 Some scholars have recently conceived of academic science as a highly 
institutionalized category of organizational activity that has meaning and value as a 
collection of related activities.  Treating academic science as an institution allows for the 
study of the unwillingness of academic networks to accept emerging models for science 
as well as the potential for new policies, such as flexible reward systems, to legitimate 
these practices  (Beesley, 2003).  Funding mechanisms have also been shown to be a 




the introduction of alternate or parallel funding schemes from government can promote 
different models for science (Benner & Sandstrom, 2000).  
 Institutional theory is one means by which to study how universities interact 
with their environment, as the societal expectations for legitimate practices constrain 
behavior, thus raising the cost of change.  As universities adopt new research practices, 
they may attempt to convince constituencies that new models of research are 
compatible with traditional values or that the idea of research should be expanded.  
Another adaptation is the creation of a buffer organization, like a research foundation, 
to conduct those activities seen to be inconsistent with conventional notions of research 
universities (Anderson & Seashore-Louis, 1991).  Institutional approaches have also 
been used in a limited sense in studies of community colleges, using the theories to look 
for similarities across the faculty cultures of the colleges (Levin, 2006).  Other evidence 
using the concept of sense-making suggests that faculty may use nostalgia for an 
idealized academia past as a means “to create continuity…in their own academic 
identities” (p. 571) as well as socialize newcomers into the morals of academia (Ylijoki, 
2005). 
 Ideas of academic identity and socialization have been present in the formation 
of the scientific ethos.  Merton, discussing how scientists required independence from 
political interference in 1938, describes an ethos with characteristics of strong 
institutionalization: 
The ethos of science refers to an emotionally toned complex of rules, 
prescriptions, mores, beliefs, values, and presuppositions which are held to be 
binding on the scientist….  Transgression is curbed by internalized prohibitions 




the ethos.  Once given an effective ethos of this type, resentment, scorn, and 
other attitudes of antipathy operate almost automatically to stabilize the 
existing structure (Merton, [1938] 1973, p. 258). 
 Parsons (1951) outlined how the institutionalization of scientific investigation 
comes from a cultural valuation of “rationality and understanding of the empirical 
world” (p. 340).  Empirical knowledge is advanced through particular techniques used by 
persons in specialized roles, employing skills not possessed by those only interested in 
practical applications of knowledge.  Consistent with Merton’s discussion of Western 
culture and science, Parsons asserts that science is not automatically advanced, but 
rather, the process is guided by a cultural structure committed to developing knowledge 
beyond its immediate uses, a value he sees in Western culture.  Also, given that science 
will challenge many traditional positions of society, its continued public legitimacy is 
dependent on factors beyond practical applicability of knowledge.  The cultural tradition 
of science based on respect for evidence, rationality, objectivity, and investigation has 
become institutionalized as the model for science.  As scientific findings and the 
contribution they make to education become valued, science becomes institutionalized 
as its values become inculcated in the value system of society (Mulkay, 1976; Parsons, 
1951).   
 As this study seeks to determine whether there is evidence of different 
institutional narratives concerning academic science, it is helpful to study the theoretical 
faculty positions using institutional elements.  An important component is the cultural-
cognitive domain (Scott, 2001).  Based on the contribution of new institutional theory in 




replication of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a), this element is concerned with 
the subjective beliefs and personal interpretations of individual actors.  The cultural 
element is important because the culture can shape individual perceptions as to what is 
proper, important, and expected.  Individuals can interpret cultural elements as 
meaningful as or symbolic of activities or beliefs that are taken for granted as 
appropriate.  For this research, the cultural-cognitive element will be used to inquire 
about the personal beliefs of the individual faculty, apart from their perceptions of 
policies in their department or expectations from their discipline.   
Synopsis of Conceptual Understandings 
The preceding discussion of the transformations to academic science and the 
scientific ethos has focused, to a large extent, on values: traditional, modern, and values 
under stress or in conflict.  Potential pathways to the resolution of these conflicts can be 
gleaned from the literatures examined here, using the theoretical perspectives and 
conceptual approach that informs this study.  With the goal of presenting a summation 
of concepts that will lead to a better sense of the research design, several important 
understandings are highlighted below.   
Findings Relevant to Control over Research Agendas 
The literature review considered many theories and macro-level observations of 
the transformation of academic science.  This treatment was necessary for the context 
of why faculty may perceive a loss of control over their research.  Moreover, the macro 




faculty in this study that are operating within the transformed environment.  Still, as 
discussed in the section introducing the problem in Chapter One, study of these issues 
requires a focus at the micro-level.  The concepts emerging as important for the four 
components of the analytical model (see p. 100) are summarized below.  
One takeaway from the literature has to be that the social relations of 
knowledge production are increasingly important and cannot be separated from the 
practice of research.  Thus, where faculty are positioned across the university, who is 
represented in their networks of interaction, and even their individual, particular values 
shape what topics they choose or the projects that appeal to them.  For those faculty 
engaged in commercial science or entrepreneurship, entrepreneurialism takes many 
forms, most of which involve increased faculty engagement in activities that bring the 
work of the university closer to industry and other stakeholder publics.  When faculty 
are in a department or research area that is closer to the market or commercial science 
activities, they tend to view that type of research as more legitimate.  The variables in 
Box 1 of the model are intended to measure such engagement.   
Box 2 of the model (see p. 100) includes variables that touch on policies and 
practices that address institutional responses to commercial science.  This review has 
discussed how the entrepreneurial university is viewed as an organizational response to 
the transformed research environment, and is specifically viewed as introducing 
managerialism into the academy.  For some, this is the adoption business practices, 
while others accept the innovative policies as necessary to extend the mission of the 




important for knowing the extent to which faculty are encouraged toward or 
constrained from engaging in commercial science activity.   
Personal and career variables emerge as important because faculty who are 
differently positioned across higher education, or that have had careers of different 
lengths or types, may feel differently about commercial science.  The transformation 
occurring in academic science is an ongoing process which has not been uniform in its 
occurrence across academia or within particular sectors or types of institutions.  We 
know from the literature to look for disciplinary differences, as well as those based on 
tenure, rank, and length in academia, or connection to industry (Box 3). 
Finally, as part of the consideration of faculty values described below, study 
participants will be categorized as one of the four faculty types in a typology that is 
being tested for this research (Box 4).  The five issues that were discussed in the 
literature review will form part of the process for differentiating among faculty for 
placement into these types (see p. 106).   
Findings Relevant to Value Systems for Academic Science  
  The Mertonian Ideal  
First, the Mertonian norms, and their attendant scientific practices, retain a 
place in the minds of scientists as a default ideal.  This primacy of place resulted from 
Merton’s role as the founder of the sociology of science, which provided a framework 
for the study of how the environment for science influenced its practice and 




development of a necessary ideology around science to guarantee both government 
support and non-interference, as it became necessary to defend science for lay 
audiences as a completely objective and rational process (Mulkay, 1976; Stokes, 1997).   
Existence of Mertonian Science 
 Second, the available literature and evidence suggests that the model of 
Mertonian science does not reflect the reality of scientific practice, that all scientists 
conduct research in differing degrees of violation with at least one or even all of the 
norms, and that this situation has existed almost since the norms were articulated.  
Numerous empirical studies have tried to document the existence and universal 
applicability of Merton’s normative structure of science, with little resulting evidence of 
consistent and universal application; several researchers intimated that Merton’s 
system may be either a myth or simply a utopian ideal that operates as a goal rather 
than a governing system for practice (Hess, 1997; Kaplan, 1964; Mitroff, 1974; West, 
1960).  In any event, there is considerable evidence to show substantial deviation from 
the normative structure by practicing scientists (Braxton, 1986, 1990, 1993; Fishman, 
1978).   
Deviance to What ? 
 Third, acceptance of the evidence in the literature recording deviation from the 
Metonian values still leaves us with an important unanswered question: deviance to 
what? If Merton’s norms do not guide practice, are there other models or conceptual 




academic scientists operating under a new value system, or potentially several systems, 
to guide their conduct (Etzkowitz, 1989)?  Within higher education circles, there has 
been long-standing resistance in the literature to the possibility of innovative 
perspectives on scientific practice.  Meanwhile, the modern sociology of science—more 
commonly called the sociology of scientific knowledge, or science studies—is attempting 
to answer these questions by moving beyond Merton’s study of the context for science 
and focusing on its content (Hess, 1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1991).   
Transformation through Adaptation 
 Fourth, this leads to the study of science as a social activity and the potential for 
the modification of the norms of science.  The transformation of the research process is 
also altering the role of the individual faculty.  However, this should not be seen as a 
shift in some external normative system, but rather, as the result of the changing views 
academic scientists hold regarding how science should be conducted.  The structural 
changes in scientific practice allow those faculty involved to integrate the previously 
conflicting views regarding basic and entrepreneurial science through a social process of 
adaptation (Etzkowitz, 1989).   
 Some attempts have been made at this social approach in the higher education 
literature.  A qualitative study of faculty involved in technology transfer examined the 
social relations among several groups involved in producing entrepreneurial science and 
asked whether the negotiation of conflicts was in fact re-norming academic science 
(Slaughter & Rhoades, 1990).  Rather than treating social structures as exogenous 




constructed by participants within and outside the university.  The ambivalence faculty 
felt produced negotiations over the control of science with involved individuals and 
groups.  Thus, the alteration of the organization of science produces modifications to 
the normative structure of science through the negotiation of conflict in the 
transformed social relations of knowledge production (Slaughter & Rhoades, 1990).  
Interestingly, despite a value difference from Etzkowitz regarding the appropriateness of 
this transformation, Slaughter & Rhoades arrive at a similar description of causality: 
each acknowledges the rewriting of norms via the process of social construction.   
Construction of New Institutional Forms 
 Fifth, the construction of new social structures and the notion that participants 
in knowledge production have the social agency—both individually and collectively—to 
transform the normative structure for academic science highlights the need for the 
perspective of institutionalism.  This theoretical area informs this study by allowing that 
faculty could be creating and adopting new and innovative normative systems, despite 
the constraints of conventional perspectives of academic science.  With institutions 
requiring human activity for replication, the freedom individuals have to adjust and 
recreate the rules of the institution or their own role in it becomes important as the 
social structures endure stress or become uncertain (Giddens, 1984; Jepperson, 1991; 
Nee, 1998).   
 The advent of entrepreneurial science presents university faculty with just such a 
state of uncertainty, similar to the ill-structured problems described by Mitroff (1974) 




norms to Merton’s system.  Certainly the effects on faculty documented in this review 
constitute evidence of such stress.  As conventional conceptions of academic science are 
challenged by new realties, faculty find their work environment altered, prompting the 
creation of new practices to adapt.  Perhaps scientific process can adapt to novel 
circumstances through the social interaction of the knowledge producers, similar to the 
way proponents of entrepreneurial and Mode-2 science theorize (Etzkowitz, 1989; 
Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000b; Gibbons, 1995; Nowotny et al., 2001).  
 With these understandings as background, the subsequent presentation of the 




CHAPTER  III. METHODS 
Research Design 
 The foundations for this study are the concepts of control and values.  Control is 
paramount as the motivation for the primary research question, and as an underlying 
concept for understanding normative systems and the regulation of behavior that are 
the subject of the second question.  Values are important in each situation as they 
influence behavior.  The conceptual understandings from the preceding pages serve as 
background: thus far, we know that the traditional norms for science have not been and 
are not always followed in practice, that science is a social process undertaken by 
persons in a dynamic environment of interaction, and that the transformation of 
academic science unsettles the conventional practices of research work.  Being persons 
in a social situation, academic scientists have the potential to adapt by altering research 
practices and creating new frameworks for action.  What is unknown is the extent to 
which this has actually happened.  
 This study seeks to explore the control faculty have to determine their own 
research agendas, and the control the academic profession exerts on the values that 
guide the manner in which that research is conducted, while determining which 
characteristics help explain the results.  Its purpose is to produce some measurement of 




program, while also exploring whether potential alternate normative systems for 
science exist.   
 The two primary questions for this study are:  
1. To what extent do university faculty feel the process for obtaining research 
sponsorship is compromising their ability to control their own research agenda?  
2. Is there evidence to suggest the existence of alternate normative/ value systems 
among faculty regarding what constitutes academic science that differ from 
traditional ones? 
In addition, the following sub-questions are introduced to further guide the analysis 
of the variables in the study.  
3. What background characteristics are associated with the different faculty types 
representing differing notions of academic science? 
4. What differences are present among faculty of different types regarding their 
perceived control of their own research agendas? 
5. What factors predict the level of control over research agendas that faculty 
indicate they possess?  
 
 As discussed in the review of the literature, control over research direction and 
choice of topics are not frequently studied.  More common are studies involving 
conflicts over the differing values of science and industry, deviations from existing 
normative systems, or changes to research practice.  The most common approaches to 
studying faculty attitudes and beliefs concerning these and related issues have involved 
qualitative designs.  In such studies, typical cases are illustrated with quotations and/or 
composite sketches of representative cases are provided.  However, there is no way to 




study (Fowler, 1993).  Some quantitative approaches have been used, but with research 
control rarely a focus of research, findings are inconclusive.   
 The study is cross-sectional in nature, with the data collected at a single point-in-
time from faculty at academic institutions from across the United States.  The decision 
to sample from many institutions rather than just a few was made because of selection 
concerns.  Having too many respondents from one institution would produce a sample 
with high within-group homogeneity (Groves et al., 2004).  This lack of variance would 
make it difficult to obtain valid results because the research subjects would not be 
differentiated sufficiently in terms of background.  Having subjects with similar 
experiences or frames of reference does not facilitate a study of significant distinctions 
that would explain variations among the participants.   
 A design with a special-purpose survey was chosen because there is no existing 
dataset inclusive of variables directly referencing either the norms of academic science 
or academic freedom issues related to faculty choice of research topics.  An original 
survey instrument provides the opportunity to collect standardized measures on these 
issues from a targeted population and relate the data together for analysis so that 
broader generalizations can be made (Fowler, 1993). 
Analytical Model  
 Figure 2 below is presents the research model for this study.  At the bottom is 
the construct of Control over the research agenda—the primary dependent variable—
which is measured using a summated-rating scale. Predictor variables are organized into 




involvement in, knowledge of, activities within commercial science, as well as sources of 
research support. 2)  The second group—Institution—includes policies and constraints 
regarding commercial science activity, and the Carnegie type, control, and research 
expenditures by source of funds.  3) The third group collects personal and career 
variables for the faculty respondents.  These are gender, academic rank, time both as an 
academic and working in industry, tenure status, and discipline.  4) Faculty type, an 
endogenous variable to be determined in the study based on two concepts from the 
theory and typology described in the introduction and measured by items on the survey.  
A more detailed discussion of the variables, their origin, definition, and usage in the 
model is provided below.  
 




 Description of Variables in the Study 
 This study utilizes an original survey instrument (see Appendix 1) consisting of 
one scale, two sections of attitudinal items, two sections of background/grouping items, 
and a few demographic items.  The control scale was created to measure the primary 
dependent variable in the study: control over research topics.  The attitudinal items are 
intended as a measure along the two dimensions of the typology theory and will be 
utilized to differentiate faculty in the analysis of the primary dependent variable.   
A description of the question sets and information regarding the development of 
the individual items is provided below alongside a discussion of the research questions 
they are intended to address.   
Dependent Variables: Control Over Research Agendas 
Research Questions 1 & 5  
1) To what extent do faculty members feel the process of obtaining research 
sponsorship is compromising their ability to control their own research 
agenda? 
5) What factors predict the level of control over research agendas that faculty 
indicate they possess?  
Survey question set 18 (12 items) 
 
The primary dependent variable for the study (control over research agenda) will 
be derived from a multi-item scale measuring the latent variable construct ‘control’ 
(DeVellis, 2003; McIver & Carmines, 1981).  Because the idea of control is both complex 
and abstract, the summated-rating scale is an appropriate technique to increase the 




by the researcher based on examples and outcomes—both anecdotal and empirical—
from the literature about university-industry relations, using a process summarized 
below.  Conceptually, the items address different potential outcomes from the 
perspective of a faculty member attempting to secure funding from research sponsors 
for their topics of choice.   
  The items in the scale inquire about faculty perceptions of their control to 
determine their own choice of research topics, secure funding to support the work, and 
the influence they feel sponsors have over their choice of topics.  Potential content for 
these items were developed in stages.  Initially, the different outcomes were 
possibilities that covered the spectrum from success to failure, with an allowance for 
middle positions in which sponsors attempted to influence research topics.  This was 
further developed to include a dimension for sponsors that consisted of them either 
being accommodating to the faculty member, or being a hindrance to their research 
goals.  This enhancement led to consideration of various potential positions in which the 
faculty member could find themselves.  Attempts to refine these concepts into a 
workable heuristic eventually led to the 2x2 matrix contained in Table 2, which 
summarizes the potential outcomes.  These will be discussed as the Four C’s and 
presented as outcome variables in the following section.   
Table 2:  Four Cs; Theoretical Positions Regarding Control over Research 
  PERCEPTION OF SPONSORS 
  Cooperative Coercive 
ABILITY TO SECURE 
SPONSORED FUNDING  
High Curiosity Compromise 




 One dimension of the heuristic is faculty self-perception of their ability to obtain 
research funding.  Although measured in this table with only two levels of high or low, in 
theory, faculty might consider criteria such as grant writing ability, status within the 
discipline, or networking connections with sponsors—among others—when rating 
themselves.   The other dimension—perception of sponsors—is measured as either 
cooperative or coercive, returning to the idea of sponsors accommodating or hindering 
faculty needs. This would include perceptions such as sponsor agreement, any sponsor 
attempts to influence topics, acceding to sponsor demands, and adaptation of demands 
through negotiation.   
In any of these four scenarios, the option to stop pursuit of the funding is an 
option, so although the consideration of failure or stop is not explicitly defined in one of 
the cells, it is embedded in the potential outcomes as an option at any point.  All of 
these considerations were used in the development of the questions in this scale.    
 The resulting “control” scale contains 12 items inquiring about the perceptions 
of relations with sponsors and ability to determine research topics.  This scale asks 
respondents to estimate how often they perceive given statements to be true.  Items 
were measured using response categories for frequency that are proportional in nature, 
since these questions inquire about aspects of faculty work that will not vary with any 
degree of regularity.  This allows respondents to think about frequency in terms of a 





Scenarios regarding topic choice [The Four Cs]  (Survey question set 12; 8 items) 
 Returning to Table 2, these four constructs—Curiosity, Collaboration, 
Compromise, and Concession (collectively labeled The Four Cs)—describe four possible 
scenarios that faculty could find themselves in during the process of obtaining 
sponsorship and determining their course of study.  The four outcomes in the cells of 
Table 2 above inform the questions used in the control scale, but also present different 
conceptions of control in their own right.   
Faculty were provided with a series of four scenarios regarding freedom of topic 
choice in the context of both government and industry funding.  Questions for these 
scenarios were developed from the constructs outlined in the foregoing discussion of 
the development of the control scale.  The outcomes have been given descriptive, 
conceptual names for illustrative purposes here, and are defined as follows:  
• Curiosity (-driven research): Researcher is able to obtain funding to research topics 
based on interest 
• Collaboration: Researcher and sponsor negotiate to work together towards shared 
goals 
• Compromise: Researcher is compelled to yield some aspects of control while 
successfully fighting to maintain others 




Endogenous Variables: Faculty Type 
Research Question 2  
Is there evidence to suggest the existence of different normative/ value systems 




 Attitudinal Variables for Classification (Typology) 
Survey question sets 19-24 (26 items) 
The attitudinal items used in the classification portion of the survey are based on 
the faculty typology discussed in the introduction and literature review (shown in Figure 
3, p. 105) and the accompanying description of the types provided by the authors. The 
types were originally theorized as positions that faculty could assume in response to the 
changes in life sciences research.  Each type is defined by the authors as comprised of a 
set of particular beliefs.   
 
Figure 3: Typology of Faculty Positions 
For this study, the typology theory was adapted to test whether the type 




Since each type is the label for a set of values, this study operationalizes the types by 
seeing whether the expression of particular values will identify a respondent as a certain 
type.  In the language of causality, the values that faculty profess should allow for the 
classification and identification of each faculty with one particular type.   Type is viewed 
as the latent variable, and the answers given for the attitude and belief items are effect 
indicators.  Thus, it is not presumed that being a certain type causes one to have a 
particular set of values; the values indicate the type.   
Before any determination can be made regarding how the practice of academic 
science may potentially be changing, it must be shown that different value systems or 
institutional logics exist and are seen as legitimate by faculty.  Testing these types within 
the context of specific issues seems a reasonable method for examining whether they 
could represent four alternate viewpoints on the complexities of academic science.   
 Survey questions were developed to test for the potential of four distinct 
viewpoints.  Content for areas of comparison was created using the descriptions 
provided by the authors, “funneled through” a series of five issues common in the 
literature about commercialization and sponsored research that were discussed in the 
literature review.  Drawing from the studies of faculty views on negotiating conflicts in 
academy-industry relations (Campbell, 1997; Campbell & Slaughter, 1999; Washburn, 
2005), market relationships (Bok, 2003; Geiger, 2004; Slaughter et al., 2004), as well as 
from the theory of Mode 2 science (Gibbons, 1995; Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, 
Scott, & Gibbons, 2003).  Table 3 below summarizes theoretical positions for the four 




Table 3:  Framework for Comparison of Faculty Types Using Commercialization Issues 








1. Grants preserve autonomy 
2. Problem-solving is not academic 
science; advancing knowledge is 
3. Patents, IP concerns threaten 
autonomy 
4. Involvement in startups, patents 
compromises research 


















1. Private contracts tolerated as necessary 
for some research 
2. Boundaries crossed to pursue interesting 
topics 
3. Negotiate publishing/patents to preserve 
autonomy & university 
4. Do what is necessary to avoid conflicts of 
interest & commitment 

















1. Necessary to negotiate 
restrictions from both sources; 
no difference 
2. Distinctions not critical; discovery 
possible through either 
3. Industry has legitimate needs for 
restrictions; Patenting OK 
4. Conflicts can be negotiated 











1. Possible to pursue funding that allows for 
research on projects of interest 
2. Distinctions not relevant;  Importance of 
topic, conducting quality research; 
Collaborations determine path of research 
3. Restrictions, patenting, secrecy are 
legitimate parts of collaborations 
4. Conflicts worked out amongst 
collaborators 
5. Social accountability; Consulting, 
continued translational research 
Note: 1= Funding, 2=Basic-Applied Research, 3=Publishing/Patenting, 4= Conflicts of 
Interest/Commitment, 5=Criteria for Success 
The five issues are:  
1) Funding, which concerns viewpoints on government/public agency grants vs. 
private contracts with industry;  
2) Basic-Applied, which deals with views on the two types of research as 
traditionally considered;  
3) Publishing/Patenting, an area inclusive of restrictions on publication, the filing 
of patents, and matters of intellectual property;  





5) Success, regarding what criteria are generally accepted as indicative of quality 
science and success as a researcher.  
Within each cell, the statements numbered 1 to 5 correspond with the five 
issues, and represent beliefs that a person with the accompanying type would ideally 
hold to be true, based on the type descriptions provided by the authors (Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2001).  These statements are the basis for the attitudinal items in this section of 
the survey.   
The survey items in this section contain five sections—based on the content 
areas—with one question within each section corresponding to one of the four faculty 
types.  Twenty items were created using the cells in the table above—one for each 
intersection of the four faculty types and the five content areas (issues).  There is also a 
general section consisting of six questions addressing differences between any faculty 
types along one of the two dimensions in the typology created by Owen-Smith & Powell 
(2001).  Each question is designed to distinguish between two types that converge in a 
particular way.  In the theory, the attitudes of any two faculty types will converge in 
some aspects since two types will always be on the same side of one of the primary 
dimensions, while the types on the diagonals also share some general attitudes about 
academic science.  In total there are 26 items.   
Self-placement on type dimensions (Questions 10 & 11) 
 The typology is constructed from two primary dimensions.  These questions ask 
respondents to place themselves on the dimensions as if they were a spectrum.  The 




of the spectra, but no other points along the scales were defined—not even neutral, 
with the intent that people would define for themselves what the points meant.  Seven-
point Likert scales were chosen to provide greater variability in responses. This rating 
method was used so that it could be compared with the type ratings derived from the 
more complex series of questions, based on the original theories and the issues 
addressed with these items.  Faculty respondents will be classified using this method, 
and then given another classification by the more complex criteria, and the resulting 
differences will be explored.  
Independent and Control Variables 
Research Question 3 
What background characteristics are associated with the different faculty types 
representing differing notions of academic science? 
Commercial Science (Survey question sets 14 – 17) 
 The survey section entitled “Personal involvement in commercial science” covers 
different areas of experience with commercial science.  The first set asks about the 
highest level of involvement each faculty has experienced with an invention, since 
previous research indicates that those faculty involved with commercial science are 
more likely to view it favorably (Campbell & Slaughter, 1999; Matkin, 1997).  A second 
section on activities asks faculty to indicate whether they have been involved with any 
of the processes listed—this is so a simple count can be made.  The third question is a 
self-rating on the level of knowledge they feel they personally have about commercial 




offers enough distinction for respondents to place themselves.  The fourth set requires a 
breakdown of the percentage of research support that comes from different sources.  It 
includes government (Federal, state, and public agencies), Industry (business, 
corporations, contracts), Foundations (private organizations, associations), university 
support, and other.  
External influences on commercial science (Survey questions sets 8 – 9) 
Several variables will also address the characteristics of the respondents’ 
environment for research and commercial science.  Self-reported items include 
statements about policies in place at the home institution, as well as constraints on 
practice that come from external pressures.  Question set 8 contains 7 items asking 
faculty to evaluate statements about different aspects of the policies and environment 
for research that exists at their university. These can be seen as the climate/culture for 
science, as well as constraints.  Question set nine is concerned with pressure that faculty 
may perceive from their institution regarding commercial science activities and 
sponsored research, in area like commercial topics, applied outcomes, limiting 
publication, and generating revenues.  
Data about the institutions will be obtained from the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching, the National Science Foundation, and the IPEDS 
database.  These institutional variables are its Carnegie classification, its control as 
public/private, and measures for research expenditures.  The NSF provides totals for 




Faculty career variables (Survey questions sets 2 -7) 
 A beginning section on “Professional background” collects information about 
each faculty member’s rank, years in academia, years in industry, tenure status, primary 
academic discipline, and administrative duties.  One of the important hypothesized 
differences among faculty could be between academic disciplines.  This allows for the 
determination of similarities or differences regarding research norms and agendas 
across academic fields.  Disciplinary differences do exist with respect to scientific norms; 
those faculty in disciplines more predisposed to theory-building and paradigm 
development have been shown to adhere more closely to traditional scientific norms 
(Fishman, 1978).   
 Faculty are certainly aware of causal mechanisms such as regional and 
environmental pressures for development, but they also understand what drivers exist 
within the universities and disciplines themselves.  For instance, working in a discipline 
with a “mirror industry” that presents potential corporate partners and customers, as 
well as the pursuit by that industry of commercial interests can influence 
university/department decisions regarding commercial involvement.  Those faculty 
perceive the need for collaboration more acutely, and universities with clearer 
statements of support functions and roles enable faculty to move in that direction 
(Laukkanen, 2003).  Differences in hard vs. soft disciplines have also been demonstrated 
(Anderson & Seashore-Louis, 1991). In an attempt to observe such distinctions, faculty 
will be sampled from five different academic fields—broadly considered—including 





• Biological sciences (e.g., Biology, Botany, Zoology) 
• Physical sciences (e.g., Chemistry, Physics, Geology) 
• Engineering (e.g., Chemical, Civil, Electrical, Mechanical) 
• Medical sciences (e.g., Allied Health, Public Health, Medicine) 
• Social sciences (e.g., Psychology, Economics, Political Science, Sociology) 
Research Question 4: 
What differences are present among faculty of different types regarding their 
perceived control of their own research agendas? 
 This aspect of the study examines the differences in perceived control by faculty 
of differing types.  Based on the theory, it should be expected that Old School faculty 
would perceive their situation to be changing at an uncomfortable pace, while New 
School faculty believe the changes are necessary and appropriate.  The hybrid positions 
should be mixed, with the differences turning on how much can be handled at an 
individual level without compromising the academy, and how much is absolutely 
necessary to get by.   
Description of Population, Sample, and Data Collection 
Data Source 
 The sampling frame (Groves et al., 2004) for the survey was a pool of faculty 
from across the US, utilizing a database maintained by a professional marketing 
company that solicits participation from college and university faculty.  A firm called 
Firstmark, Inc. maintains databases and provides direct mailing services and 




professionals in government, health care, financial services, and other industries.  Being 
one of the few such companies to target education specifically, their database includes 
educators in both K-12 and higher education, as well as specific populations by job or 
school type.  Names are compiled from institutional directories and are guaranteed to 
be current within the previous 18-month period.   
 Firstmark states that the database available for college and university faculty 
contains more than 1,000,000 faculty and department chairs from 20 broad academic 
areas.  Fee-based access to the lists are provided electronically in Excel or CD format, 
with specificity of the lists determined in advance in collaboration with Firstmark using 
several selection criteria.   
Sample 
 Since most previous research has worked with relatively small datasets, the 
objective for this study was sample of 5,000 faculty from research and doctoral 
universities in the United States to allow for analysis of the large number of items in the 
instrument scales.  The pool of available faculty in the data source was winnowed by 
several criteria available in the database.  First, to ensure selection from research and 
doctoral universities, while allowing for a broader sampling than just large state or 
private universities, the pool of institutions from which faculty were drawn narrowed to 
the 282 institutions classified in the 2005 Carnegie Basic Classification System as 
Doctorate-granting universities.  These institutions fall into three categories: Research 




universities.  Utilizing specified ZIP codes from IPEDS, 1000 faculty within each of the 
five disciplinary areas of interest were selected from the 282 institutions.   
 Given the direct access to the faculty via the database, single-stage sampling was 
used for this study.  The unit of analysis in the study is individual faculty members, 
although they are included in the database by their institutional affiliation and other 
characteristics.  A systematic stratified sampling technique was employed (Babbie, 
1983), since certain characteristics of the population are known in advance (Fowler, 
1993).  As the study is designed to examine faculty across disciplines, this was the 
primary level of stratification.  Equal representation in the population from the five 
disciplinary areas was obtained, and the database provider generated a sample using a 
random start.   
 The final sample of eligible participants for the survey was 4,540 from 252 
institutions. The purchased dataset had a number of coverage errors, resulting in a large 
percentage of people ( > 40%) who were ultimately deemed ineligible for the study.  
Most often, the errors were because a person either was not tenure-track faculty, not 
faculty at all, or because the directory information was simply outdated and the person 
listed was no longer there.  Because of these coverage errors, replacements were found 
for each person deemed ineligible, using a staff of temporary research assistants trained 
to help with the coverage errors and replacements that were required to produce an 
accurate dataset for the survey sample.  Even with these efforts, several hundred 
people were eliminated during the administration of the survey for reasons such as 




as a researcher.  There were not sufficient resources to allow the staff to complete a 
second round of replacements.   
Survey Design 
 The survey was designed to be conducted online, using a commercially-available 
web-based data collection and analysis program known as SurveyMonkey.com, 
following a period of parallel testing. The advent of internet survey programs presents 
many new opportunities to survey researchers.  In terms of survey design, web surveys 
offer greater flexibility with survey design, functionality, and content, as well as 
additional features that can increase the motivation of respondents to complete the 
questionnaire. Still these new options come with a responsibility to the designer to use 
them for purposes of maximizing data quality and minimizing error (Couper, Traugott, & 
Lamias, 2001).   
 For instance, computer-assisted surveys can reduce skip errors because they 
require participants to answer all questions, although there can be higher non-response 
at the individual level if people are intimidated by the technology.  In addition, 
computer-assisted surveys can increase the legitimacy of the questionnaire to the 
respondents, and has been shown to reduce the cognitive burden on individuals as they 
respond to the questions (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  Web-based designs also 
have the potential to achieve efficiencies in terms of time, logistics, and cost in the use 
of self-administered questionnaires.  Moreover, although there is some concern among 




with many populations, surveys of certain populations—such as university professors—
will likely experience only minor coverage problems (Dillman, 2000; Groves et al., 2004).   
 A web-based design was chosen to facilitate data entry since the sample for the 
study was large.  Although email is a common practice with commercial internet survey 
programs, email addresses for participants are not available from the database provider.  
In fact, no database service contacted included email addresses for faculty in their 
records.  Because of this, email addresses were obtained during the process of 
correcting coverage errors and locating replacements discussed earlier. Accuracy among 
those sampled was verified through the directories of individual institutions.   Anyone 
without research activity was excluded and replaced, as were faculty who were 
emeritus.   
Instrument Testing 
 Consistent with established survey techniques (Fowler, 1993, 1995; Groves et al., 
2004), the instrument was subjected to some preliminary testing.  Due to the large 
scope of the intended study, a large scale field test was cost-prohibitive.  Moreover, as 
this study is a first attempt to examine the particular constructs of interest, it was 
deemed more appropriate to perform tests on the constructs themselves, as well as the 
items intended to measure them.   
 The type of pretesting performed for this study has been variously called review 
by knowledgeable analysts (Dillman, 2000) or expert review (Caspar, 2004), as well as 
intensive individual interviews (Fowler, 1995) or cognitive interviews (Scheuren, 2004).  




methodologists and data analysts, as well as people who have expertise in the 
constructs of the survey and can identify with potential respondents.  The purpose of 
this form of testing is to determine how respondents understand the questions and feel 
about the response tasks; it is not an effort to simulate full-scale data collection (Fowler, 
1995).  The goal at this stage is to “finalize the substantive content of the questionnaire 
so that construction can be undertaken” (Dillman, 2000, p. 141).  
 A population of 50 individuals was compiled from lists of research faculty, 
technology transfer officials, and methodologists known to this researcher from 
previous project work and research positions.  These individuals either knew the 
researcher directly, had contact with the researcher through interaction during prior 
research, or had some familiarity with the researcher in his capacity as a colleague on 
previous research projects in which they participated.  Each individual was sent an email 
invitation to participate in the instrument testing—either directly from the survey 
program or directly from this researcher—along with a link to the web survey.  
Participants were asked to read through the survey questions, instructions, and 
response scales, and address the following questions, if they found something of 
concern:  
• Do the questions make sense?  Is anything unclear?  
• Do the questions seem appropriate to the target population (university research 
faculty)?  
• Should any questions be added? Deleted? Changed in some way? 
• Does the wording of the questions seem relevant to the experience of sponsored 
research? 
• What is your opinion on the concept of controlling one’s research agenda? 





 From this population, nine individuals indicated they could assist in the 
instrument testing.  Seven persons provided feedback through email dialogue with the 
researcher, and two individuals agreed to be interviewed about the survey.  Among 
those who provided feedback, five were technology transfer officials from three 
different public universities in Michigan, three were research faculty, and one was a 
survey methodologist from the Institute for Social Research.   
 These individuals affirmed the general structure and focus of the draft sent to 
them, although several important revisions resulted from their feedback.  All confirmed 
that the concept of control was a legitimate topic for faculty to address in this format, 
and that the questions about sponsored research were presented in a way that was 
reasonable. Some requested clarification between federal and industry sponsorship on 
one set of questions, while others offered additions for the questions about institutional 
policies and constraints.  From their contributions, the researcher was able to make 
revisions that clarified the meaning of several questions, expanded the answer choices 
for others, and altered instructions or questions that seemed inappropriate, misleading, 
or confusing.   
 This type of review from knowledgeable experts offering some important 
advantages has, while also possessing a few important limitations.  These reviews are a 
cost-effective means for identifying a wide variety of potential problems, such as the 
layout or logic of the survey, or the way concepts have been operationalized.  Still, there 
is no realistic feedback from actual respondents, and it remains unknown how the 




that some aspects could have been missed by the reviewers because they are dividing 
their attention between the content of the survey and the task of responding to review 
questions (Dillman, 2000).  
Data Collection 
In October 2008, the online survey was administered to 4,540 research faculty 
from a pool of 252 institutions classified in the 2005 Carnegie Basic Classification System 
as Doctorate-granting universities.  Following three rounds of follow-up contacts, usable 
responses were received from 1,210 faculty, producing a response rate of 26.7%, which 
is an average rate for internet surveys, averaging below mail rates, but which are more 
cost-effective (Kaplowitz, Hadlock, & Levine, 2004).  
Preliminary Analytical Procedures 
 This section discusses how the research questions will be addressed and includes 
groundwork analyses, data manipulations, and the testing of variables to be included in 
the analysis.  First will be the factor analysis performed on the 12-item control scale and 
the creation of the primary outcome variable for the study.  Next is the initial attempt to 
use the typology as a classification scheme and examination of the resulting distribution, 
which is the precursor to the comparison with the method used in the analysis.  Then 






Research Question 1:  
To what extent do faculty members feel the process of obtaining sponsored 
research funds is compromising their ability to control their own research agenda?  
 
 Because this question is dependent upon the creation and determination of 
other values from the survey data analysis, it is necessarily being addressed last in the 
data analysis.  However, it is conceptually important to discuss it first here.  The 
question of faculty control to determine research topics is addressed by the 12-item 
scale.  The first step was data reduction using exploratory factor analysis to create the 
construct to be tested, and then determine the reliability of the scale for the primary 
dependent variable.   
Factor analysis (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995; Kim & Mueller 1978a, 1978b) was used 
to determine if the scale was indeed unidimensional (McIver & Carmines, 1981) and the 
determination of internal consistency of the scale yields information about the 
homogeneity of the individual items.  The items will have strong association with the 
latent variable if they have a strong relationship with one another, as they are all 
presumed to be measuring the latent variable—in this case, control (DeVellis, 2003).  
Variables determined not to be part of a reliable scale were considered for use as single 
dependent variables.   
A factor analysis with PCA extraction and varimax rotation was performed on the 
initial 12-item scale, resulting in a one factor solution, following reliability testing (Table 




“Self-directed research” and is based on questions answered on five point Likert scales 
ranging from 1=Always to 5 = Never.  Answers in the negative indicate a higher level of 
control or freedom from interference of sponsors.  The scale has a moderately high 
estimate of reliability (α = 0.86).   





 Factor 1:  Self-directed Research α  =  0.86   
6 
Researching topics of interest to my research sponsors keeps me 
from studying topics important to me 
0.84 0.70 
9 
I have to compromise my research interests in order to secure 
funding for any research 
0.83 0.69 
5 
I alter the focus of my research to accommodate the project goals 
of my research sponsors 
0.77 0.59 
2 




My research sponsors have specific problems they want me to 
research for them 
0.70 0.50 
3 
Inability to find funding keeps me from pursuing the problems of 
greatest interest to me 
0.67 0.45 
12 
I am restricted from conducting basic research with the funding I 
am able to raise 
0.65 0.42 
    
 Dependent Variables   
  Mean SD 
1 I am able to find research funding for the questions I wish to 
pursue (1 = Never, 5 = Always) 
3.41 0.81 
11 I am concerned that my commercial activity will compromise my 
ability to conduct objective science (1=Always, 5=Never)  
4.46 0.96 
Factor 
Self-Directed Research (Composite: Original code;  
1=Always, 5=Never) 
3.57 0.83 
Although other components were extracted in the solution, none produced 
reliable factors scales, as reliability scores only increased when the scales were reduced 




estimates of control.  The first is question 1 listed in Table 4, on which faculty would rate 
their success in finding money to research what they wish, with ‘5=Always’ being the 
high score.  The second item to be used singly is number 11, which asks about concerns 
that commercial activity will compromise the objectivity of one’s science (5=Never).   
Additional Outcome Variables for ‘Control’ 
 Dependent variables for control were also derived from the topic-choice 
scenarios that faculty rated for frequency of occurrence.  The four Cs—Curiosity, 
Collaboration, Compromise, Concession—were rated in the context of both government 
and industry funding scenarios, thus producing eight measures of control.  Because of 
the natural pairings of these variables, the four categories were compared to determine 
any mean differences between the two funding contexts.  These variables were also 
used in group comparisons for variables that are theorized to be important, such as 
faculty type and academic discipline, as well as for regression models.  Comparisons 
were also made between measures of affirmative scenarios of control—Curiosity and 
Collaboration, and the negative scenarios representing the overcoming of sponsor 




Academic Science Typology 
Research Question 2: 
Using theorized faculty types as proxy, is there evidence to suggest the existence of 
alternate normative/ value systems among faculty regarding what constitutes 
academic science that differ from traditional ones? 
 
 The next step in the analysis was the determination of the faculty types.  These 
types are proxies for the existence of different institutional forms, and to the extent that 
substantial numbers of respondents fall into types other than the traditional Old School 
type, there may be some evidence of legitimately different conceptions of academic 
science.  Provided there is an appropriate distribution among the types, a regression 
model with the categorical variable could be estimated.  
Self-Placement on Typology Dimensions 
The first method for classification was to discover the distribution that resulted 
from faculty placing themselves on the two primary dimensions of the typology: Threat-
No threat and Overlap-Distinct (see Figure 3, p. 105, and Appendix 1, Q 10-11).  Each 
respondent placed themselves on a spectrum representing each dimension, measured 
in seven point scales.  Using that data, as a crude method for classification, each 
respondent’s score was allowed to vary randomly because the limited number of 
possible values (seven discrete points) would otherwise place many respondents at 
exactly the same point in space.  Using the added random variance, they were placed 
into high and low halves of each of the two dimensions using the midpoints of the scales 




coordinates on a graph, and each respondent was placed into one of the 4 quadrants of 
the 2x2 matrix.  The resulting distribution is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Type Classification Based on Self-Placement on Primary Dimensions 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Old School (OS) 332 28.8 
Engaged Traditionalist (ET) 407 35.3 
Reluctant Entrepreneur (RE) 139 12.1 
New School (NS) 274 23.8 
Total 1,152 100.0 
 
In a Chi-square test, the distribution of these types differed significantly from a 
placement simply  using each dimension’s mean as the cut point with no random 
variation (χ2 (3 (N=1152) = 129.07, p < .001).  Old School (28.8%) and Engaged 
Traditionalist (35.3%) are the most common types, perhaps suggesting that when asked 
to place themselves, the ends of the dimensions that indicate a moderate perceived 
threat from commercial science and greater perceived distinction between academic 
and commercial science are attractive to faculty. 
Graphically, the clustering around Old School and Engaged Traditionalist, and the 
relatively small numbers for Reluctant Entrepreneur based on these self-ratings can be 
seen in Figure 4 below.  The axes and dimensions in this graph correspond to those in 
the depiction of the typology in Figure 3 (p. 105).  Even with the random variations, 
there is still clustering around the values of the scales, but the trend of clustering away 





Figure 4:  Scatterplot of Faculty Self-Ratings on Two Dimensions of Typology 
 Another classification was created using the 20 items in the survey about values 
for academic and commercial science.  Indices were created using means of the items 
associated with each type, and faculty respondents were assigned a preference based 
on their comparative scores, with some uniform random variance introduced to break 
ties.  Bivariate correlations and graphical analysis were used to make determinations of 
the potential for distinct types.  The distribution from this self-placement and the 

























Group Differences and Predictor Variables 
Research Question 3: 
What background characteristics are associated with the different faculty types 
representing differing notions of academic science? 
 
 A complete answer to this question is dependent upon the typology emerging as 
an effective classification scheme, which would mean the type constructs themselves 
truly represent distinct constructs.   This portion of the analysis involves descriptive 
presentations of the survey results to summarize the general nature of the responses 
and to create a profile of the faculty participants.  The analysis here also outlines which 
variables have the potential to contribute to the statistical models for the measurement 
of the control variables.  The analysis begins with frequency distributions, and also 
considers groups comparison of means using ANOVAs to examine variables that could 
prove significant predictors in the regression models.  Ultimately, this question will be 
answered in those models. 
Research Question 4: 
What differences are present among faculty of different types regarding their 
perceived control of their own research agendas? 
 Here, analysis of variance is employed to test group differences for the outcome 
variables that define control and look for relationships among the independent and 
dependent variables.  This consists of analysis of the factor used as the primary 




Research Question 5: 
What factors predict the level of control over research agendas that faculty 
indicate they possess?  
 Finally, the model for the analysis of the primary dependent variable will be 
utilized.  To obtain an understanding of the factors that contribute to the variability in 
the level of personal control indicated by the control scale, OLS regression will be used.  
The primary dependent variable will be regressed on the complete set of independent 
variables.  The regressions analyses allow for an estimation of the fit of the proposed 
model on the dependent variable, these analyses allow us to determine the effect of 
personal, career, commercial involvement, and institutional variables on the types and 
the level of personal control over research topics.   
Summary of Survey Variables  
Table 6 below summarizes the variables in the study and their source.  For the 
dependent variables measuring control, there are two different sets of variables.  One 
set is the multi-item scale derived from the factor analysis.  It contains seven items and 
measures the construct of “Self-Directed Research.”  The second set will consist of eight 
models for the Four Cs—four for government funding and four for industry sponsorship.  
The other two dependent variables used in the study were from the original control 
scale.   
The predictor variables listed will be used in all of the OLS regression models 





Table 6: Variables in the Study 
VARIABLES Description/Coding Item(s) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   
Self-directed research Factor Scale (7 items) (1 =Low; 5= High) 18 
Four Cs 8 Scenarios [4 Gov’t, 4 Industry] (1= Low, 5= High) 12 
Securing funding 
Objectivity concerns 
Scale item 1 
Scale item 11 
18 
18 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES   
Faculty Type Indicators   
Funding  Likert (1=Disagree Completely, 5=Agree Completely) 20 
Basic/Applied Likert (1=Disagree Completely, 5=Agree Completely) 21 
Publish/Patent Likert (1=Disagree Completely, 5=Agree Completely) 22 
Conflict Likert (1=Disagree Completely, 5=Agree Completely) 23 
Success Likert (1=Disagree Completely, 5=Agree Completely) 24 
   
Overlap (Dimension#1) (1=Distinct, 7=Overlap) 10 
Threat (Dimension #2) (1=Threat, 7=No Threat) 11 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   
Policies Likert (1=Disagree Completely, 5=Agree Completely) 8 
Constraints Likert (1=None at all, 5=An enormous amount) 9 
Involvement Choice (Single answer; 1-8) 14 
Knowledge Choice (Single answer; 1-5) 15 
Activities Choice (Multiple answers; 1-10) 16 
Support Open-entry (4 prompts; Amounts sum to 100%) 17 
CONTROL  VARIABLES   
Personal Demographics   
Gender Dichotomous; M,F 25 
Career    
Rank Full, Associate, Assistant, Clinical, Lecturer 2 
Academic Years as an Academic 3 
Industry Years in Industry 4 
Tenure Tenured, On Track, Not on Track, No Tenure System 5 
Discipline Biological, Physical, Med, Engineering, Soc Sci  6 
Institution   
Type Carnegie classifications: RU/VH, RU/H, DRU IPEDS 
Control NSF; For-profit, Private, Private-religious, Public  
Research Expenditures NSF; 2007 data, by source of funds NSF 





Description of Respondents 
Faculty Profile/ Background variables 
The 1,210 faculty respondents in this study are drawn from 252 doctoral/ 
research universities and colleges from across the US.  Tables 7 and 8 below collect the 
descriptive information about the respondents based on information from the survey.  
Table 7 below presents two variables that are unique to this survey.  Table 8 provides 
summaries of common variables and comparisons with national data.  The comparison 
data comes from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).   
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Unique Survey Variables 







0 -7 years 292 24.2 Never worked in Industry 698 57.9 
8 - 15 years 338 28.0 Worked less than 1 year 101 8.4 
16- 24 years 303 25.1 1- 5 years 222 18.4 
25 + years 272 22.6 6 years or more 184 15.3 
TOTAL 1,205 100.0 TOTAL 1,205 100.0 
 
These faculty have been academics for many years.  The majority has no direct 
experience working in industry, although one-third have worked outside academia in 
this capacity.  They are active researchers, as emeritus faculty or anyone found to have 
primarily a clinical affiliation with their institution was excluded from the sample and 
this respondent pool.   
Moving to Table 8, the faculty are drawn from five broad disciplinary areas, with 
Engineering being the least represented (some engineering faculty indicated they did 




Medical/Health sciences providing the largest pool.  The majority are women, as female 
faculty were intentionally oversampled. 
Table 8: Comparative Descriptives of Faculty Population 
Primary Discipline Survey Population National Population 
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Engineering (all types) 164 13.6 22,810 12.5 
Medical/ Health Sciences 290 24.0 11,200 6.2 
Physical Sciences 223 18.4 28,430 15.6 
Biological Sciences 255 21.1 53,430 29.4 
Social Sciences 277 22.9 66,050 36.3 
TOTAL 1,209 100.0 181,920 100.0 
     
Present Academic Rank     
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Professor 470 39.0 61,454 37.7 
Associate Prof 404 33.6 48,789 29.9 
Assistant/ Res Scientist 330 27.4 52,815 32.4 
TOTAL 1,204 100.0 163,058 100.0 
     
Tenure Status     
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Tenured 807 66.9 94,540 58.0 
On tenure track 291 24.1 38,887 23.8 
Not tenured 108 9.0 29,631 18.2 
TOTAL 1,206 100.0 163,058 100.0 
     
Gender     
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Male 519 42.9 138,415 64.0 
Female 691 57.1 77,789 36.0 
TOTAL 1,210 100.0 216,204 100 
     
Institution Type     
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Very high research activity 686 56.7 228,785 62.8 
High research activity 352 29.1 94,217 25.9 
Doctoral/Research Universities 172 14.2 41,379 11.4 
Total 1210 100.0 364,381 100.0 
     
Control Type     
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Public 973 80.5 239,782 65.8 
Private 236 19.5 124,599 34.2 
Total 1209 100.0 364,381 100.0 




For the purposes of creating a picture of the general faculty population from 
which this sample was taken, to the general faculty population in the types of 
universities of interest in the study, Table 8 displays frequency distributions for 
academic rank, tenure status, gender, and discipline.  Using IPEDS data from 2006 on 
faculty demographics, data on academic rank and tenure status was available on full-
time research faculty for 178 of the institutions.  The NSF data on discipline is from the 
Division of Science Resources Statistics, 2003 Survey of Doctorate Recipients. 
The sample has a slightly higher percentage of Professors and Associate 
Professors than the population, and 5% fewer Assistants.  The sample is skewed toward 
more tenure since it has almost nine percentage points more professors, only half the 
percentage value of non-tenured faculty (18.2% v. 9.0%), with roughly equivalent 
proportions of faculty on the tenure track.  Regarding gender, the oversampling of 
women was mentioned above, and the resulting sample represents almost an inverse of 
the population, with e 64-36 split in the population and a 57.1% to 42.9% split in the 
sample, a difference of roughly 7 percentage points on both groups.  
Table 8 also summarizes the distribution of the faculty respondents among the 
three institutional types, and by public-private control of their respective institutions.  
Comparative data for these two items can also be found in Table 8 above.  More than 
half (56.7%) are from institutions classified as having “very high research activity,” which 
is below the population level of nearly 63%.  The proportions from institutions with 
“high research activity” (29.1%) and “doctoral/ research universities” (14.1%) are both 




control type, over 80% of the sample faculty are from public universities, while the 
remaining private grouping includes both religious and non-religious schools.  Thus, the 
respondent pool is oversampled in faculty from public universities and is 
underrepresented with regards to faculty from private institutions.  
Table 9 below breaks the sample down into groups based on the percentage of 
their funding they estimate comes from government and industry sources.  For the 
government funding, 31% of the sample report no such support; the remaining faculty 
were divided into quintiles to obtain meaningful stratification (higher within-group 
similarity) across the 100-point spectrum, while also creating roughly equal group sizes 
for analysis.  Overall, the data reveals that these faculty support their funding from 
diverse sources, as only 339 (28%) report having 90% or more of their funding coming 
from government sources.   
Table 9: Self-Reporting of Research Support, For Government and Industry Funding 
 
Percentage groupings, government funding 
 






No Government funding 375 31.0  No Industry funding 939 77.6 
1 to 49% 154 12.7  1 to 24% 154 12.7 
50 to 75% 209 17.3  25 to 100% 117 9.7 
76 to 89% 133 11.0  
   90 to 99% 169 14.0  
   100 % 170 14.0  
   Total 1210 100.0  Total 1210 100.0 
The grouping analysis was a little more challenging for the industry-funding data; 
more than three-fourths (77.6%) of the faculty report no industry funding for their 
research.  With the same goal for grouping as above, the remainder of the faculty was 
placed into two groups.  For these respondents, the smallest percentage of faculty 




CHAPTER  IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter has four main components.  First is a descriptive summary of the 
independent variables; second is the analysis of the faculty typology—including 
classification—which will address Research Questions 2 and 3.  The third and fourth 
sections each analyze data that answers Research Questions 1 and 5.  The third section 
is an analysis of the control scenarios defined as the Four Cs, while the fourth section is 
the analysis of the primary dependent variable—Control, measured by the variable 
“Self-Directed Research.”  This section includes an examination of group differences 
(which also addresses Research Question 4) and the OLS regression models. 
Descriptive Summary of Independent Variables 
This presentation of descriptive statistics corresponds to the survey questions, 
which can be referenced in Appendix 1.  
Institutional Influences on Research 
Institutional Policies for Commercial Environment 
 Table 10 below summarizes the means and standard deviations for the seven 
items that asked about the institutional climate and environment for research.  This set 
contained items that asked about policies that were both supportive and those that 




institution offers a supportive environment for entrepreneurship, patenting and 
licensing, and for resolving conflicts, as these were the highest rated items.  There was 
not much agreement that institutions restrict the publication of research results when it 
comes to commercial science.  Finally, there was general disagreement that institutions 
require faculty to offset their salaries with external research funds, while there was only 
slight agreement with the notion that universities provide internal funds to faculty for 
research support.   
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Environment for Research 
 N Mean SD 
Has an “entrepreneurial environment” that encourages the 
commercialization of research 
1072 3.51 1.12 
Requires me to offset part of my salary with external research  
funds 
1141 2.67 1.63 
Provides financial assistance to support aspects of my research 
program 
1144 3.14 1.24 
Has policies that restrict publications derived from sponsored 
research 
956 1.60 0.91 
Offers procedural support for faculty involved in patenting/ licensing 
of innovations 
836 4.03 0.90 
Has policies to help faculty prevent/resolve conflicts of 
interest/ commitment 
894 3.88 0.92 
Rewards commercial activity in promotion/tenure decisions 808 2.94 1.16 
Valid N (listwise) 546   
Note: 1=Disagree completely, 5=Agree completely 
Institutional Pressures/Constraints 
Table 11 below provides the descriptive statistics for the five variables asking 
about institutional constraints, or pressures that faculty feel to achieve particular 
outcomes associated with commercial science.  The 5-point scales for these variables 
have been re-coded, collapsing the two highest levels into a single category.  Based on 




make their research commercial.  None of the means here approach the level of 
“moderate (3)”, indicating that respondents generally express a sentiment closer to 
“only a little (2)” pressure to have the focus or produce the results considered here.   
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Pressure for Commercial Outcomes 
 N Mean SD 
Select topics with commercial potential 1115 1.68 0.98 
Focus on applied outcomes 1136 2.45 1.16 
Commercialize research results 1102 1.57 0.87 
Limit publication of research results 1133 1.17 0.51 
Generate revenues from research 1123 1.93 1.13 
Valid N (listwise) 1070   
Note: 1=None at all, 4=Significant/Overwhelming 
 
Personal Experience with Commercial Science 
Involvement 
 The first question set dealing with personal involvement in and experience with 
commercial science (CS) was adapted from an existing scale (Matkin, 1990), and asked 
faculty to indicate the highest level of involvement they had ever achieved with an 
invention or technology developed from commercial science activity.  The frequency 
distribution is shown in Table 12 below.  
Table 12:  Frequency Distribution for Highest Level of Commercial Involvement 
 Frequency Percent 
No CS activity 444 36.69 
No invention/ No action 399 32.98 
Pub findings, gave to sponsor 85 7.02 
Submitted invention disclosure 53 4.38 
Applied for patent 53 4.38 
Obtained patent 49 4.05 
Licensed invention 19 1.57 
Received royalty income 62 5.12 
Start-up from tech 46 3.80 




Almost 70% of these faculty (36.69% + 32.98% = 69.67%) fell into the first two 
categories listed, indicating that they either had no commercial science activity, had not 
had such an invention, or took no action with any invention.  The remaining levels 
indicate small percentages of faculty having experienced involvement with the other 
components of working with academic inventions.  Still, beginning with the fourth 
category—“Submitted invention disclosure”— 282 faculty (representing 23.3%) have at 
least started down the path of submitting an invention disclosure, with 46 of those 
indicating a start-up based on their research.  By this measure, the bulk of the faculty in 
this sample has not been commercially active via inventions, but a moderate-sized 
group has traveled far along this path. 
Activities 
Table 13: Highest Number of Commercial Science Activities 
 Frequency Percent 
No Involvement 554 45.79 
1 212 17.52 
2 176 14.55 
3 108 8.93 
4 or more 160 13.22 
Total 1210 100.00 
Table 13 above summarizes the data for the item that provided faculty with 10 
examples of commercial science activities such as consulting, research parks, or industry 
collaborations (see Appendix 1), and asked them to indicate whether they had ever 
been involved in them.  Positive indications were totaled for each respondent and the 
data are presented as here as the counts for each possible total.  The counts were below 




highest levels, so for analytical purposes, these categories were combined into one level 
of “4 or more.”  While the largest group of faculty has “No involvement,” totaling the 
number with at least one commercial science activity reveals that more than half 
(54.2%) have some current involvement as part of their normal duties.  Whereas most 
faculty are not involved in business development from inventions, it would appear many 
faculty have some exposure to this realm of activity.  
Personal Knowledge 
 Faculty were provided with a five-point scale with which to assess their own 
level of knowledge regarding commercial science processes and activities, especially in 
the context of the previous questions about inventions and commercial science 
activities.  This scale ranged from “no knowledge” to “sophisticated knowledge.”  Table 
14 below shows the frequency distribution for the results, with the two highest 
categories combined.  Over half of the faculty indicate possessing “vague” knowledge 
(50.72%) of the commercial science world, with another 22.55% acknowledging “No 
knowledge”.   Combining the top two groups, over one-quarter (26.72%) have at least 
“reasonable” knowledge.  Again, it would seem that the majority of these faculty are not 
directly involved in commercial science, but that those who are have learned from their 
experience.  
Table 14:  Frequencies for Self-Assessment of Commercial Science Knowledge 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
No knowledge 249 22.55 
Vague knowledge 560 50.72 
Reasonable knowledge 214 19.38 
Substantial/ Sophisticated 81 7.34 





 Faculty were asked to estimate the percentages of their research support that 
comes from various sources: 1) government, inclusive of federal and state levels and 
agencies, 2) industry, business, and corporations, 3) private organizations, such as 
foundations and professional associations, 4) university support, and 5) other.   













Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 




61.68 35.80 38.68 39.67 61.98 38.16 65.17 36.16 30.05 37.79 45.74*** 
Industry/ 
corporations2 




3.54 8.75 13.29 24.16 3.99 11.36 7.11 16.47 8.33 19.43 11.92*** 
University 
support4 
13.07 25.83 24.63 33.63 15.55 27.15 13.90 24.67 35.33 39.90 22.72*** 
Other 2.26 13.63 3.16 16.08 2.88 15.42 1.45 8.09 4.35 18.91 1.33 
 Notes: Means are percentages; η2 = effect size; *** = p < .001 
Effect sizes: 1 η2= 0.13, 2 η2= 0.05, 3 η2= 0.04, 4 η2= 0.07 
 
Table 15 above provides the mean percentage levels of support indicated, by 
source and academic discipline, from all sources.  Not surprisingly, most support comes 
from the government, with an average higher than 60% for the biological and physical 
sciences and engineering faculty.  Social science faculty rank last in government funding, 
but depend on the highest average levels of internal university support.  Industry 
funding is highest for engineers and lowest for social science faculty.  The medical 
science faculty indicate a broad support, with less than 40% from government, almost a 




university support is higher than industry funding, except for engineering where they 
are almost equal.   
Overall, there is wide variability in the data provided by respondents, owing to 
both the estimated nature of the data and the natural differences in actual levels of 
funding received by such a diverse group.  Also, there was a significant effect of 
academic discipline on all funding sources except ‘Other’, indicating statistically 
significant differences by discipline within these types of funding sources. 
 Summary 
 Faculty indicate the environment at their universities is generally supportive of 
commercial science activity, and that there is not overwhelming pressure to limit 
publications of results or skew their research towards commercial outcomes.  The 
involvement in and knowledge of commercial science seems to be concentrated in 
about one-quarter of the overall respondent pool, although more than half are involved 
in at least one commercial science activity.  Finally, their research is primarily 
government funded, with industry support ranking third or fourth in terms of 
percentage of support for all disciplines, except engineering, where it ranks second.   
Typology Variables (Res Q’s 2 &3) 
 This section of the analysis will address the second research question which 
focuses on the existence of alternate normative systems for academic science, and the 
third question regarding differences in background characteristics between types.  First, 




differences will be analyzed, and finally, the potency of the typology as a classification 
scheme will be tested, while also examining the integrity of the type constructs 
themselves.  
Self-Placement on Primary Typology Dimensions 
Rather than choose a type description that most appealed to them, faculty were 
asked to place themselves on two spectra—presented as seven-point scales—
representing the two primary dimensions of the typology.  The goal was to determine 
whether plotting the scores on these dimensions like coordinates on a graph would 
produce a distribution of faculty among the types that would differ from a distribution 
made from a more intricate classification method.   
First is the Overlap dimension (M=3.37, SD=1.59) which asks whether academia 
and industry are distinct realms or whether they overlap.  The other is the Threat 
dimension (M=3.65, SD=1.60), and asks whether or not they believe the academy is 
threatened by commercial science.  With higher numbers meaning Overlap and Threat, 
the means below the midpoint suggest these faculty see the academy and industry as 
more distinct, but that the academy is moderately threatened by commercial science 
(see Figure 3, p. 105).  The distribution from this self-rating, first presented in Chapter 3, 
will be compared with one produced from the index measures, as described below. 
Index Preferences (Composite Measures) 
 Beyond the self-reporting on the two main dimensions of the typology, a more 




discussed in Table 3 (p. 107).  Combining the description of the types with issues 
common in the literature on commercialization, a series of items was created that 
presented respondents with statements on the issues from the perspective of each type 
(Table 16, p. 142).  Since each type has five associated issue questions, composite 
variables were created averaging the means.  Table 16 presents the issue statements, 
descriptives, and their corresponding theorized faculty type.  
Looking at the issues in isolation, the scores for the funding statements indicate 
faculty believe that academic and commercial science have some compatibility, with the 
lowest score (2.94) coming for the Reluctant Entrepreneur position and the highest 
(3.86) for the Engaged Traditionalist position.  The division between basic and applied 
science seems less important than topic importance, as the Old School position here 
scores lowest (1.76) and the Engaged Traditionalist position is the highest.  For 
publishing /patenting, there is support for restrictions being seen as legitimate, although 
not to protect sponsors.   Still, the Old School position favoring publication over IP 
restrictions has the highest score.  Conflicts seem to worry faculty regarding their 
potential effect on academic science, and they seem to rate solutions by university 
policies and individual faculty negotiation about equally.   However, the highest scoring 





Table 16:  Descriptives for Issue Statements, with Corresponding Type Association 
 Mean SD N 
    
FUNDING    
Funding academic research with government grants is the best way to preserve 
faculty autonomy (Old School) 
3.63 1.00 1,035 
Both government grants and private contracts come with legitimate restrictions that 
faculty must negotiate (Engaged Traditionalist) 
3.86 0.74 1,018 
Private industry contracts should only be obtained as necessary to advance academic 
science (Reluctant Entrepreneur) 
2.94 1.04 1,005 
Private industry contracts can advance academic science with as much legitimacy as 
government grants (New School) 
3.37 1.00 1,016 
    
BASIC/APPLIED    
Applied research should be the domain of government and industry scientists, not 
academics (Old School) 
1.76 0.87 1,052 
Faculty are able to conduct commercial research while maintaining traditional 
academic values (Engaged Traditionalist) 
3.62 0.84 1,004 
Engaging into commercial activity is necessary to protect academic research from 
further encroachment by industry (Reluctant Entrepreneur) 
2.41 0.85 910 
Topic importance is a more vital research consideration than its classification as pure 
or applied science (New School) 
3.41 1.14 1,031 
    
PUBLISHING/PATENTING    
Academics should favor publication of results over any intellectual property 
protections         (Old School) 
3.70 1.01 1,020 
Publication restrictions are legitimately needed to protect research sponsors                      
(Engaged Traditionalist) 
2.53 1.01 959 
Patents and restrictions on private intellectual property are needed to protect 
academic science from industry (Reluctant Entrepreneur) 
3.37 0.93 917 
Patenting, and intellectual property restrictions are legitimate parts of research 
collaborations (New School) 
3.47 0.90 935 
    
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST/COMMITMENT    
Involvement with commercial activities fundamentally alters the academic 
environment for openness (Old School) 
3.29 1.00 985 
Academic recognition and commercial success are independent reward systems             
(Engaged Traditionalist) 
3.59 0.95 986 
University policies prevent conflicts of interest better than training individual faculty 
on industry engagement (Reluctant Entrepreneur) 
3.16 0.99 876 
Potential conflicts can best be addressed by individual faculty through negotiations 
with research sponsors (New School) 
3.23 0.99 946 
    
CRITERIA FOR GOOD SCIENCE    
Success should be evaluated primarily on traditional criteria like publications and 
contributions to the field (Old School) 
3.98 0.88 1,050 
Success can be measured by either academic achievement or significant commercial 
involvement, such as patenting (Engaged Traditionalist) 
3.40 0.97 1,037 
Success can be viewed as disseminating results and innovations through publications 
and patents (Reluctant Entrepreneur) 
3.95 0.69 1,042 
Success comes from applying academic research to solve important practical 
problems          (New School) 
3.73 0.99 1,043 
Valid N (listwise)   675 





For success in science, there is general agreement with the conventional 
viewpoints about evaluations of good science, but also agreement regarding the use of 
values consistent with commercial science and the non-conventional systems of 
thought.  Regarding these last two issue areas, it is possible that respondents had 
trouble drawing the distinctions between the type positions that the theory would 
indicate, or that the respondents would view their answers as context-dependent, 
rather than seeing the positions as widely applicable.   
In creating the indices, the questions that corresponded to each type were 
averaged in each case to create a composite score for that type.  Because a person 
could still have types with the same mean score, uniform random variance was again 
introduced for the purpose of breaking ties.  Each faculty respondent was given a 
composite score for each type, and values were compared to classify each person based 
on their highest score.  Interestingly, using these indices produces a different frequency 
distribution then does the use of only self-placement on the two primary dimensions.  
The comparison is presented below in Table 17.   
Table 17:  Comparison of Classification Methods for Faculty Type 
 Self-placement, 2 dimensions Index Preference 
 Frequency Valid Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Old School 332 28.8 292 27.1 
Engaged Traditionalist 407 35.3 256 23.8 
Reluctant Entrepreneur 139 12.1 123 11.4 
New School 274 23.8 406 37.7 
Total 1,152 100.0 1077 100.0 
 
In comparison to the initial classification, in this distribution, the largest group of 




almost 14%, while Old School still has the second largest group (27.1%), dropping nearly 
two points.  Engaged Traditionalist drops from first to third (23.8%), losing 11.5 points, 
while Reluctant Entrepreneur retains roughly the same proportion as before, while 
losing 0.7 points. Expressed as preferences, 35.2 % of the faculty had the highest 
agreement with the statements represented by the hybrid positions, and including the 
New School preference, 72.9% of these respondents expressed the highest agreement 
with a position other than that of the traditional, conventional views of academic 
science—the Old School position.  
Returning to the dimensions outlined in the typology theory (Figure 3, p. 105), 
this distribution indicates a preference for the positions with less perceived threat from 
commercial science and greater perceived overlap between the realms of academic and 
commercial science, especially in the growing preference for New School.  This 
observation indicates that when faculty are presented with a more complex picture of 
the issues related to academic and commercial science—such as the five issues 
incorporated into the study—and the different perspectives for science represented by 
the faculty typology, they indicate more tolerance for the ambiguity presented by the 
changing environment for sponsored research. 
Shifting the analysis to the integrity of the type constructs themselves, Table 18 
below presents a crosstabulation of the outcomes from these two placement 
procedures to allow for a comparison of the distribution among the types.   A high level 
of consistency among the two classification schemes would yield the highest 




consistency was only observed for the two primary types.  For these data, the Old 
School (retaining 46.1%) and New School (retaining 56.5 %) have the highest carryover 
from one classification to the other, while the two hybrid positions have their largest 
percentage of faculty classified as New School.   















N 143 54 45 68 310 
% Self-Placement 46.1% 17.4% 14.5% 21.9% 100.0% 
% Index Preference 49.3% 21.2% 37.2% 16.8% 29.0% 
 
      
Engaged 
Traditionalist 
N 90 106 44 137 377 
% Self-Placement 23.9% 28.1% 11.7% 36.3% 100.0% 
% Index Preference 31.0% 41.6% 36.4% 33.9% 35.2% 
 
      
Reluctant 
Entrepreneur 
N 34 25 15 56 130 
% Self-Placement 26.2% 19.2% 11.5% 43.1% 100.0% 
% Index Preference 11.7% 9.8% 12.4% 13.9% 12.1% 
 
      
New School 
N 23 70 17 143 253 
% Self-Placement 9.1% 27.7% 6.7% 56.5% 100.0% 
% Index Preference 7.9% 27.5% 14.0% 35.4% 23.6% 
 
      
 
N 290 255 121 404 1070 
TOTAL % Self-Placement 27.1% 23.8% 11.3% 37.8% 100.0% 
 
% Index Preference 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The largest overall distribution shift to the New School position came from the 
Reluctant Entrepreneur position; as these two positions share a belief that the academy 
and industry overlap, perhaps the issue questions revealed that many in this group do 
not consider view commercial science as the threat they might think at first.  Still, over 
half of those classified as Old School using the index preferences were other types using 
the self-placement method of measurement.  Perhaps the issue statements make their 





Using the index classification, the first element for examination of differences 
among the faculty types will be how they break down across the academic disciplines 
sampled.  Chi-square analysis provides strong evidence of an association between 
discipline and type (χ2 (12, N=1077) = 73.46, p < .001).  The results are in Table 19 below.   
















Old School Count 31 35 68 92 66 292 
% within Type 10.6% 12.0% 23.3% 31.5% 22.6% 100.0% 
% within Discipline 20.3% 14.1% 33.7% 38.8% 28.0% 27.1% 
Engaged 
Traditionalist 
Count 44 60 52 47 53 256 
% within Type 17.2% 23.4% 20.3% 18.4% 20.7% 100.0% 
% within Discipline 28.8%  24.1% 25.7% 19.8% 22.5% 23.8% 
Reluctant 
Entrepreneur 
Count 6 37 17 21 42 123 
% within Type 4.9% 30.1% 13.8% 17.1% 34.1% 100.0% 
% within Discipline 3.9% 14.9% 8.4% 8.9% 17.8% 11.4% 
New School Count 72 117 65 77 75 406 
% within Type 17.7% 28.8% 16.0% 19.0% 18.5% 100.0% 
% within Discipline 47.1% 47.0% 32.2% 32.5% 31.8% 37.7% 
 
Count 153 249 202 237 236 1077 
TOTAL % within Type 14.2% 23.1% 18.8% 22.0% 21.9% 100.0% 
 
% within Discipline 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Some findings are as expected: engineering (47.1%) and the medical sciences 
(47%) have their highest representation among the New School type, while engineers 
are lowest on Reluctant Entrepreneurs (3.9%).  Old School has its lowest representation 
in the disciplines that could be expected, engineering (10.6%) and the medical sciences 
(12%), while having higher proportions among the physical (23.3%) and biological 
(31.5%) sciences, which typically prize basic research more highly, and the social 
sciences (22.6%) which generally do not have opportunities to participate in commercial 




Some surprising findings include the highest proportion of social science faculty 
appearing as New School (31.8%), and the relatively consistent proportions of Engaged 
Traditionalist types across the five disciplines.  Both the medical (30.1%) and social 
(34.1%) sciences have a high proportion of faculty falling into the Reluctant 
Entrepreneur type, which is more understandable for the social science group than it is 
for the medical science faculty.   
This breakdown does point out the fact that all four faculty types are 
represented across these five disciplines, indicating again that it may be difficult with 
this typology to reliably place faculty in mutually exclusive categories.  However, it does 
add support to the idea that academic science is being conducted with differing value 
structures across the university, and not just in one or two specialized fields that are 
close to industry.   
Besides discipline, the only other career variable to show an association with 
faculty type is years worked in industry (χ2 (9, N=1074) = 71.65, p < .001).  Academic 
rank, tenure, and years as an academic showed no significant associations with type.   
Table 20 below shows the crosstab for faculty type by “years worked in industry.”  There 
appears to be an association between New School and years worked in industry, as 
those having worked both “1- 5years” and “6 years or more” have their highest 
representation within New School.  However, both Old School and New School have 
roughly equal proportions of faculty among those who have “worked less than 1 year” 




preferred by wide margins in every category, except in the “Never worked” group, 
where the gap closes.  
Table 20: Faculty types, by Years Worked in Industry 





New School TOTAL 
Never worked 
in Industry 
Count 195 128 94 203 620 
% within Industry Work 31.5% 20.6% 15.2% 32.7% 100.0% 
% within Type 67.2% 50.0% 77.0% 50.0% 57.7% 
Worked less 
than 1 year 
Count 31 31 6 29 97 
% within Industry Work 32.0% 32.0% 6.2% 29.9% 100.0% 
% within Type 10.7% 12.1% 4.9% 7.1% 9.0% 
1- 5 years Count 49 52 13 84 198 
% within Industry Work 24.7% 26.3% 6.6% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within Type 16.9% 20.3% 10.7% 20.7% 18.4% 
6 years or more Count 15 45 9 90 159 
% within Industry Work 9.4% 28.3% 5.7% 56.6% 100.0% 
% within Type 5.2% 17.6% 7.4% 22.2% 14.8% 
TOTAL 
Count 290 256 122 406 1074 
% within Industry Work 27.0% 23.8% 11.4% 37.8% 100.0% 
% within Type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Among the variables measuring personal experience with commercial science, 
Chi-square analysis does show strong evidence of an association between ‘knowledge of 
commercialization processes’ and type (χ2 (9, (N=1062) = 20.34, p = .016).  Table 21 
below presents the contingency table for these variables.  The data present modest 
evidence that an increase in commercial science  knowledge is associated with being 
New School, with the “reasonable” and “substantial” categories being more highly 
represented among New School than those indicating ‘No’ knowledge, while even those 
indicating ‘vague’ knowledge more often fall into the New School type.   
The percentage of each category falling into Engaged Traditionalist declines 
slightly as the knowledge level increases, until a jump in the final grouping.  Among 
those indicating ‘substantial/sophisticated knowledge,’ Engaged Traditionalist is second 




seems to show a negative association with commercial science knowledge, as its 
proportion decreases as the level of knowledge rises; it seems the more they learn, the 
less they like it.  Also, while the overall percentages are higher, Old School presents this 
same inverse relationship pattern.  
Table 21: Faculty Type, by Knowledge of Commercial Science Processes 




Entrepreneur New School 
TOTAL 
No knowledge Count 75 57 34 64 230 
% within CS Knowledge 32.6% 24.8% 14.8% 27.8% 100.0% 
% within Type 26.0% 22.4% 28.6% 16.0% 21.7% 
Vague knowledge Count 146 130 58 213 547 
% within CS Knowledge 26.7% 23.8% 10.6% 38.9% 100.0% 
% within Type 50.5% 51.2% 48.7% 53.3% 51.5% 
Reasonable              
knowledge 
Count 50 43 23 92 208 
% within CS Knowledge 24.0% 20.7% 11.1% 44.2% 100.0% 
% within Type 17.3% 16.9% 19.3% 23.0% 19.6% 
Substantial/    
Sophisticated 
Count 18 24 4 31 77 
% within CS Knowledge 23.4% 31.2% 5.2% 40.3% 100.0% 
% within Type 6.2% 9.4% 3.4% 7.8% 7.3% 
TOTAL 
Count 289 254 119 400 1062 
% within CS Knowledge 27.2% 23.9% 11.2% 37.7% 100.0% 
% within Type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Among the other variables measuring personal experience with commercial 
science, there is also a general trend for greater involvement equating to New School 
placement, and less involvement leading to an Old School one.  Chi-square analyses for 
‘involvement in commercial science inventions’ and type (χ2 (24, (N=107) = 39.91, p = 
.022) and ‘number of commercial science activities’ and type (χ2 (12, (N=1077) = 62.98, p 
< .001) each reveal significant associations with faculty type.  The extent to which these 
associations persist in the presence of other variables will be determined in the models 
predicting the dependent variable of control over research agendas.  
Regarding the variables inquiring about university policies for commercial 




differences among the faculty types.  Descriptive statistics and group differences are 
presented in Table 22 below.  Two variables dealing with the environment for 
commercial science—‘offers financial support for my research’ (F (3, 1060) = 4.099, p = 
.007), and ‘has policies to resolve conflicts of interest’ (F (3, 829) = 4.157, p = .006) —
each had significant differences between Old School and Engaged Traditionalist.  The 
effect sizes were small (0.011 and 0.015, respectively), but these data indicate that 
Engaged Traditionalist faculty feel greater support for their research than do Old School 
types, but that both perceive some support in these areas.  






Entrepreneur New School 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
My institution: 1 
        Offers financial support  
for my research 2.95a 1.26 3.30 a 1.25 3.17 1.16 3.19 1.23 
Has policies to resolve conflicts 3.74 a 0.95 4.06 a 0.88 3.92 0.90 1.67 0.97 
         In my research, I feel pressure to: 2 
        Select topics with commercial 
potential 1.67 a 0.97 1.69 b 0.97 1.39 a,b 0.75 1.77 1.02 
Focus on applied outcomes 2.24 a 1.13 2.40 b 1.14 2.33 c 1.14 1.60 a,b,c 0.91 
Commercialize my research results 1.60 a 0.91 1.55 b 0.85 1.29 a,b,c 0.53 1.64 c 0.92 
1Note: 1=Disagree completely, 5=Agree completely 
2Note: 1=None at all, 2=Only a little, 3= A moderate amount, 4=Significant/Overwhelming 
  Note: Means sharing subscripts within a row are significantly different. 
With respect to the variables asking about pressure for commercial science 
outcomes, three— ‘select topics with commercial potential’ (F (3, 1040) = 4.665, p = 
.003), ‘focus on applied outcomes’ (F (3, 1057) = 7.727, p < .001), and ‘commercialize 
research results’ (F (3, 1027) = 4.992, p = .002) —presented several significant 




more pressure than do Reluctant Entrepreneur types to select commercial topics.  
Engaged Traditionalists indicate the most pressure to focus on applied outcomes, while 
New School types express less pressure than all the others.  Reluctant Entrepreneurs 
also indicate the lowest pressure to commercialize their results, while New School 
express the highest.  In all three cases, the effect sizes are small (0.013, 0.022, and 
0.014, respectively).  
These data, combined with what did not produce significant differences, indicate 
that the faculty types are not significantly different with respect to most of the policies 
supporting or constraining the research of the faculty that were asked for this study.  
The most differences are regarding pressure for applied outcomes and commercial 
results, with Old School and New School showing mixed results, and the Engaged 
Traditionalist type indicating higher pressure than the Reluctant Entrepreneur type.  
Work experience in industry and knowledge of commercial science processes is 
associated with a movement towards New School, but other background factors were 
not significant.   
Although there is a significant association between discipline and type, there 
were both some expected and some surprising distribution patterns, yielding no clear 
alignment between the discipline and particular types—a result that probably says more 
about the broad-based nature of the transformation of academic science than it does 
about the validity of the typology.  Thus it becomes difficult to construct a profile of 
each of the types, or to verify that the faculty falling into the types in this study mirror 





The next step in the typology analysis was to determine whether it provides any 
indication of mutually exclusive types that could be used for classification purposes and 
group comparisons in the regression models.  Table 23 below reveals some low to 
moderate correlations between the four composite index scores for the type variables, 
using the groupings derived from the index preferences.  Given that these are paired 
comparisons, if the types were indeed distinct, we should expect to see moderate to 
high negative correlations, so that as a person scores high on one, they should be lower 
on the other.  The correlations observed here are moderate, and there are only two 
negative correlations, although interestingly, Old School—New School is one of these, as 
is Old School—Engaged Traditionalist.  Others are positively correlated, and the Engaged 
Traditionalist-New School has a moderate positive correlation, possibly explaining the 
movement towards New School in the placement method comparison.   
Table 23: Correlations of Type Indices 




Entrepreneur New School 
Old School --    
Engaged 
Traditionalist 
-0.34 ** --   
Reluctant 
Entrepreneur 
0.25 ** 0.06 * --  
New School -0.44 ** 0.51 ** -0.01 -- 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Graphical observation makes the case more clearly.  Figure 5 on page 154 
contains six graphs of the possible type pairings (these graphs are reproduced in 




toward distinct types would reveal clustering along the axes—with high values for one 
and low for another.  The six graphs display cases in bins, with larger circles representing 
more cases.  Also, fit lines are included to show the slope of the relationship.  The actual 
numerical values on the graphs are not critical; the important item of focus is the 
clustering of the bin counts.   
The graphs show further evidence of a lack of distinction between types.  
Instead, clustering occurs around the midpoints or the intersection of two types in each 
graph.  The clearest distinction can be seen in the Old School—New School comparison, 
which has the negative correlation of -0.44.  This provides some support for the theory, 
since it is these main-diagonal positions that are posited to be most directly opposed.  
The strongest positive correlation is for Engaged Traditionalist—New School, which is 
perhaps explained by each positions acceptance of the need for commercial activity.  
The graphical analysis shows that it may be difficult to reliably place people into 
one type category.  This could be because the type constructs are not as distinct as the 
theory would indicate, or it could be that the faculty in this study have preferences that 
fall across types, or that their preferences could be context-dependent.  Since there is 
not a clear way to classify faculty respondents into one type, this could be evidence that 










Another way to look at how the classifications of the typology theory do not 
match the complexity of the issues involved in commercial science is to examine how 
respondents rated the individual issues: funding, basic/applied research, publishing/ 
patenting, conflicts of interest/commitment, and criteria for good science.  Table 24 on 
the next page summarizes the items rated highest, or that had the highest level of 
agreement, among the faculty of a given type.   
The five primary rows represent the five issue questions (funding, etc.), and 
within each is an indicator for the questions written from the point of view of the types 
(see Table 16, p. 142).  The middle columns are the faculty classified into one of the four 
types (using the indices), so each cell is the percentage of each faculty type who had the 
highest level of agreement with the questions that correspond to each viewpoint.  The 
columns to the right depict the same data in terms of rankings, from highest to lowest 
levels of agreement.   The bottom section summarizes how many times faculty of each 
type agreed with the question representing their own type first, second, third or fourth.  
 
 
Table 24: Percentages and Rankings for Type Agreement on Issue Questions 
    Faculty Type -Index Preferences Faculty Type -Index Preferences 
  
Percentages Rankings (High to Low) 
















 Funding Issues Old School 54.4% 13.1% 30.5% 13.2% 1 2 2 3 
Eng. Trad 41.8% 82.1% 60.2% 72.5% 2 1 1 1 
Reluctant  Entr 3.2% .8% 4.2% .5% 3 4 4 4 
New School .7% 4.0% 5.1% 13.7% 4 3 3 2 
Basic-Applied 
Issues 
Old School 16.2% 2.0% 4.1% 1.0% 3 3 4 3 
Eng. Trad 26.4% 49.0% 29.8% 16.0% 2 1 2 2 
Reluctant  Entr 2.5% .4% 9.1% .5% 4 4 3 4 
New School 54.9% 48.6% 57.0% 82.5% 1 2 1 1 
 Publish-Patent 
Issues 
Old School 62.9% 15.9% 18.3% 22.7% 1 2 3 2 
Eng. Trad 1.4% 3.3% 1.7% 1.8% 4 4 4 4 
Reluctant  Entr 15.9% 14.6% 41.7% 9.7% 3 3 1 3 
New School 19.8% 66.1% 38.3% 65.8% 2 1 2 1 
Conflicts Issues Old School 25.8% 5.0% 13.3% 4.6% 3 4 3 4 
Eng. Trad 36.4% 57.1% 21.2% 41.2% 1 1 2 1 
Reluctant  Entr 34.9% 32.1% 61.1% 30.2% 2 2 1 2 
New School 2.9% 5.8% 4.4% 24.0% 4 3 4 3 
Success Issues Old School 41.8% 4.0% 13.6% 6.2% 1 4 3 3 
Eng. Trad 8.0% 22.5% 10.2% 6.2% 4 2 4 3 
Reluctant  Entr 22.0% 12.4% 22.0% 10.7% 3 3 2 2 
New School 28.2% 61.0% 54.2% 76.9% 2 1 1 1 
         
   
RANKING OWN TYPE: 1st 3 3 2 3 
     
2nd 0 1 1 1 
     
3rd 2 0 1 1 





Similar to the comparison of the two classification schemes in Table 18 (p. 145), 
part of the story is in the main diagonals (like a correlation table), which have been 
highlighted for the rankings.  This analysis does show some stability for the types.   For 
each issue, faculty had the highest levels of agreement (ranked 1) with the question 
representing their own point of view twice, and this occurred three times for the 
‘publishing/ patenting’ issue.  The bottom summary presents how many times each type 
had ranked is associated issue question ranked 1st, and this occurred three times for 
every type except Reluctant Entrepreneur, which had two 1st rankings.  Still, the 
rankings do not tell the whole story, as there are many large gaps between the 
percentages of faculty within various groups, so the ordering of agreement belies the 
disparity between types.  Many types show large percentage drop-offs between 1st and 
2nd, for example, which again speaks to some measure of inconsistency in the rankings. 
Since there is not a reliable method to classify each faculty respondent into one 
type, additional analysis was performed to identify the preference orders the faculty 
express among the four types, again using their composite scores.  There are 24 possible 
combinations of preference order, and each faculty respondent was placed into one of 
the combinations.   
The analysis of patterns in the data reveals a distribution among all of them, 
rather than a clustering around just a few, and there were no combinations that 
remained unused.   The results, sorted in descending order of occurrence, are shown in 
Table 25 below, with the first column presenting the top two preferences, and the 




Table 25:  Distribution of 24 Possible Type Preference Orders, with Sorting 
Sorted  Preferences 
Top 2 





New School- Engaged Traditionalist Reluctant Entrepreneur-Old School 165 15.5 
New School- Engaged Traditionalist Old School-Reluctant Entrepreneur 109 10.2 
Engaged Traditionalist -New School Reluctant Entrepreneur -Old School 87 8.2 
Old School- Reluctant Entrepreneur Engaged Traditionalist -New School 78 7.3 
Old School- Reluctant Entrepreneur New School -Engaged Traditionalist 54 5.1 
Engaged Traditionalist -New School New School -Engaged Traditionalist 53 5.0 
Old School -Engaged Traditionalist New School -Reluctant Entrepreneur 50 4.7 
New School -Reluctant Entrepreneur Engaged Traditionalist -Old School 44 4.1 
Old School -Engaged Traditionalist Reluctant Entrepreneur -New School 43 4.0 
New School -Old School Engaged Traditionalist -Reluctant Entrepreneur 41 3.8 
Old School -New School Engaged Traditionalist -Reluctant Entrepreneur 34 3.2 
Engaged Traditionalist -Reluctant Entrepreneur Old School -New School 31 2.9 
Old School -New School Reluctant Entrepreneur- Engaged Traditionalist 29 2.7 
Engaged Traditionalist -Old School New School- Reluctant Entrepreneur 28 2.6 
Engaged Traditionalist -Old School Reluctant Entrepreneur -New School 27 2.5 
Engaged Traditionalist -Reluctant Entrepreneur New School -Old School 26 2.4 
New School -Old School Reluctant Entrepreneur -Engaged Traditionalist 26 2.4 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -Old School Engaged Traditionalist -New School 25 2.3 
Reluctant Entrepreneur-Engaged Traditionalist New School -Old School 24 2.3 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -Old School New School- Engaged Traditionalist 22 2.1 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -Engaged Traditionalist Old School -New School 19 1.8 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -New School Old School -Engaged Traditionalist 19 1.8 
New School -Reluctant Entrepreneur Old School -Engaged Traditionalist 19 1.8 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -New School Engaged Traditionalist -Old School 12 1.1 
Total  1,065 100.0 
Note: Primary types; Hybrid types 
Those with New School as a first preference make up 37.9 % of the faculty, with 
an additional 22% having New School as their second most-preferred. Those with Old 
School as a first preference area represent about 26.9% of the respondents, and 
another 15.9% indicate Old School as their second preference.  Surprising also may be 
the 638 people with New School as a first or second choice, representing 60% of the 
sample, whereas 457, or 42%, have Old School in their top two preferences.  Thus, Old 
School values and the conventional view of research are still very much present in the 




The three highest frequencies are for the combinations that have New School 
and Engaged Traditionalist in the top two, representing 33.9% of the respondents.  
These are the faculty who share a belief that commercial science is not a threat to the 
academy.  However, the next largest group (12.4%) is those who preferred the positions 
that do view commercial science as a threat—Old School and Reluctant Entrepreneur.   
The occurrences of having one of the two hybrid positions as one of the top two 
are less frequent.  Engaged Traditionalist is the first preference for 23.7% of these 
faculty, while 11.4% prefer Reluctant Entrepreneur first.  Also, 11 of the bottom 13 
groupings have one of the hybrid positions first, and four of these have both as the two 
most preferred.  Reluctant Entrepreneur is the least preferred overall, as all six of its 
appearances in the first position occur in the bottom seven combinations.  And while 10 
of the first 12 combinations have a hybrid type in the top two, only three have it as the 
first position.  Still, these patterns reveal that one of the hybrid position are legitimately 
preferred first by more than one-third of the sampled faculty (35%), showing that 
faculty with these values can do research at major universities.   
Summary 
The typology placement based on the indices presents a more complex 
understanding of the boundary between academic and commercial science than does 
just asking faculty about the threats from or overlap with industry.  Faculty were not 
asked to place themselves into one of the types, but their rating of the dimensions 
produced a distribution indicating moderate threat from commercial science and a 




Engaged Traditionalist type, followed by Old School, it was reasonable to conclude 
faculty believe traditional academic values can either be maintained in the face of any 
threat, or that the separate nature of academic and commercial science means that the 
academy as a whole will not be undermined by individual faculty engaging in such 
activity.   
However, the two different classification procedures showed that placement via 
the indices reveals a shift in the distribution towards the New School perspective as 
first, whereas it was third initially. The picture emerging from this distribution is one of 
greater overlap between academic and commercial science and a lesser threat from 
commercial science.  The inference would be either that academic values can be made 
to work alongside those from the commercial science culture, or that the normative 
structure of commercial science is simply part of the process for conducting academic 
science now.  However, the continued prominence of Old School signifies the 
persistence of traditional values.  
Based on the results presented here and other analysis that was undertaken, the 
faculty typology of academy-industry relations as measured in this study is not workable 
as a classification scheme to reliably differentiate amongst a pool of academic scientists. 
There does not appear to be sufficient distinction between the constructs defining each 
type to allow for clean placement of faculty into one type, especially for those that may 
exist on the theoretical border between two types.  Combined, these findings seem to 
indicate that the value systems faculty bring into sponsored research activity could be 




With respect to examining group differences among faculty types, the analysis 
was dependent upon the type constructs themselves being distinct enough to produce a 
reasonable classification, and that the constructs would be sufficiently well-defined so 
that the faculty indicating a preference as one of the types would have beliefs that 
distinguished them from faculty in the other types.   Hence, there does not appear to be 
a reliable way of assigning particular background characteristics to the types for any 
predictive purposes.  
 
Dependent Variables: Measures of Control (Res Q’s 1 & 5) 
Based on the review of the literature, faculty should exhibit some differences in 
their perceived sense of control by academic discipline and source of support for their 
research.   Also, it is theorized that there will be some differences between faculty 
types, so the analysis here will also test the academy-industry typology offered by 
Owen-Smith and Powell (2001).  Before that, however, the control scenarios (Four Cs) 
are examined. 
Control Scenarios (Four Cs) 
First are the results from the theoretical scenarios for control and sponsor 
relations—Curiosity, Collaboration, Compromise, & Concession (see Table 2, p. 102).  
Respondents were asked to rate the frequency of occurrence of four different scenarios 
regarding control over their topic choices, in relation to sponsorship from both 




that the first two outcomes in Pairs 1 and 2—Curiosity and Collaboration—involve 
scenarios in which faculty can obtain funding for their interests or negotiate with 
sponsors to get most of what they seek, these can be referred to as affirmative 
measures of self-direction.  The other two outcomes in Pairs 3 and 4—Compromise and 
Concession—involve negative scenarios in which limiting restrictions or overcoming 
interference from sponsors is desired, rather than having to compromise research topics 
or concede one’s interests.  Higher scores here indicate higher levels of freedom from 
interference and other hindrances, thus resulting in greater control.  
The mean comparisons for the four paired scenarios for government and 
industry funding are displayed in Table 26 below.  Based on this data, overall the faculty 
respondents feel they retain more control or have greater freedom from interference 
when receiving sponsorship from government agencies.  In three of four cases, the 
means are significantly higher for government funding.  The values as a whole also 
suggest that freedom from interference is more likely to indicate greater control as 
respondents indicate higher values (less frequency of occurrence) for Compromise and 
Concession; measures for self-direction, as expressed here in the Curiosity measure, 
score moderately high on control, indicating that topic selection based solely on faculty 
interests happens more often than just ‘Occasionally’.   
The scores for industry funding also indicate that interference (Pairs 3 and 4) is a 
less common occurrence—and thus results in higher control scores—than does either of 
the self-direction measures in Pairs 1 and 2, Curiosity and Collaboration.  The control 




measured here, indicating that faculty only rarely feel they can be self-directed in their 
topic choice when getting industry sponsorship.  However, given that industry generally 
has specific objectives for its research sponsorship, this should not be surprising.   
 Table 26:  Results from Paired T-Tests of Four Theoretical Scenarios for Sponsor Relations 
 Mean SD t df Sig.  
Pair 1 
CURIOSITY: Government funding 
Able to obtain funds solely on my interests  
3.31 1.13 
      
CURIOSITY: Industry-Corporate funding 
Able to obtain funds solely on my interests 
2.22 1.21 23.17 799 0.00 
Pair 2 
COLLABORATE: Government funding 
Agree on topics of mutual interest  
2.72 1.38 
      
COLLABORATE: Industry-Corporate funding 
Agree on topics of mutual interest 
2.72 1.55 0.05 779 0.96 
 Note: 1= Never, 2=Rarely, 3=Occasionally, 4=Usually, 5= Always    
       
Pair 3 
COMPROMISE: Government funding 
Yield some aspects of topic selection 
3.62 1.39 
      
COMPROMISE: Industry-Corporate funding 
YIELD SOME ASPECTS OF TOPIC SELECTION 
3.51 1.48 2.51 754 0.01 
Pair 4 
CONCESSION: Government funding 
Accede to sponsor influence to get funds 
3.88 1.24 
      
CONCESSION: Industry-Corporate funding 
Accede to sponsor influence to get funds 
3.61 1.44 6.35 726 0.00 
 Note: 1=Always, 2=Usually, 3=Occasionally, 4=Rarely, 5=Never    
Note:  Higher scores indicate higher self-perceptions of control 
It is also possible to examine the differences for the scores within a funding type 
according to kind of control they indicate.  Remembering that two constructs—Curiosity 
and Collaboration—are affirmative  aspects of control indicating self-direction, and the 
other two outcomes—Compromise and Concession—are negative definitions in which 
higher scores indicate overcoming sponsor interference, Table 27 below presents 
comparisons of these combinations within each funding type.  Within each pair, the 




In all eight of these comparisons, the mean for the lower item (the adverse 
outcome) is higher than that of the upper item (the affirmative outcome), and the mean 
difference is significant for every paired test. This would mean that faculty express a 
greater sense of control when control is defined as freedom from adverse influences of 
sponsors on their research agendas.  Thus, the faculty feel more secure about not being 
interfered with by their sponsors than they do about having complete or mostly-
complete autonomy from them.   
Table 27: Results from Paired T-Tests of Positive and Negative Control Scenarios 
Government-Agency Funding 
  
Mean SD t df Sig. 
Pair 1 CURIOSITY 3.47 1.10 
   
COMPROMISE 3.67 1.38 -4.21 1038 0.00 
Pair 2 CURIOSITY 3.47 1.10 
   
CONCESSION 3.95 1.22 -10.74 1020 0.00 
Pair 3 COLLABORATE 2.66 1.39 
   
COMPROMISE 3.67 1.38 -14.52 1026 0.00 
Pair 4 COLLABORATE 2.67 1.39 
   
CONCESSION 3.94 1.21 -19.37 1010 0.00 
Industry-Corporate Funding 
  
Mean SD t df Sig. 
Pair 1 CURIOSITY 2.27 1.22 
   
COMPROMISE 3.51 1.48 -17.12 750 0.00 
Pair 2 CURIOSITY 2.28 1.22 
   
CONCESSION 3.61 1.44 -18.94 728 0.00 
Pair 3 COLLABORATE 2.73 1.55 
   
COMPROMISE 3.51 1.48 -8.19 759 0.00 
Pair 4 COLLABORATE 2.75 1.55 
   
CONCESSION 3.61 1.44 -9.24 735 0.00 






To delve into these control scenarios a little more deeply, the next table presents 
the results of one-way independent ANOVAs, testing for group differences by academic 
discipline (Table 28 below, p. 166).  Several things stand out when considering the group 
differences.  Engineering, for example, is significantly different from at least one other 
discipline in all but one comparison (Curiosity-industry), and in many cases, more than 
one.  Also, engineering presents some interesting circumstances; in the upper half of the 
table which presents the two affirmative scenarios exhibiting self-direction, it has the 
highest score for Collaboration for both forms of sponsorship, but is fourth for Curiosity 
with government sponsorship.  However, for both measures of freedom from 
interference, engineers present the lowest scores (the lowest control) in all cases.   
Social scientists present interesting extremes; they express most of the lowest 
scores for the self-direction measures, Curiosity and Collaborate—and understandably, 
with industry funding—but indicate the highest levels on the four measures of freedom 
from interference—Compromise and Concession—regardless of funding source.  
Meanwhile, the medical, physical, and biological science respondents all indicate 
moderate and moderately low levels of self-direction, with Curiosity-government being 
the highest rated scenario, but with Collaboration scoring higher overall.  The medical, 
physical, and biological science disciplines each present moderately-high to high scores 
on the measures of freedom from interference, with Concession being the rarest 
scenario.  Perhaps engineers tolerate these more restrictive scenarios as part of their 
work, as they express the lowest control scores for these scenarios, but in any case, they 






Table 28: Mean Scores on Control Scenarios, by Academic Discipline 
 




Physical Sciences Biological 
Sciences 
Social Sciences ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F η2 
 Affirmative scenarios: self-direction, autonomy     
             
CURIOSITY: Government 3.30a,b,c 1.03 3.40 1.15 3.63
 
 b,d 1.02 3.64
 
 c,e 1.03 3.25
 
 d,e 1.22 5.89 *** 0.02 






c 1.23 6.62 *** 0.03 








 c,d 1.35 9.01 *** 0.03 









24.92 *** 0.11 
    Note: 1= Never, 2= Rarely, 3= Occasionally, 4= Usually, 5= Always         
 Negative scenarios: restriction, interference     
             
COMPROMISE: Government 3.17 a,b,c,d 1.21 3.68 a 1.48 3.66 b 1.38 3.76 c 1.38 3.95 d 1.28 7.68 *** 0.03 
COMPROMISE: Industry-Corp 2.66 a,b,c,d 1.27 3.76 a 1.48 3.43 b,e 1.50 3.44 c,f 1.47 4.15 d,e,f 1.24 22.08 *** 0.10 
CONCESSION: Government 3.43 a,b,c,d 1.29 3.93 a 1.24 4.03 b 1.17 4.00 c 1.21 4.20 d 1.07 9.85 *** 0.04 
CONCESSION: Industry-Corp 2.80 a,b,c,d 1.31 3.91 a 1.35 3.57 b,e 1.45 3.50 c,f 1.50 4.19 d,e,f 1.21 20.94 *** 0.10 
  Note: 1=Always, 2=Usually, 3=Occasionally, 4=Rarely, 5=Never     
Note: Means sharing subscripts within a row are significantly different. *** = p < .001 






Even though some groups express high or low scores relative to others, it should 
be noted how infrequently faculty expressed extremely high levels of self-direction or 
freedom from interference.  For the two self-direction measures—Curiosity and 
Collaboration—there are no group means at 3.70 or higher; most of the scores are 
between 2.0 and 3.0.  On the measures regarding restriction and interference—
Compromise and Concession—the scores are generally higher, with only two scores for 
engineering being below 3.0.  However, just five of the 20 scores here are above 4.0, 
with social scientists falling between “Rarely “and “Never” three times.  Meanwhile 
faculty from the biological and physical sciences each scored above 4.0 in the area of 
Concession-government.   
Table 29 below (p. 168) displays the mean score comparisons by the faculty type 
variable being tested in this study.  Only three of the eight scenarios have significant 
differences between the types: Curiosity-industry and the two Collaborate scenarios.  
The two types on the main diagonal of Table 1 and Figure 3—Old School and New 
School—are significantly different, and have the highest mean differences for the three 
measures.  Old School is also significantly different (and rates lower) from Engaged 
Traditionalist in each scenario, but has no significant differences from Reluctant 
Entrepreneur.  Given the low scores, it would also appear that Old School faculty 
generally perceive the least amount of control regarding Curiosity and Collaboration.  
Also, in accordance with the theory, New School faculty express higher scores in 
scenarios involving industry funding, but they also are significantly higher regarding 






Table 29:  Mean Scores on Control Scenarios, by Faculty Type 
 Old School Engaged Traditionalist Reluctant Entrepreneur New School ANOVA 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F η2 
 Affirmative scenarios: self-direction, autonomy    
           
CURIOSITY: Government 3.59 1.07 3.40 1.13 3.47 1.09 3.39 1.09 2.01 0.006 
CURIOSITY: Industry-Corp 1.89 a,b 1.11 2.27 a 1.16 2.27 1.29 2.37 b 1.22 6.25*** 0.024 
COLLABORATE: Government 2.34 a,b 1.40 2.81 a 1.33 2.61 1.45 2.82 b 1.39 7.33*** 0.022 
COLLABORATE: Industry-Corp 2.33 a,b 1.55 3.11 a,c 1.55 2.30 c,d 1.50 2.84 b,d 1.51 10.24*** 0.040 
 Note: 1= Never, 2= Rarely, 3= Occasionally, 4= Usually, 5= Always       
 Negative scenarios: restriction, interference    
           
COMPROMISE: Government 3.77 1.39 3.56 1.35 3.60 1.48 3.67 1.38 1.06 0.003 
COMPROMISE: Industry-Corp 3.53 1.59 3.41 1.42 3.64 1.55 3.53 1.43 0.47 0.002 
CONCESSION: Government 4.07 1.21 3.93 1.16 3.87 1.27 3.88 1.25 1.38 0.004 
CONCESSION: Industry-Corp 3.52 1.56 3.44 1.47 3.71 1.49 3.72 1.35 1.61 0.007 
 Note: 1=Always, 2=Usually, 3=Occasionally, 4=Rarely, 5=Never     
 Note: Means sharing subscripts within a row are significantly different. *** = p < .001 





The hybrid positions only have one significant difference with each other—on 
Collaborate-industry, with Engaged Traditionalist having the highest score of any type 
for this scenario.  The Engaged Traditionalists—those who view commercialization as 
something that can be done in moderation without damaging academia as a whole—
report a higher frequency of collaboration with research sponsors for government 
funding than do Reluctant Entrepreneurs.  For their part, Reluctant Entrepreneurs, who 
view commercial activity as an unfortunate necessity, perceive significantly less control 
than do New School faculty.   
The lowest set of scores observed is for Curiosity-based research with industry 
funding, with results hovering around the “Rarely” range, and Old School faculty seem 
to have the lowest perceptions of self-direction in the three scenarios with meaningful 
group differences.  In general, the scores for the four self-direction measures are lower 
than for the freedom from interference ones, however, there are no significant group 
differences in the bottom half of the table.   
Regression Models (Four Cs) 
Table 30 below (p. 170) summarizes the results from regression models 
estimated for all eight of the control variables discussed here.  The full details of each 
model can be found in Appendices 8 – 15.  Gender was only significant once—a positive 
association with Compromise for industry funding.  The career variables had only a few 
significant associations, and all were for government funding: the long time academics 
have a boost in Curiosity, relative to those in academia 7 years or less, and those with 8-




mid-career can exercise more direction than their junior colleagues, while the most 
senior faculty simply have to give up less. ‘Years in industry’ has two positive 
associations for Collaboration-government, but negative for Concession for those with 
the most experience.   
Table 30:  Summary of Eight Regression Models, Four Cs for Both Funding Sources 
 Curiosity Collaboration Compromise Concession 
 Gov’t Ind Gov’t Ind Gov’t Ind Gov’t Ind 
DEMOGRAPHICS         
Gender      +   
CAREER         
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7)     +  +  
16-24 Years in academia         
25-plus Years in academia ++        
Less than 1 Yr worked -Industry (Ref= None)         
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry   +      
6-plus Yrs worked in industry   +    – –  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT         
Knowledge of Commercialization   +++ ++ – – – – 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science         
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None)      –   
2 Commercial Science activities    ++  –   
3 Commercial Science activities  ++  +     
4-plus Commercial Science activities  ++  +++  – –   
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT         
Pressure Select topics with commercial potential       – – – – 
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes –    – –   
Pressure: Commercialize research results      – –   
Pressure: Limit publication of results   +      
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research – –        
My academic institution:         
Has entrepreneurial environment         
Requires salary offset w external funds ++    – –  – –  
Provides financial support for my research +   +   +  
Has policies to restrict publication of results  +     –  
Has procedural support for licensing/patents         
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest         
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T     – –     
SOURCE OF SUPPORT         
Current sponsorship: Government-Public +++ –       
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations – ++  +++     
Current sponsorship: Foundations         
Current sponsorship: University      +  + 
Current sponsorship: Other –  – –  +   
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES         
Old School      –   
Engaged Traditionalist      –  – 
Reluctant Entrepreneur     – –  – –  
New School  + ++      




 Curiosity Collaboration Compromise Concession 
 Gov’t Ind Gov’t Ind Gov’t Ind Gov’t Ind 
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)         
Engineering    ++  – – –  – – – 
Medical/ Health Sciences  ++       
Physical Sciences         
Biological Sciences +   +     
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Act)         
Type-High research activity         
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ         
Control (Ref = Public)         
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)         
Federal Government         
State Government    +     
Industry    +     
Institutional Funds         
         
R2 0.163 0.131 0.142 0.265 0.130 0.196 0.169 0.194 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.098 0.109 0.237 0.096 0.165 0.136 0.163 
Standard Error 0.980 0.939 1.225 1.094 1.218 1.074 1.040 1.028 
F 5.053 3.914 4.293 9.237 3.864 6.300 5.244 6.245 
 Note: (+ = p < .05, ++ = p < .01, +++ = p < .001);     – = p < .05, – – = p < .01, – – – = p < .001) 
 
Regarding commercial science involvement, ‘knowledge of commercialization’ 
was theorized to have a positive association with control, in that those who knew more 
about the process would feel greater control over their research, but for this data, it was 
not the case.  Collaboration with self-reported government and industry funding sources 
were positive; Compromise and Concession were both negatively associated with 
control for both sponsorship types.  Level of involvement with an invention had no 
significant associations.  Involvement with commercial science activities had significant 
associations only for industry funding; ‘number of commercial science activities’ had 
positive associations for Curiosity and Collaborate, but were negative for Compromise.   
Moving to the institutional environment for commercial science, the pressure or 
constraints had largely negative associations—as would be expected—except for one 




the negotiated status of collaborative research partnerships allows faculty to accept 
such restrictions.  
The effects of institutional policies were varied.  Three variables had no 
significant effects: having an entrepreneurial environment, policies to support licensing 
and patenting, and policies to resolve conflicts. Requiring salary offsets from 
sponsorship was positive for Curiosity-government, but negative for Compromise and 
Concession with government sponsors, which may indicate an exacerbation of having to 
give up some control in the first place.  Receiving institutional financial support was 
positive in three models—a finding that makes intuitive sense—while policies to restrict 
publication had one positive and one negative association, with the positive one 
somewhat surprising. Having commercial science rewarded for promotion and tenure 
had one negative association for Collaboration-industry.   
Source of support is also mixed, with government support split in the Curiosity 
models, suggesting the perception of such funding is situational.  Industry support is 
positively associated with Curiosity and Collaboration with industry funding, but is 
negative for Curiosity with government funding.  University support was positive for 
Compromise and Concession with industry funding.  Perhaps receiving these in-house 
funds provides some offset to the feeling of lesser control in these two circumstances.  
Each faculty type had at least one significant relationship across the eight 
models, although not as many instances as might be expected.  Three types—Old 
School, Engaged Traditionalist, and Reluctant Entrepreneur—had only negative 




three types retains some conventions of academic science in its traditional form, so it 
not unreasonable to expect that faculty with those preferences would feel some loss of 
control with sponsors having stringent demands for their research.  Conversely, the type 
position most in accord with the legitimacy of sponsor negotiations—New School—had 
only positive associations: one each with Curiosity, Collaborate, and Concession. 
 Academic discipline was also mixed.  Relative to social science faculty, 
engineering emerged as significant for three models with industry funding: positive for 
Collaboration and negative for Compromise and Concession.  With engineering faculty 
being more accustomed to working with industry partners, those scenarios where some 
control is lost may not be as bothersome as they might be for other disciplines. 
Medicine only emerged as positive for Curiosity-industry, indicating that these faculty 
may be able to find industry partners that share their interests, or allow them greater 
latitude.  Biology had two positive associations for Curiosity and Collaborate, indicating 
they feel better about control of their research with government funding, but can find 
workable situations with industry support.  The physical sciences had no significant 
associations.  
Institutional type and control type has no significant effects, suggesting that 
where a faculty is situated does not affect the personal sense of control one has or 
should have, but could also mean that all faculty are similarly affected by the 
competitive environment for research funds, and not just those at large publics doing 




funds were only positively associated with Collaboration-industry in two instances—
state government and industry funds.   
Finally, as a whole, these models explain modest amounts of the variance of 
their dependent variables, with adjusted R2 values ranging from just under 10% to 23%.  
The adjusted R2 values are unbiased estimators of the variance that would be explained 
by the models for the entire population. The large number of predictors in the model 
increases the possibility of an inflated R2 value since most independent variables will 
have some correlation with the outcome variable.  Thus, the model is penalized for 
having predictors that account for little vaiation beyond that already explained by the 
important predictor variables.  With the low values for the shrunken R2 values, it would 
seem that the model has too many predictors that do not explain meaningful amounts 
of variance (Archdeacon, 1994; J. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  
Summary 
The control scenarios involving different funding contexts were important 
because all faculty are not in the same position regarding sponsor relations because of 
differences between government and industry funding.  For all but one of the paired 
control scenarios tested, the level of perceived control was higher for government 
funding than for industry funding. There were group differences in every control 
scenario for the different academic disciplines, but only for three of the scenarios when 
grouping faculty by their theorized type.  This adds to the evidence for lack of distinction 




Also, faculty indicate that their relations with sponsors are not as contentious or 
restrictive as the literature about industry funding might argue. For all scenarios, higher 
scores indicate higher control, but it is important to reiterate that the second set of 
pairs—Compromise and Concession—define negative scenarios that constitute 
interference or constraint, and higher scores mean less frequency of occurrence, and 
thus, increased control. The means for all four of these scenarios were significantly 
higher than were those for the Curiosity and Collaborate pairings, which were defined as 
positive scenarios indicating control and self-direction.  
There is considerable variability in the important predictors for each of the eight 
models.  Except for the Curiosity scenarios, the models explained more variance for the 
industry funding scenarios than for the government funded ones. Among the important 
theorized predictors, career variables measuring experience were only significant for 
government funding, while commercial science knowledge was significant for six of the 
eight models.  Involvement in commercial science activities were only significant for 
industry funding, which may be a natural artifact of the data and sample; those not 
getting industry funding might not be involved in commercial science to any meaningful 
extent.  
The variables concerning institutional pressures for commercial science were 
negative in every case when significant, except one, while institutional policies regarding 
commercial science were mixed in their effects.  Sources of support seem more 
important for industry funding than government, as two government models have no 




the faculty types, both government and industry funding have one model with no 
significant predictors.  Government scenarios saw New School emerge once and 
Reluctant Entrepreneur twice.  Industry funding has all types except Reluctant 
Entrepreneur emerge at least once, and has five overall.  Finally, no disciplines were 
significant in three of the four government models, but at least one was in all four 
industry models.  Research expenditures were only significant in one industry model for 
Collaboration.  
Control Over Research Agenda  (Res Q’s 1, 4 & 5) 
Original Scale for Control 
Moving to analysis of the primary dependent variable, Table 31 below (p. 177) 
summarizes the means for the 12 items developed for the Control scale.  These were 
originally coded on a frequency scale ranging from 1=Always, 2=Usually, 3=Occasionally, 
4=Rarely to 5=Never.  For items 1, 4, and 8, the scale was reversed to make Always = 5 
so that higher scores would indicate higher control.  The resulting scores can 
consistently be interpreted as lower values meaning lower control, less freedom, or 
more hindrances, and higher scores indicating higher levels of control, or greater levels 
of freedom from restrictions and ability to overcome interference.   
These means suggest moderate to high levels of control, and indicate that these 
faculty believe the positive aspects of control occur somewhere between “Occasionally” 
and “Usually”, while the negative aspects of interference or hindrance occur only 




created for the study to capture faculty perceptions of their ability to control their 
research agenda.   
Table 31:  Descriptives for Control Scale Items 
   Mean SD N 
1 
I am able to find research funding for the questions I wish to 
pursue 
3.41 0.81 1088 
2 
Sponsors of research actively attempt to influence my choice 
of research topics 
3.54 1.09 1067 
3 
Inability to find funding keeps me from pursuing the problems 
of greatest interest to me 
3.15 1.02 1081 
4 
I am able to fit my research questions into the project goals of 
my funding providers 
3.59 0.79 1057 
5 
I alter the focus of my research to accommodate the project 
goals of my research sponsors 
3.28 1.08 1066 
6 
Researching topics of interest to my research sponsors keeps 
me from studying topics important to me 
3.83 0.99 1070 
7 
My research sponsors have specific problems they want me to 
research for them 
3.50 1.23 1047 
8 
I convince research sponsors that my research questions will 
advance their interests 
3.06 1.13 1039 
9 
I have to compromise my research interests in order to secure 
funding for any research 
3.72 1.14 1057 
10 
Research sponsors ask me to make my research more 
commercial 
4.40 0.87 1051 
11 
I am concerned that my commercial activity will compromise 
my ability to conduct objective science 
4.46 0.96 1029 
12 
I am restricted from conducting basic research with the 
funding I am able to raise 
3.94 1.21 1038 
Note: 1 = Low Control, 5= High Control 
Based on the data reduction conducted in chapter 3, there are three outcome 
variables for control over research agendas.  First, is the one factor scale that 
emerged— “Self Directed Research” (see Table 4). This variable will also be examined 
for group differences.  The other two variables are derived from single items in the 
original scale: Question 1 is “I am able to find research funding for the questions I wish 




compromise my ability to conduct objective science.”  All three variables are on a 5-point 
scale, with higher scores equating to higher control.  
Group Differences 
The primary dependent variable “Self-Directed Research” is measured as a 
composite of the seven items from the factor, using an averaging of the original scores 
for each respondent to produce a single score.  The analysis of this variable begins with 
determining what differences exists between groupings within some of the independent 
variables.  Beginning with the personal/career variables, one-way analysis of variance 
tests revealed a few significant differences, although tenure, academic rank, and years 
as an academic were not among them. 
In a surprising finding, female faculty (M=3.64, SD=0.82) have significantly higher 
perceived self-direction (t (1087) = -3.36, p =.001, 2-tailed) than their male counterparts 
(M=3.47, SD=0.83).  Female faculty were oversampled because of their relative lack of 
representation in the science disciplines as a whole, so it was notable that gender would 
have this effect, given the established challenges facing women in the sciences.  Perhaps 
owing to these challenges, the female scientists at these institutions have to be driven 
to succeed and direct their work with greater self-efficacy than male faculty.  
Significant differences were observed for faculty grouped by their years of work 
experience in industry, F (3, 1082) = 8.50, p < .001, (Table 32 below).  Those indicating 
they had never worked in industry (3.67) had a significantly higher level of self-direction 




indicating six or more years of industry experience.  The effect could be attributable to 
those working in industry accepting the trade-offs that come from partnering with 
corporations for research projects, or a real sense by those with no industry experience 
that their research sponsorship provides greater latitude.  
Table 32: Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVA, Self-Direction and Industry Work 
 Never Less than 1 yr 1 to 5 yrs 6 plus yrs 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Self-direction 3.67a,b 0.81 3.46 0.84 3.38 a 0.84 3.44 b 0.83 
Notes: Means sharing a subscript are significantly different.  Effect size: η2 = 0.02 
Higher scores indicate higher control. 
As was posited, there were significant differences noted in the level of perceived 
self-direction by academic discipline, F (4,1084) = 30.75, p < .001, (Table 33 below).  
Engineering has the lowest level of indicated control (2.97), and this value is significantly 
different from the other four disciplines. Given their frequent alignment with industry, 
some loss of autonomy could simply be an accepted part of their research work.   












Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Self-
direction 2.97 a,b,c,d 
0.71 3.64 a,e 0.77 3.58 b,f 
0.8
0 3.56 c,g 
0.85 3.86 d,e,f,g 0.78 
Note: Means sharing a subscript are significantly different.   Effect size: η2 = 0.10. 
Higher scores indicate higher control 
Conversely, social science has the highest level of indicated self-direction (3.86) 
with a value that also differs significantly from the other four disciplines.  With the 
lowest amounts of sponsored research funds among these disciplines, perhaps these 




Finally, there is no indication of any meaningful differences between the medical, 
physical, and biological sciences.  
Turning to institutional characteristics, there was no statistical difference for 
self-direction between faculty at the three different institutional types in the study-- 
research universities with “very high” or “high” research activity, and doctoral/research 
universities. However, control type did yield a meaningful difference.  Faculty at public 
universities (M=3.52, SD=0.83) indicate a lower level of self-direction than do their 
counterparts at private universities (M=3.75, SD=0.79), t(1086)= –3.73, p<.001.  This 
observation could be due to the changing nature of research funding at public 
universities in recent decades, whereas faculty at private universities could be more 
accustomed to securing sponsorship.  
 Faculty were also grouped according to variables concerning research funding by 
sponsorship type.  First was an analysis based on research support at the level of the 
institution.  Faculty were grouped in quintiles according to the percentage of 
sponsorship at the level of the home institution that came from federal funds and the 
percentage coming from industry funds.  One-way analysis of variance tests were 
conducted, but neither of these main effects were significant for level of perceived self-
direction based on funding type at the institutional level.  
However, groupings according to self-reported support percentages (from the 
survey data) by source did reveal important differences.  Faculty had been asked to 
indicate what percentage of their own research support came from different funding 




regarding public or government funding (Table 34 below), those indicating ‘no funding’ 
were placed in a group, and those with any value greater than zero were placed into 
quintiles.  These six groups had homogeneous variance in the ANOVA, and the main 
effect of this grouping was significant, F (5, 1083)=6.99, p< .001.  The effect size was 
small, explaining 3% of the variance. 
Table 34: Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVA, Self-Direction and Public Support 
 
None 1 to 49% 50 to 75% 76 to 89% 90 to 99% 100 % 





0.84 3.43 a 0.78 3.40 b,e 0.79 3.48 c 0.85 3.53 d 0.81 3.65 e 0.84 
Note: Means sharing a subscript are significantly different.  η2= 0.03; Higher scores indicate higher control. 
 
 The highest level of self-direction was for those faculty indicating they received 
no public money at all from any government funding (3.78).  This group’s mean was 
significantly different from every other group except for those indicating 100% 
government support for their research.  The finding that receiving either none or all of 
one’s research support from the government makes no difference regarding self-
direction is surprising, suggesting two different reasons to have similar notions of 
control over one’s research agenda.  Also, the group indicating 50-75% of its support 
from the government had significantly lower self-direction than did those with 100% 
government funding support, although this could be an artifact of the distribution. 
Group differences were also analyzed for percentage of research support from 
industry funding (Table 35 below).  Homogeneous variance was observed for these 
three groups, and the main effect of industry funding was significant.  The highest level 




between this group and the other two being statistically significant.  The effect is also a 
medium-level effect size, with the main effect explaining almost 9% of the variance. 
These data provide another example of how receiving industry sponsorship lowers this 
perception of autonomy, but it could suggest that faculty in this position have a more 
nuanced conception of autonomy than has been captured.  
Table 35: Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVA, Self-Direction and Industry Support 
 
None 1 to 24% 25 to 100% ANOVA 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F  (2, 1086) η2 
Self-direction 3.70 a,b 0.80 3.19 a 0.78 3.07 b 0.77 52.63*** 0.088 
Note: Means sharing a subscript are significantly different.   Higher scores indicate higher control. 
An important aspect of the conception of control that faculty perceive could be 
the knowledge they already have of the processes involved in commercial science.  One 
survey question inquired specifically about this and faculty were placed into four groups 
based on the distribution among the responses.  Analysis of variance was performed; 
these four groups had homogeneous variance and the main effect of commercial 
science knowledge was significant.  
Table 36 below summarizes the main effect for level of commercial science 
knowledge, F (3,1070) = 29.95, p < .001.  The highest level of self-direction is indicated 
by those faculty reporting no commercial science knowledge (3.93), and this level is 
significantly higher than the other three groups.  Interestingly, those reporting the 
highest level of knowledge had the lowest perceived self-direction regarding their 
research (3.24), and the level was significantly different from those with no knowledge 
or ‘vague’ knowledge.   In fact, there seems to be a negative association between 




lower control.  Indeed, ‘reasonable’ knowledge rates lower than ‘vague’ for self-
direction.   It could be that the increasing understanding of the commercial science 
process entails some acceptance that autonomy will not be absolute, similar to those in 
the Reluctant Entrepreneur type. 
Table 36: Means, SD, and ANOVA, Self-Direction and Commercial Science Knowledge 
 




Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Self-direction 3.93 a,b,c 0.78 3.55 a,d,e 0.78 3.29 b,d 0.83 3.24 c,e 0.84 
Note: Means sharing a subscript are significantly different.  Effect size: η2 =0.08. 
Higher scores indicate higher control. 
  Finally, to answer the fourth research question, the level of perceived self-
direction was compared across the four faculty type preferences.  The means for the 
types were all clustered between 3.50 and 3.69, but the results from the one-way 
ANOVA failed to show a significant main effect for faculty type, F (3, 1056) =2.37, p = 
0.69.  The results provide more evidence that they type theory does not produce 
groupings with sufficient distinction, as this result would indicate that all four types of 
faculty have similar perceptions of control, despite the theorized disparateness of their 
views regarding academic science. 
Regression Models 
To gain a more complete understanding of the factors that contribute to 
perceived levels of control regarding one’s own research, the dependent variables 




independent variables.  The results from the regression analyses are reported in Tables 
38 – 40 below.   
The first dependent variable is Self-directed Research, comprised of seven items 
as described in Table 4.  The model, as presented in Table 37 below (p. 185), fits the 
data (F=14.47, p <.001) and explains nearly 36% of the variance for this item.  
Surprisingly, the career measures used here were not observed to be significant 
predictors, at any level.  Thus, there is no advantage to experience in terms of years as 
an academic relative to junior faculty, nor does having industry work experience 
contribute significantly to control over research, relative to having none at all.   
Another set of variables theorized to have some effect would be involvement in 
and knowledge of commercial science practices and processes.  In this model, increased 
knowledge has a significant negative association with ‘self-directed research,’ similar to 
what the group differences indicate. This finding could suggest that the awareness of 
commercial science processes causes a redefinition of control that includes an 
understanding that some “pure” sense of control is lost.  Moderate involvement in 
commercial science activities also has a negative effect on control here, and the result 
could suggest a similar phenomenon.  
Several important predictors were observed to have negative effects on the 
amount of self-direction a respondent would perceive.  Four of the five variables 
measuring institutional pressure for commercial science outcomes have significant 
negative associations with control.  Since these are constraints, this result is not 




external research funds has a slight negative effect on self-direction, whereas receiving 
university support has a positive association.   
Table 37:  Regression Results for Model Predicting Self-Directed Research 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .069 .044 .043 .121  
CAREER          
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) -.005 .053 -.003 .920  
16-24 Years in academia -.063 .056 -.035 .259  
25-plus Years in academia -.015 .060 -.008 .799  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .039 .072 .014 .591  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry -.066 .052 -.032 .211  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry .011 .060 .005 .849  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization -.064 .031 -.065 .043 * 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science .009 .010 .027 .368  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.102 .056 -.049 .071  
2 Commercial Science activities -.088 .031 -.079 .005 ** 
3 Commercial Science activities -.088 .026 -.096 .001 ** 
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.036 .021 -.062 .077  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.093 .032 -.110 .004 ** 
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.133 .022 -.190 .000 *** 
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.097 .035 -.102 .005 ** 
Pressure: Limit publication of results .011 .043 .007 .806  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research -.061 .019 -.084 .002 ** 
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment .002 .022 .003 .928  
Requires salary offset w external research funds -.040 .013 -.080 .003 ** 
Provides financial support for my research .036 .017 .055 .035 * 
Has policies to restrict publication of research results -.025 .025 -.026 .302  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents .010 .031 .010 .740  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .035 .028 .035 .215  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.023 .022 -.027 .303  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT          
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .001 .001 .049 .168  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations -.003 .001 -.069 .015 * 
Current sponsorship: Foundations .001 .001 .031 .249  
Current sponsorship: University .002 .001 .074 .021 * 
Current sponsorship: Other .003 .001 .062 .016 * 
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.033 .040 -.024 .410  
Engaged Traditionalist -.065 .047 -.040 .163  
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.090 .043 -.055 .036 * 
New School .015 .042 .011 .719  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)          
Engineering -.335 .076 -.145 .000 *** 
Medical/ Health Sciences .044 .031 .047 .154  
Physical Sciences -.011 .022 -.015 .631  
Biological Sciences -.002 .016 -.004 .891  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)          
Type-High research activity -.022 .044 -.013 .618  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ -.005 .030 -.005 .854  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government -.006 .004 -.124 .088  
State Government -.005 .004 -.048 .266  
Industry -.007 .005 -.054 .134  
Institutional Funds -.005 .004 -.076 .224  
      
(constant) 5.449 .442   .000  
      
R2 0.359     
Adjusted R2 0.334     
Standard Error 0.643     
F 14.465   .000  
Note: (N = 1,210; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) 
 
Other significant predictors involve financial support, with industry funding 
having a small negative association, suggesting that faculty so funded recognize some 
restrictions on their freedom.  However, receiving university research support and other 
funding each had positive associations.  Turning to faculty type, only the preference for 
Reluctant Entrepreneur emerges here as a significant predictor, having a negative 
association with control.  The negative effect makes intuitive sense given the thinking of 
this type that commercial science forces faculty to protect their work from industry.   
Regarding academic discipline, being an engineer, relative to a social scientist, 
also decreases predicted control by - 0.36.  However, it is unclear whether engineers use 
the same conception of control that social scientists would use.  Finally, being at a 
private institution increases perceived self-direction over being from a public university.  
These findings suggest that institutional pressures and internal policies that push 
or incentivize commercial science activity can affect how much self-direction faculty feel 
they possess when selecting research projects.  Policies that exert heavy pressure on 
faculty can lead to decreases in self-direction, while those that act as incentives can be 




while having the university offer financial support for one’s research program can  
increase the perception of control in this sense.   
Also, situational contexts can have an effect, at least in terms of engineers, with 
this data indicating that they perceive less self-direction than their colleagues.  This 
could be attributable to the nature of their work, which requires closer work with 
industry and private vendors, with greater focus on applied outcomes in line with those 
interests.  In addition, increased knowledge of and participation in commercial science 
also leads to lower perceived self-direction, perhaps for similar reasons.  
The model performs the best predicting this DV, Self-Directed Research; better 
than it did for any other variable in the entire study (adjusted-R2 = .33).  Since the study 
was conceived and the survey was designed with the goal of explaining this outcome, 
and the outcome variable consists of a unidimensional scale measuring control, it is a 
reasonable outcome for the model to have had the most success predicting this 
dependent variable.   
The second regression is for the dependent variable called Ability to secure 
funding, the first measure from the original control scale (see Table 31, p. 177).  Table 
38 below (p. 188) displays the results of this regression model (F=6.58, p < .001) which 
accounts for more than 20% of the variance in the dependent variable.  Again, the 
personal and career variables fail to emerge as significant predictors, indicating that 
perceptions of control over one’s research are not attributable to these types of 
measures.  However, experience does not emerge as a factor in any capacity.  Unlike the 




involvement in commercial science activities were not significant in this model.   Neither 
‘knowledge of commercial science processes’ nor ‘involvement in commercial science 
activities’ had associations as theorized.   
Table 38:  Regression Model Predicting Ability to Secure Funding 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .033 .048 .022 .489  
CAREER      
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) -.041 .057 -.024 .474  
16-24 Years in academia .022 .061 .012 .719  
25-plus Years in academia .000 .065 .000 .994  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) -.039 .079 -.014 .620  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry .103 .057 .052 .071  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry -.083 .065 -.039 .205  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT      
Knowledge of Commercialization .040 .034 .042 .235  
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science -.007 .011 -.020 .545  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.079 .061 -.039 .194  
2 Commercial Science activities -.045 .034 -.042 .178  
3 Commercial Science activities -.008 .028 -.009 .762  
4-plus Commercial Science activities .009 .022 .017 .670  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT      
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.030 .034 -.037 .385  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.002 .024 -.004 .919  
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.109 .038 -.119 .004 ** 
Pressure: Limit publication of results -.019 .047 -.012 .685  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research -.042 .021 -.061 .044 * 
My academic institution:      
Has entrepreneurial environment .017 .023 .023 .469  
Requires salary offset w external research funds .034 .014 .070 .018 * 
Provides financial support for my research .111 .018 .175 .000 *** 
Has policies to restrict publication of research results .004 .027 .004 .886  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents -.008 .034 -.008 .811  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .061 .030 .063 .045 * 
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.039 .024 -.048 .104  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT      
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .005 .001 .248 .000 *** 
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .000 .002 .007 .827  
Current sponsorship: Foundations .001 .001 .032 .281  
Current sponsorship: University -.001 .001 -.049 .172  
Current sponsorship: Other -.004 .001 -.080 .005 ** 
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School .041 .043 .032 .338  
Engaged Traditionalist .015 .051 .009 .770  
Reluctant Entrepreneur .058 .046 .037 .207  
New School .093 .045 .069 .039 * 
      
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)      
Engineering .024 .083 .011 .769  
Medical/ Health Sciences .084 .033 .093 .012 * 
Physical Sciences .044 .024 .066 .066  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)      
Type-High research activity -.041 .048 -.024 .393  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ -.010 .032 -.009 .764  
Control (Ref = Public) .118 .059 .061 .045 * 
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government -.002 .004 -.046 .571  
State Government .000 .005 -.003 .948  
Industry .000 .005 .001 .989  
Institutional Funds -.002 .004 -.028 .685  
(constant) 2.219 .480  .000  
      
R2 0.203     
Adjusted R2 0.172     
Standard Error 0.697     
F 6.577   .000  
Note: (N = 1,210; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) 
 
Regarding the institutional constraints, the pressure to commercialize results 
had a significant negative relationship with ability to find funding, as did having policies 
that link commercial science research to P & T decisions.  However, three institutional 
commercial science policies did have positive associations. A requirement for salary 
offset (which had been negative for the self-directed DV), receiving university research 
support, and having policies for resolving conflicts were positively associated.    
Having government funding as a source of research support was positively 
associated with ability to raise sponsored funds, although other funding sources were 
negative. Only one faculty type—New School—emerged as a significant positive 
predictor of ability to fund one’s research.  It is possible that these faculty view raising 
sponsored funds as part of their normal work duties, as the typology theory would 
suggest.  For the academic disciplines, medicine and biological sciences have positive 
associations, relative to social science.   
The environment for commercial science at one’s institution is important for this 




salary offset, can have positive effects provided they are coupled with other policies 
that make faculty feel supported in their for commercial science activities. Being in a 
discipline that deals with commercial science regularly also helps, as does having a 
disposition towards New School values and beliefs about academic science.    
 The third regression model is also for a single variable from the original control 
scale.  This variable is Concern about conducting objective science, and asked faculty 
whether they were worried their commercial activity could compromise their objectivity 
(1=Always, 5=Never).  This model (F= 6.307 p< .001) accounts for almost 20% of the 
variance for this dependent variable (see Table 39, p. 191).   
Some of the results for this model are similar to the first two, with background 
and career predictors failing to emerge as significant.  However, similar to the first 
model and unlike the second, moderate involvement in commercial science activity has 
a slightly negative effect.  Those results would indicate some concern about objectivity 
from having participated in such activities, although ‘commercial science knowledge’ 
was non-significant.    
Other important predictors that were found to have significant negative 
associations include institutional constraints that cause faculty to feel pressure to select 
commercial topics, commercialize their results, and limit publication of findings from 
sponsored research.  These associations suggest faculty are concerned such policies may 
compromise their ability to be objective.  Meanwhile, receiving university research 
funding is again positive, and self-reported sources of research sponsorship had no 




Table 39:  Regression Model Predicting Concern for Objective Academic Science 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .022 .056 .012 .692  
CAREER      
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) -.007 .066 -.003 .922  
16-24 Years in academia .009 .070 .005 .896  
25-plus Years in academia .015 .075 .007 .838  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .143 .091 .045 .117  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry -.107 .066 -.047 .105  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry -.054 .076 -.022 .476  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT      
Knowledge of Commercialization -.029 .039 -.026 .469  
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science -.016 .013 -.041 .229  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.161 .070 -.069 .022 * 
2 Commercial Science activities -.072 .039 -.058 .063  
3 Commercial Science activities -.091 .032 -.088 .005 ** 
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.042 .026 -.065 .102  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT      
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.087 .040 -.092 .030 * 
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes .019 .027 .024 .486  
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.192 .043 -.181 .000 *** 
Pressure: Limit publication of results -.122 .054 -.068 .025 * 
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research -.008 .024 -.010 .733  
My academic institution:      
Has entrepreneurial environment -.028 .027 -.034 .300  
Requires salary offset w external research funds -.002 .017 -.004 .892  
Provides financial support for my research .075 .021 .103 .000 *** 
Has policies to restrict publication of research results -.026 .031 -.024 .395  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents .048 .039 .041 .219  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest -.042 .035 -.038 .231  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.032 .028 -.034 .249  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT      
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .001 .001 .047 .236  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .002 .002 .043 .179  
Current sponsorship: Foundations .001 .001 .023 .452  
Current sponsorship: University .000 .001 -.014 .703  
Current sponsorship: Other .000 .002 .005 .866  
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.261 .050 -.173 .000 *** 
Engaged Traditionalist .067 .058 .037 .253  
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.020 .053 -.011 .702  
New School .030 .052 .019 .566  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)      
Engineering -.107 .096 -.041 .265  
Medical/ Health Sciences -.002 .039 -.002 .957  
Physical Sciences -.006 .028 -.008 .831  
Biological Sciences .014 .020 .025 .487  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)      
Type-High research activity -.091 .056 -.047 .101  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ .006 .037 .005 .869  
Control (Ref = Public) -.019 .068 -.008 .784  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government -.003 .005 -.059 .466  
State Government -.004 .005 -.033 .489  
Industry -.001 .006 -.010 .800  
Institutional Funds -.005 .005 -.077 .276  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
(constant) 6.084 .554  .000  
      
R2 0.196     
Adjusted R2 0.165     
Standard Error 0.805     
F 6.307   .000  
Note: (N = 1,210; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) 
 
The Old School faculty type has a significant negative association, indicating that, 
as expected, those who hold the values associated with conventional academic science 
would express concern about the intrusion of commercial science activity into their 
research.  Academic discipline failed to emerge as significant in this model, again 
relative to social science.  This was surprising, as the disciplines differ in regards to the 
levels of basic and commercial research they conduct.  Finally, none of the institutional-
level variables emerged as significant predictors.  
With low values for the adjusted R2, the second and third models, the only 
conclusion to be reached is that the models have too many predictors that do not 
contribute meaningfully to the explanation of variance in the population.  The outcome 
variables for these two models were each part of the original 12-item scale for control, 
but were not part of the one-factor solution.  Thus, they are measuring a different 
dimension than what they survey was originally designed for, and as such, the models 
suffer from poorer estimation.   
Summary 
Regarding the models for the primary dependent variable in the study, for the 
factor of self-directed research, most of the significant predictors had a negative effect 




‘personal knowledge of commercialization processes’, and ‘participation in commercial 
science activities’ were negatively associated with control, as were most of the 
institutional policies regarding the commercial science environment, especially those 
acting to increase the pressure for commercial outcomes.  The only policy that increases 
control is ‘receiving institutional financial research support.’  This result is reinforced by 
the outcome that ‘university funds as a source of support’ increases control.  Industry 
support was negative.  Only one type, Reluctant Entrepreneur, was significant with a 
negative association, and engineering emerged as the only discipline to have an effect 
relative to social science, and this effect was also negative.  A final positive association 
comes from being a faculty member at a private institution.   
The second model was for a single variable, and this was an item that read: “I am 
able to find funding for the questions I wish to pursue,” which was coded so that 
1=Never, 5=Always.  Most of the significant predictors had a positive association with 
this dependent variable.  While two institutional policies that increase pressure for 
commercial outcomes and getting research funding from other sources were negative, 
policies to offset salary with external funds, resolve conflicts, and provide institutional 
research support were positive.  Higher levels of government research support, being 
New School, being in the medical or biological sciences, and being at a private 
institution were associated with increased ability to secure funding.  
The third model was also predicting a variable from a single question: “I am 
concerned that my commercial activity will compromise my ability to conduct objective 




quantifiers; 1=Always, and 5=Never.   This model had fewer significant predictors than 
the others.  More commercial science activities, policies that increase pressure for 
commercial outcomes, and being Old School were negatively associated with this 
concern about maintaining objectivity. The only positive predictor was receiving 





CHAPTER  V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This chapter begins by providing context for and a consideration of the two 
primary components of this study—the faculty typology and the analysis of the concept 
of control over research agendas.  The discussion of the faculty typology builds from 
research questions 2, 3, and to some extent 4.  The reflection on the dependent 
variables for ‘control’ uses data analyzed for research questions 1, 4, and 5.   
The implications section considers the consequences of these results, both for 
the theoretical underpinnings of the study and the effects these findings could have on 
outcomes related to policy and practice.  The chapter concludes by outlining limitations 
of this particular study and by offering suggestions for future research that follow 
directly from this study, as well as some that diverge.  
Discussion 
A distinction exists within the field of science studies between scholarship 
concerned with fundamental and theoretical understanding of the development of 
scientific knowledge, and the scholarship focused on the critique of science and 
technology as social institutions and their effects on society.  This has been called the 
‘High Church—Low Church’ divide (Fuller, 2004).  The theoretical literature (High 
Church) is concerned with the internal dynamics of the processes and resources used to 




Church) examines the political and practical value of science and focuses on policy, 
reform, the governance of science, and activism for the public interest (Sismondo, 
2008).   
The two primary components of this study have touched on both sides of this 
divide.  The examination of the faculty typology and the consideration of its types as 
proxies for different institutional forms and value systems in academic science is a ‘high 
church’ issue because this strand of science studies has focused on the effects of social 
factors on matters like topic choice and what counts a good science (Hess, 1997).  With 
its consideration of the processes of academic science as a socializing system that 
condition faculty to approach science with particular values, we gain some knowledge of 
how different normative systems can influence the construction of scientific research.   
The focus on the ethos for science is important because Merton saw science as a 
self-regulating system governed by its norms (Bucchi, 2004), however the criticism of 
Merton is that such norms cannot fully explain the social behavior of scientists.  Rather 
than approach the study of this institutional environment for science as the governing 
power of a particular set of norms, the typology component of the study was designed 
to determine whether alternate institutional forms that touch on this expanded notion 
of academic science would be seen as legitimate.  Through the consideration of 
dimensions that acknowledge the social connection of academia to industry, and of an 
array of issues that constitute part of the substance of academic and commercial 
science, these alternate institutional forms provide insight into the reflexive and socially 




The other component of the study—control over research agendas— comprises 
the ‘low church’ emphasis because of the focus on issues pertinent to the concern over 
the loss of autonomy and objectivity in academia.  The apprehension in the higher 
education literature about collaboration with industry and the infusion of private capital 
into research is consistent with the concern in science studies about socially responsible 
science, increased democratic participation in governance, and the determination of 
science policies that will benefit the widest populations (Sismondo, 2008).   
Scholarship within higher education in this category has generally focused on the 
perceived loss of “pure” science, such as corporate influence pushing out democratic 
values (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) and the articulation of a research policy that outlines 
the roles of governments and universities in commercial science (Metcalfe, 2008), while 
broader disciplinary perspectives have examined how science is interconnected with the 
political economy and affected by regulatory and market externalities (Frickel & Moore, 
2006).   
The contention that involvement in commercialization will compromise 
universities is grounded in a contrast of the two distinct cultures present within 
academia and industry (Bok, 2003; Rosenstone, 2001; Washburn, 2005).  Industrial and 
academic research have fundamentally different goals that involve the sharing and use 
of information, what counts as competitive advantage, and how success is judged (Bird 
& Allen, 1989; Geiger, 2004). 
There is not an established location for the construct of ‘faculty control over 




management, and translation outlined by Metcalfe (2008), but as defined in this study, 
it would seem to span the areas of support (the funding subcomponent, in particular) 
and management, which focuses on institutional-level policies.  Because the construct of 
control is part of the academic freedom of faculty and is viewed as tied to the overall 
autonomy of academic scientists, concern over its sustainability will be of interest to 
those seeking to reform academic science and maintain its independence.  
The discussion will first focus on the faculty typology and the findings regarding 
normative systems in academic science.  Those results will address the second and third 
research questions for the larger study.  Then the discussion will shift to the outcome 
measures of control examined in the study, thereby addressing the first, fourth and fifth 
research questions.   
Faculty Typology 
The second research question in this study was seeking evidence that university 
faculty had beliefs about academic science which diverged from the traditional norms of 
Mertonian science.  The premise was based on the established concepts in the literature 
that institutions like academic science can be modified over time as people adapt to 
conflicts and ambivalence about existing beliefs in light of external challenges.  Using a 
typology as proxy for alternate institutional forms, the study also sought to determine 
whether faculty respondents could be classified into one of these types using value 
statements developed for each type.  Preference for non-conventional types could be 
evidence of the legitimacy of alternate value systems.  Additionally, the third research 





Mertonian science persists as an ideal; Old School is prominent, but not 
dominant 
The literature examining Mertonian norms and the analysis of this data each 
point to deviations from the values conventionally associated with academic science by 
the higher education literature.  However, the norms as an ideal for research practice 
still hold considerable sway, at least as a governing ideology.  As a proxy for Merton’s 
norms, the values represented by the Old School type retain a prominent place among 
the faculty studied here; it was the second-most preferred type in both classification 
methods discussed, with a weighted average of 28% (see Table 17, p. 143).  Its 
proportion remained consistent across the two classification schemes, and it was the 
most frequent type among biological and physical science faculty. 
 Among the individual Old School issues, there were high levels of agreement for 
four of the five, although the basic/applied research separation registered the lowest 
score among all 20 statements (1.76).  Perhaps this could be a clue as to why this value 
structure does not dominate those represented by the other types.  The findings from 
earlier studies that the conventional position’s status as an ideal does not translate to 
practice were again observed.  Still, over 40% of the faculty had Old School as one of 






Support was found for alternate institutional forms, in particular the legitimacy 
of New School 
Returning to the question posed earlier regarding alternate value systems and 
deviation from Mertonian science, three value systems for other potential institutional 
forms were considered in this study, and all three found support.  The strongest 
evidence of legitimacy was found for the position opposite the traditional one—New 
School—which acts as a proxy for the transformed views of academic science resulting 
from perspectives such as Mode-2 science and the triple-helix model.  It had the highest 
average across the two classification distributions –32%–and in the one using indices, it 
was the most preferred type.   
New School also experienced the greatest consistency between the two 
schemes, as more than 56% of those initially classified as that type were present in the 
second distribution.  But New School also experienced the biggest positive change in 
distribution of any of the types, as the losses among the other three types all accrued to 
the New School (see Table 18, p. 145).  Thus, using the index classification, the largest 
proportion of faculty in this study do not view commercial science as a threat and see 
the overlap of the academy and industry as necessary for conducting quality academic 
science.  The individual New School index items also found moderate to moderately 
high agreement broadly.  Also, perhaps not surprisingly, the disciplines with the highest 
percentages of New School types are engineering and medicine, although all disciplines 





Engaged Traditionalist emerges as the stronger hybrid position 
The value systems approximated in the hybrid types also received some support, 
with the Engaged Traditionalist position easily being the stronger of the two, with an 
average of 31%.  This type also does not perceive the academy as threatened by 
commercialism, even though faculty with this belief system view the academy as distinct 
from industry.  They negotiate the challenges by maintaining the separation between 
the two realms, and believe individual faculty can conduct research in both realms 
without compromising the academy as a whole.  Having this type emerge so 
prominently could mean either that the commitment to conventional norms for 
research remains quite strong, or that the traditional values themselves are quite 
resilient and are not necessarily undone or quashed by engagement with commercial 
science.   
Still, comparing the self-placement and index classification schemes, the 
Engaged Traditionalist type had a substantial loss of frequency relative to the 
distribution gains observed among the New School and Old School types.  Based on the 
index preferences, Engaged Traditionalist has a pretty even distribution among the 
disciplines, ranging from about 17% to 23%, and Engineering has the highest percentage 
of this type among its ranks.   The relative lack of preference for the Reluctant 
Entrepreneur position could either mean that these faculty are not in a position often 
enough to be forced to make some decision to protect their work from encroachment 
by industry, or that the type construct itself does not reflect a reality faced by a large 




Of course, the possibility exists that the subtleties of this position could be 
drawn out with more effectual scales that touch on the different nuances of this 
complex construct.  Evidence certainly exists for differentiation in the way faculty 
approach commercial activity, as recalled by the distinction by Meyer (2003) between 
entrepreneurial academics and academic entrepreneurs.  
Use of the typology as a classification scheme was not supported 
Regarding their potential as a classification scheme, the faculty type constructs 
tested in this research exhibited mixed results here, so these results should be 
considered inconclusive at best, with a strong possibility that the typology is simply not 
workable as an effective framework for reliably differentiating among academics.  For 
now, the basis of the Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) theory that academic scientists 
could be classified into one of four distinct types was not supported.  The distribution of 
faculty did not produce the sort of clustering that would have to be expected from 
distinct types.   
Only two of the 11 regression models for control had more than one faculty type 
variable emerge as significant predictors; in seven models, just one type was significant, 
and the effects were mixed overall.  It was hoped that the type variables would be 
robust predictors that would play a role in making a distinction among faculty for 
outcomes such as control over research.  As such, they could not be used as the major 





The typology could represent non-exclusive, context-dependent institutional 
forms that faculty can move between or use simultaneously 
Despite this poor performance as a classification scheme, the typology may 
represent something very real as a spectrum of value systems upon which faculty can 
draw as circumstances warrant.  The results from this study suggest that faculty ascribe 
to values associated with multiple types, and that they often prefer ones that represent 
positions that differ from the norms of Mertonian science.  The conventional, Old School 
value system was still embraced by many faculty, but it is not the most preferred.  The 
values and beliefs associated with its polar opposite—New School and its attendant 
embrace of the culture of industry sponsored research and applied outcomes—was 
actually the most preferred system, both alone and in combination with the other types.  
The embrace of multiple positions lends support to the theory outlines by Owen-Smith 
and Powell (2001), who based their creation of the hybrid types on the fact that their 
interview subjects “simultaneously partake of multiple logics to to justify their activities 
(p.5).   
Such results would validate the assertions from earlier studies (e.g., Mitroff, 
1974) which claimed there were opposing norms that offset Merton’s, but were 
nonetheless needed to provide balance and ultimately support the advance of science.  
The science studies literature on the new context for science is seeking to get inside the 
“black-box “of Mertonian science, recognizing that science, as a social system, is a 
contested terrain just like many other cultural institutions (Kuhn, 1962).  Merton’s 
embrace of sociological ambivalence showed he understood how social factors can 




practice to the external circumstances.  Certainly Merton and others saw the need to 
reconcile the traditional ideology of science to its modern practice (Hess, 1997).  
The expansion of big science as a complex enterprise involving multiple sectors 
of society has been called “post-academic” (Ziman, 1996).  Certainly, the transformation 
of academic science has altered the processes for knowledge production. We may be 
seeing faculty operate with different, but no less legitimate, sets of values, and even 
move between them as needed.  Given the increasingly porous boundaries between 
society, industry, and science, and because of the decreasing internal consistency of the 
shared values, norms, and practices of modern scientists, the term “scientific 
community” may no longer describe the academic scientists working inside research 
universities, (Bucchi, 2004).  
Control Over Research 
Key Findings 
 Control as complete autonomy over the direction of one’s research or as 
“curiosity-based research” was NOT supported as the prevailing definition emerging 
from this study.   
 
The first research question in this study asked about the extent to which faculty 
believe they must compromise control over their research.  Given the moderate scores 
on the primary dependent variable and all four topic choice scenarios, faculty do not 
feel that sponsored university research is entirely self-directed; certainly the literature 
on the diversity of influences affecting academic science has cautioned us to expect as 




funds based solely on my interests” in the Curiosity scenario scored lower than the 
Compromise and Concession scenarios: Curiosity’s rating for government funding was 
just the 5th highest out of the eight scenarios, and its rating for industry funding was the 
lowest score overall.  Other outcome variables, such as “I am able to find funding for the 
questions I wish to pursue” rated between Occasionally’ and ‘Usually’, although it 
cannot be known from this data to what extent those scores are a function of limited 
funding availability in particular fields, as opposed to sponsors’ attempts to direct or 
change the direction of projects.  
The levels of control expressed by these faculty on the multi-item scale were 
moderate to moderately-high; all were above the mid-point (3.0) and a few approached 
and exceeded 4.0.  The mean for the variables comprising the “Self-Directed Research” 
factor was 3.57.   Regarding the control scenarios (Four Cs), while there were no levels 
of self-direction that could be considered very high, and few scores on the freedom 
from interference could be classified as such, the moderate scores across the board 
suggest that faculty control is not in danger of being run over by sponsors and 
subjugated to their whims.  Ziman (1996) acknowledges that it is unlikely that ‘post-
academic science’ will be given over completely to commissioned research, but he does 
worry about who will set the problems when researchers work in teams with those 
whose interests go beyond just producing knowledge.   
 The level of self-direction did not differ by faculty type. 
 Addressing the fourth research question in the study, the four faculty types 




Directed Research.’  The ANOVA approached significance levels, but the results 
reinforce the other findings from this study that the type constructs themselves do not 
produce sufficient distinctions between faculty.  Nor were the type preferences major 
contributors to the explanation of variance in the regression models.  Old School was 
associated with greater concern for objectivity in academic science, while New School 
was positively associated with ‘ability to secure funding.’  Overall, it was a 
disappointment that the types could not be used to compare groups of faculty on the 
primary dependent variable.   
Institutional policies and environments can support, constrain, or contextualize 
adaptations to transformations of academic science for faculty who are situated 
differently.   
Different forms of institutional policies can contribute to or take away from the 
sense of self-direction in research that faculty perceive.  Policies that make faculty feel 
too much pressure to produce commercial results were virtually always negatively 
associated with control in all the models tested here, while university financial support 
of research was significantly positively associated in 6 of the 11 models.  In any case, it 
seems that the policies adopted by institutions can have an effect on making 
commercial science something faculty feel they either have to do or something they 
believe they can do, with proper support.   
Where faculty conduct their research, in terms of their discipline and institution, 
seems to have some effect.  Being at a private university was associated with higher 
control in the models for ‘Self-Directed Research’ and securing funding, but was not 




attributable to how often faculty are willing or required to place themselves in 
situations where their control and academic values will be challenged.  For instance, 
engineers report lower senses of control than social scientists, but could simply view 
such trade-offs as part of their work and thus, encounter it more frequently.  
Engineering was negatively associated with control in three of the four models where it 
was significant.  Other research has confirmed that faculty participating in industry 
collaborations have different views on them than do non-involved faculty and that such 
faculty are more willing to tolerate ambiguity and negotiate potential conflicts of 
interest (Campbell, 1997; Campbell & Slaughter, 1999). For engineering, autonomy 
could be a luxury standing in the way of otherwise productive collaborations.  
Other faculty may be in a better individual situation, such as having the 
experience of securing grants, or being in a field where that type of activity is not as 
prevalent.  Social scientists have the highest scores for control in the group comparisons 
of the primary dependent variable, Self-Directed Research,’ and the eight control 
scenarios, by discipline.  Social science is significantly different from every other 
discipline in the self-directed research comparison, and from at least one other 
discipline in every one of the control scenarios.   
Some findings from the regression analyses were surprising, particularly how 
certain items were non-significant.  Years as an academic and years experience in 
industry was not significant in any of the three primary models.  However, ‘years as an 
academic’ was associated with increased control in three government-funded scenarios 




science known as the Matthew effect in which those with the most success accrue even 
more (Merton, 1968).  Industry experience was positively associated only for 
Collaboration.  Although a plethora of research centers that collaborate with industry 
have made moving between academia and industry more commonplace (Dietz & 
Bozeman, 2005), the effect from working there on the determination of one’s own 
research agenda seems to be modest.   
 Involvement in commercial science activities appears to have mixed effects.  
Increased involvement in or knowledge of commercial science appears to cause some 
faculty to feel more secure about their research, while causing others to become 
overcome by the ambiguity. This could also be because many people rated themselves 
as having limited knowledge, and perhaps they rely on institutional policies more.   
Government funding support to individual faculty was rated as leading to a 
greater sense of control than did industry funding. 
Receiving government or industry funding is associated with higher control for 
three of the four scenarios.  However, in the group comparisons for self-directed 
research, there was no statistical difference between those receiving 0% and 100% of 
their research support from the government, although those getting 100% had a higher 
control score than those receiving 50% – 75%.  Also, industry funding seems to have a 
negative effect.  While these outcomes may be expected, they do present some 
unknowns regarding the construct of control.  Perhaps there are different conceptions 
of control that should be defined when referring to each type of funding.  Faculty 




single measuring stick?  Do these faculty have the same expectations for control that 
faculty competing for government grants do? As a matter of frequency, faculty routinely 
obtaining this type of funding may have a different understanding of what it means to 
design a study according to one’s interests. These observations lead to the last finding. 
Control does not appear to be a steady-state.  Rather than autonomy, control 
was more likely to mean the ability to overcome influences and interference from 
sponsors to obtain most of what was desired.  
There may indeed be different levels of control regarding research, but it may 
also be possible that there is not one standard when it comes to control.  It is not known 
whether everyone would define it the same way, and it stands to reason that not every 
academic scientist gets the same starting point, owing to personal, institutional, or 
disciplinary factors.   Perhaps we need a more nuanced definition or a spectrum of 
control levels or types.  One starting point may be provided by the control scenarios.   
Since faculty in this study could not define their research agenda with absolute 
authority, it should be noted that a considerable aspect of academic freedom in 
research seems to be the ability to overcome interference from sponsors to obtain one’s 
research interests.  Based on the findings discussed here, the freedom from interference 
and sponsor hindrances could be what is most important to defining a realistic sense of 
control over research.  All four of the outcomes involving negative scenarios had 
significantly higher control scores than did the self-direction items, regardless of funding 
type.  Thus, having the ability to overcome sponsor interference or negotiate issues 
away seems to be a critical component in having control over research, more so than 





As discussed in the introduction, the modifications to the practice of academic 
science are part of the broader transformations in society resulting from the political, 
economic, societal, and cultural dimensions of globalization.  One of the most 
prominent tensions discussed in the literature on globalization is that between the 
forces of modernity on the one hand, and the cultural groundings people cling to during 
social upheaval—their identity—on the other.  Higher education finds globalization so 
unnerving for the same reasons citizens around the world do; it produces a tension 
between the modernity of the global knowledge economy and what institutions 
consider their identity—the deeply-held beliefs regarding the idea, purpose, or mission 
of a university.  This is particularly unsettling for institutions accustomed to tradition, 
autonomy, and a certain degree of deference from society on intellectual matters.   
 The paradox of globalization is that as the world becomes more interconnected, 
local communities, institutions, and processes become more important (Giddens, 1990, 
2000).   One problem is that the history of globalization has shown that the economic 
and political changes occur ahead of the cultural and broader societal ones.  The same 
occurs at the university level.  Disciplinary inequities become manifest as some are able 
to embrace the market more easily than others.  And as Clark’s (1998) institutional case 
studies reveal, the initiatives to secure external funding move ahead before the 
institution becomes fully culturally engaged in entrepreneurship.  It is this cultural lag 
that causes consternation among citizens and scholars alike.  This tension must be 




Is academic science a social institution? Certainly the sociological literature on 
science and the production of knowledge believes this to be the case, and the growing 
literature on institutions in education recognizes university research as one.  The types 
considered in this study were not institutions, but the values they present are 
reasonable embodiments of new institutional logics as created by faculty having to 
adapt to the ill-structured nature of being caught in a transformed environment for 
research.  We probably do not know the new form academic science will take, but the 
confluence of forces discussed and studied here would seem to indicate that it will 
contain some of the reflexive properties of other social institutions.  These include an 
integration of personal values, university cultures, disciplinary influences, and 
government demands with the global trends of innovation networks, dispersed 
influence, and stakeholder involvement.   
Global demands are always filtered through local norms and values; they can be 
filtered out, or integrated.  Adaptation is a process of bricolage—borrowing and copying 
ideas from elsewhere, drawing upon local knowledge, trial and error, until something 
new that works is created (Ball, 1998).  Two concepts come together to support the 
notion of faculty adapting to global trends in their local contexts:  the concept of 
reflexivity that was introduced in the original discussion of globalization, and the 
concept of institutional adaptation through the ‘choices-within-constraints’ process by 
individual actors with agency.    
If faculty do in fact feel Merton’s sociological ambivalence about their individual 




identifying the processes by which any such change could be studied.  Waters (2001) 
stresses that there is a ‘localization’ aspect to the globalizing, in which local actors will 
increasingly seek to self-author their communities but will make these decisions using 
global referents.  The reflexivity thesis is that the knowledge economy/information 
society is generally empowering because it allows people to access more knowledge to 
shape their lives (Delanty, 2003). 
An integrated model of knowledge production must incorporate several 
elements to show the cycle of connections amongst actors.  First, universities will have 
to acknowledge some acceptance of the concept of socially distributed knowledge; 
universities are no longer the only source of knowledge creation, and more aspects of 
society have demands for knowledge that has uses for problem solving and practical 
applications.  Second, universities (and their faculty) should view themselves as situated 
within some form of a knowledge region or network in which universities forge 
relationships with governments, industry, and other seekers and users of knowledge.   
Whether this perspective on the university takes the form of Mitra and Formica’s 
(1997) “social context of innovation” or Walshok’s (1995) “Technopolis” is a matter for 
design and debate, but it will most likely be a network university (Dill & Sporn, 1995a) in 
which the connections are present at multiple levels—across departments and 
disciplines, as well as administration and faculty. Policies, research, and strategies will 
have to be crafted with a sense of the complexity and contradictions inherent in the 




market by attracting just a few financiers, but to engage with enough so that no one 
single provider dominates research agendas.   
Another important question is whether universities can be agents for social 
transformation in the global knowledge environment. The concern in both the higher 
education and science studies literatures over potential restrictions of freedom and the 
compromise of basic research for faculty resulting from sponsored research is not 
without merit.  But we should keep in mind the single-digit percentages of total 
university research expenditures that come from industry, as well as the enormous 
investment in research and universities in general that give multiple publics a stake in 
what happens.  A knowledge region means that many types of organizations are in 
partnership with institutions, or are part of the information flow, and it is now a 
reasonable expectation that these external actors will want to verify that the 
universities are performing adequately (Power, 1997).   
Surely, a university engaged with these publics can have more influence than 
one subsidized by government funds alone.  Neave (2000) observes that the 
Humboldtian tradition of a university separated from society via the barrier of state 
support to ensure that the university was a disinterested site of learning and 
scholarship, unrestrained by external agents, may no longer be feasible.  However, he 
offers this counsel to higher education:   
It is no longer sufficient to be in the world.  The university has also to be of the 
world.  Thus, the responsibilities of the university…seem to be expressed not in 
its detachment from society so much as in its close, if not symbiotic, 
engagement.  There is much to be gained by the lowering of academia’s draw 




surely be that each and every university is now faced with the full weight of 
responsibility for the actions it undertakes…Such entrepreneurship in no way 
absolves universities from the moral, ethical and social consequences which 
arise from such undertakings.  On the contrary, entrepreneurship merely 
underlines them (p. 24). 
 Both the field and the industry of higher education will have to embrace a future 
of university engagement with civil society in terms of the research enterprise.  Any 
advocacy for funding via government provisions to the exclusion of all other means 
seems unrealistic, and poorly serves universities that should be positioning themselves 
as global knowledge producers.  The history of science has shown that governments of 
either ideological persuasion can attempt to direct the products of academic science 
toward ends that comport with their visions (S. Turner, 2008).  Keep in mind that a 
resistance to government authority over science is what prompted Merton to develop 
his normative structure in the first place.  However, as this study has shown, those 
norms no longer provide a sufficient guide for academic science.  
 This study, along with its review of the literature concerned with the normative 
structure of science, should serve as notice to the higher education community that 
academic science and its participant universities would be better equipped to meet the 
challenge of the global economy as knowledge producers if they were not constrained 
by norms for science that were developed in 1942.  The institutional logics presented by 
the Owen-Smith and Powell typology are reasonable starting points for a new social 
structure for science. Even if the type constructs themselves are not discrete, the values 




we should view Mertonian science the way the sociologists of science do:  as a 
contribution valuable in its time, and of its time.  
 That support was found for the alternate value systems speaks to the broad 
nature of the changes in academic science.  The design of this study included drawing of 
faculty from disciplines other than just the high-tech fields because the theories 
addressing the transformation—especially Mode-2 science—indicate that the changes 
are occurring across the entire academy.  The finding that New School found support 
across all disciplines was meaningful because it provided some evidence that Gibbons, 
et al may be correct about the widespread nature of the modifications to traditional 
academic values.  To further test this hypothesis, studies of control and values should be 
conducted among faculty in even more disparate fields, as Mode-2 theory states that 
the transformation of knowledge production includes even the humanities.  
 Still, we should ask if another criterion is needed besides values to gauge the 
extent to which academic science is being changed.  Values and the normative structure 
are the context of science—we need to know more about the content of science.  
Context is conceptualized as having a direction of causality going from values to 
practice: the context (values) influences the practice.  We should also determine the 
extent to which causality may run in the opposite direction, with the content and 
practice of science influencing the values and context.  These results show that how 
faculty are positioned in their field or across the university can affect the way they 
approach an important aspect of their work, such as expectations for control over their 




state/region, involvement with specific networks and collaborators, or certain types of 
funding sources could have even more influence over how control is perceived.  
 Just as regional positioning could be important, so could location in different 
national university systems.  Securing funding in the US differs from the process in other 
countries, and it would be interesting to determine whether the level of control over 
research increases or decreases when the competition is among faculty at one’s own 
institution.  Also, the position of other governments on how they should engage with 
universities for economic outcomes would be an important factor, such as the move 
toward the steering and evaluative state in Western Europe. For example, one might 
find that the long-standing commitment to Social Democratic principles has led to an 
expectation from faculty that government should provide money with little oversight, 
but this will be changing as governments adopt more forms of accountability.  
The study of entrepreneurial institutions not only needs new conceptions but 
also new tools for inquiry.  A possible framework comes from an examination of 
universities in the Italian system.  Lazzeroni & Piccaluga (2003) say that traditional 
methods of evaluation and old indicators of performance are not applicable to 
institutions that are engaged with industry and economic development.  They offer four 
conceptions of the university in which it can function as a factory for: 1) knowledge, 2) 
human capital, 3) technology transfer, or 4) territorial development.  Faculty that 
identified with these four positions would no doubt have very different expectations for 
academic science at their university, and would probably view basic science, research 




 Finally, just as the primary type constructs in the typology theory were not 
dichotomous and required the extension into hybrid types, so too, control should not be 
viewed as a unidimensional construct.   The factor tested here was called self-directed 
research, but it was surprising that the first item on the original scale –“I am able to find 
funding for the questions I wish to pursue”—decreased the reliability of the factor scale.  
This suggests that, perhaps, finding funding and being self-directed are not as 
inextricably linked as is commonly asserted in the higher education literature.  With the 
idea of control not having a universal meaning, it would appear the relationship 
between being funded and having self-direction requires greater clarification.  
Implications for Policy and Practice 
Both components of this study are concerned with the autonomy of science, 
sharing a focus on the independence of individual faculty from the demands of external 
actors that obtain entry into the scientific process, either as a sponsor, collaborator, or 
both.  The recent decades have witnessed a move from concern over state and military 
intervention to private capital and industry partnerships.  The higher education 
literature has contended that the preservation of independence for faculty is best 
achieved through the separation of academic and commercial science because their 
values are so divergent.  The results from this study suggest that faculty have a strong 
tolerance for the ambiguity that results from the overlap of academic and commercial 
science, and that they can negotiate and adapt to this situation by demonstrating facility 




These results also show that the traditional norms of academic science are not 
necessarily abandoned by the invocation of alternate value systems.  The high 
preference for the New School type in the index preference distribution suggests that 
rather than disillusionment or corruption, the viewpoint that the academy and 
commercial science overlap and that higher education is not threatened by commercial 
science represents a realistic, healthy engagement with a transformed environment that 
not only views universities as contributing to economic growth, but also recognizes their 
potential prominence of place within a distributed system of knowledge production.  
Furthermore, the embrace of the Engaged Traditionalist position of individual faculty 
keeping academic and commercial science separate suggests that these respondents 
believe that faculty can locate their boundaries and maintain a balance between the 
two realms without the need for extensive regulation.  
Of course, the climate for entrepreneurialism and the support for commercial 
science activity that exists within a department or institution are important.  The 
literature and this study both show that being involved in commercial science activities 
and having the opportunity to increase one’s knowledge of commercialization processes 
can enhance the perception of control.  Supportive policies and the opportunity to get 
involved can demystify the commercial realm while also removing the stigma of 
association with such work.   
The faculty in this study may not have defined their level of control as complete 
autonomy, but neither have they expressed a sense of being subservient to the 




cases.  The fact that disciplines closer to industry or more involved with commercial 
science expressed lower control could either mean that those faculty perceive some loss 
of self-directedness, or it could be that they have a realistic conception of what being 
self-directed means in a transformed research environment.   
There are also considerations for academic science at the individual, 
institutional, and collective levels.  Faculty may direct their own research programs and 
make use of the networks and skills they have, but they also work in disciplines that 
differ with respect to the types of research that can attract external finance and 
collaboration, and they conduct research at institutions that have policies and 
infrastructures that vary in levels of support and pressure for commercial science.  All of 
this culminates in an effect across higher education with consequences for the role of 
universities as producers of knowledge and knowledge products.   
For some departments and some faculty, personal career characteristics or 
policies that enable individual faculty to maintain their own balance may be sufficient; 
however it is likely that most faculty will require more structure from their institutions, 
especially given that overcoming interference from sponsors was more important for 
control than concepts like autonomy.  Leadership and policy structures that enable 
faculty to approach sponsor demands as part of the research design process, and the 
sponsors themselves as partners rather than as simply funding providers, seem like 
reasonable  expectations for helping faculty engage and adapt with this environment.  
Administrators and policymakers should realize that even an abstraction like the 




for the types of research that universities produce.  Where opportunities exist to create 
innovation networks, research parks and small business development centers, inter-
university consortia and other collaboration formats, they should be embraced because 
they increase the engagement of their faculty with the transformed environment for 
academic science.  
Implications for Theory and Research 
The results from this study indicate that a more complicated definition of control 
is in order, since it appears not all faculty may have the same expectation or opportunity 
to exercise a given level of self-direction.  As was noted in the discussion, the control 
scenarios used in this study could provide one method for developing an expanded 
definition of control.  Because overcoming sponsor influence proved to be a more 
meaningful component of control than did autonomy, and because those disciplines 
closer to commercial science may face greater challenges from sponsors—but also 
better opportunities to secure funding—it is possible that a spectrum of control would 
be more realistic.  Such a spectrum should have some allowance for overlap between 
control outcomes, as individual faculty will not have equal opportunities to secure 
funding, or be equally adept at overcoming sponsor influence.   
Figure 6 below, which allows for movement along both axes to locate individuals 
along outcomes that have some range, could more accurately represent the possibilities 
faced by faculty.   The horizontal axis represents a spectrum from having sponsors 
influence research agendas to having their wishes incorporated into the goals of the 




‘skill’ or ‘ability’ to secure funding, since not all disciplines or institutions present faculty 
with equal opportunities for grants and other resources.  The outcomes are theoretical 
positions, as faculty may be higher or lower along the axes for any particular outcome.  
Having ranges that overlap signifies that faculty could move through one outcome to get 
to another, or occupy some middle ground as research collaborations proceed through 
various stages, from design to research to dissemination.   
 
 
Figure 6: Possible Outcomes for a More Complex Representation of 'Control' 
 Could the framework of the faculty typology provide insight into how individual 
faculty can find such a balance?  First is the question of whether the types even exist.   
The failure to establish the types as stable, reliable, and distinct has been discussed, and 
it is possible that the constructs as defined by the original theory are not generalizable 




Recall that they were developed for the life sciences; it could be that other disciplines 
would have different type constructs.  However, given the varied preferences expressed 
by the faculty, it does seem reasonable for some framework of multiple value systems 
to exist.  Their level of definition and permanence remain to be determined, but their 
existence as institutional logics seems probable.   
These differing value systems, perhaps represented by the type constructs used 
here, provide evidence that faculty are—to use a sociological lens—reflexively adapting 
to the transformed research environment (Bauchspies, Croissant, & Restivo, 2006).  
While faculty predisposed to conventional (Old School) perspectives on academic 
science may disapprove of the invention of new norms or scientific practices, such 
practices could represent an acceptance within the scientific community of the new 
research environment, and adaptation to it.  Etzkowitz (1989) describes this as the 
occurrence of normative change, rather than the stigmatization of deviance.   
Evidence of support for alternate value systems regarding what constitutes good 
academic science could be similar to the way scientific thinking often works regarding 
any phenomena of interest.  Conceiving of science as a social activity, Hess (1997)—
taking a cue no doubt from Kuhn (1962)—points out how the three phases of research 
involve scientific revolutions, controversies, and normal science.  The current 
environment for science has been defined as a revolution (Etzkowitz & Webster, 1998), 
and we are certainly in the midst of controversy regarding what academic science 
should be, so it may be some time before the final verdict is in on what constitutes the 




With this in mind, the two components of this study can be joined because the 
transformed research environment has implications for both ‘control’ and accepted 
scientific practices.  It may be unrealistic to expect to find completely disinterested 
academic scientists, as all academics have problems that interest them, and the idea of 
a lone truth-seeker working with complete neutrality and autonomy in the era of big, 
complex science seems unworkable (Bucchi, 2004; Ziman, 1996).   
There has always been a tension between the universalistic values of science and 
the particularistic values of faculty (Hess, 1997), and academic science would seemingly 
be better served by acknowledging the positive aspects of these beliefs that motivate 
faculty to drive research into areas that satisfy their curiosity.  “Standpoint 
epistemologies” (Harding, 1992) like feminist theory violate the norm of universalism, 
but that does not disqualify their advocates from the production of objective science.  
Perhaps science and technology studies (Hackett, Amsterdamska, Lynch, & Wajcman, 
2008) can ascertain whether and how the institutional logics that govern the 
organization of scientific practice can keep pace with the factors that determine the 
conduct of scientific research.  
Limitations of the Study 
The measurement of control over topic choice could be performed with more 
complicated constructs than the ones employed here.  The schematic presented in 
Figure 6 could be a starting point for more context-specific theories and definitions.  
Future research should try to isolate the effects of particular disciplines, institutions, and 




restrictions for faculty dealing with government agencies and for those working with 
corporations.  In addition, control could be examined at different points in time of a 
research project, so as to determine how much control faculty have over what topics to 
explore, the final topic choice, and what aspects of the research design and methods are 
subject to negotiation and agreement.  
The failure of the typology as a classification scheme could be due to its type 
constructs, or their applicability as outcomes to be predicted, while the possibility of 
measurement error in the design of the scales also certainly exists.  These results would 
seem to validate the assertions from the science studies literature on the new context 
for science and how this affects its content.  It may not be reasonable to expect faculty 
to reliably differentiate between constructs that could be context-dependent or based 
on subjective criteria like the perception of threats, which in turn could be affected by 
the different disciplinary, departmental, or institutional circumstances of individual 
faculty.  Also, it may not be appropriate to incorporate norms and values into the same 
instrument, as they could measure different things, such as regulations and principles, 
respectively.  In addition, the directionality of cause and effect between one’s issue 
positions and beliefs on particular issues concerning academic and commercial science 
was not explored in this study.   
The study may also have produced more robust findings if the faculty sample 
had been more involved with commercial science.  These respondents had some 
involvement and experience with such activities, but most did not.  This was part of the 




science suggest that the changes occur across the academy, faculty from multiple 
disciplines were targeted, but involvement in commercial science was not a 
requirement for inclusion.  Perhaps a more focused sample of faculty in different 
disciplines that possess greater experience in commercial science activities would shed 
light on how the adaptation to this environment occurs.   
Suggestions for Future Research 
The concept of control over research agendas is an under-researched 
phenomenon in the higher education literature, but also in the broader social science 
and science-focused literatures.  We should know more about the relationships 
between sponsors and topic choice.  Quantitative studies such as this one should 
attempt to operationalize more nuanced and realistic constructs of what control could 
mean in particular fields.  Qualitative studies could better explore the phenomena of 
control, or examine different theories of control in more depth, while case studies could 
capture the processes and events that precede and determine how topic choices are 
made in collaborative projects or those requiring external funding.  
Regarding the faculty types, additional research, perhaps using more involved 
scales, or asking respondents to rank items or make forced choices among a range of 
options, would more reliably capture the true nature of these value systems.  Further 
research is required to ascertain the full picture of the belief systems of academic 
scientists, but these data indicate that alternate normative systems have as much, or 




Researchers seeking to examine the stability of the alternate normative systems 
could look for evidence of institutionalization such as policies, procedures, and 
established practices—as well as communication regarding these elements –as part of 
the work of faculty, departments, and disciplines.  Studies could also be longitudinal in 
nature, looking for patterns that promote adaptation and transformation of the practice 
of academic science.  
The field of higher education should become more conversant with the concepts 
from science studies about the social relations of knowledge production, and move 
away from a focus on context and investigate instead the content of science.  We should 
know more about how the individual faculty, departments, labs and universities 
approach these innovation networks and altered expectations.  Such an approach would 
help us better understand the nature and functioning of the large-scale collaborations 
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Graphs of Paired Type Indices 



























R Sq Linear = 0.118























































































































































Regression Models for the Four Cs 
Appendix 8:  Regression Model Predicting Curiosity and Government Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .023 .068 .011 .733  
CAREER      
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) -.001 .081 -.001 .988  
16-24 Years in academia .145 .086 .060 .091  
25-plus Years in academia .256 .091 .101 .005 ** 
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) -.066 .111 -.017 .550  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry -.040 .080 -.015 .617  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry -.101 .092 -.034 .273  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization .023 .048 .017 .633  
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science -.001 .016 -.002 .946  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.076 .086 -.027 .377  
2 Commercial Science activities -.053 .047 -.036 .259  
3 Commercial Science activities -.026 .039 -.021 .510  
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.031 .031 -.041 .314  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.075 .049 -.067 .120  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.073 .033 -.078 .029 * 
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.037 .053 -.029 .488  
Pressure: Limit publication of results .061 .066 .029 .353  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research -.102 .030 -.106 .001 ** 
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment -.003 .033 -.003 .922  
Requires salary offset w external research funds .068 .020 .103 .001 ** 
Provides financial support for my research .062 .026 .072 .017 * 
Has policies to restrict publication of research results .005 .037 .004 .894  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents .012 .048 .009 .801  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .044 .043 .033 .298  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.021 .034 -.019 .534  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT      
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .004 .001 .143 .000 *** 
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations -.005 .002 -.078 .017 * 
Current sponsorship: Foundations .001 .002 .009 .769  
Current sponsorship: University -.001 .001 -.039 .286  
Current sponsorship: Other -.005 .002 -.075 .011 * 
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES          
Old School .110 .061 .061 .070  
Engaged Traditionalist .083 .071 .038 .246  
Reluctant Entrepreneur .053 .065 .024 .415  
New School -.002 .063 -.001 .969  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)          
Engineering .092 .117 .030 .429  
Medical/ Health Sciences .059 .047 .048 .206  
Physical Sciences .060 .034 .065 .078  
Biological Sciences .051 .025 .078 .036 * 
      
      
      
      




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity) -.084 .068 -.036 .214  
Type-High research activity -.030 .046 -.020 .509  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ .059 .083 .022 .479  
Control (Ref = Public)      
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government -.005 .006 -.079 .342  
State Government .000 .007 .000 .997  
Industry .002 .007 .013 .745  
Institutional Funds -.007 .006 -.087 .227  
      
(constant) 2.98 0.68  .000  
      
R2 0.163     
Adjusted R2 0.131     
Standard Error 0.980     
F 5.053   0.00  





Appendix 9:  Regression Model Predicting Curiosity for Industry Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender -.029 .065 -.015 .651  
CAREER          
8-15 Years in academia  (Ref = 0 -7) .001 .077 .000 .992  
16-24 Years in academia .122 .082 .054 .136  
25-plus Years in academia .118 .087 .050 .176  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) -.058 .106 -.016 .587  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry .026 .077 .010 .733  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry .050 .088 .018 .571  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization .061 .046 .049 .186  
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science .002 .015 .005 .894  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) .069 .082 .027 .399  
2 Commercial Science activities .034 .045 .025 .449  
3 Commercial Science activities .106 .038 .092 .005 ** 
4-plus Commercial Science activities .101 .030 .139 .001 ** 
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.091 .047 -.086 .051  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.037 .032 -.042 .247  
Pressure: Commercialize research results .016 .051 .013 .753  
Pressure: Limit publication of results -.058 .063 -.029 .359  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research .010 .028 .011 .715  
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment -.002 .032 -.002 .957  
Requires salary offset w external research funds .016 .019 .026 .396  
Provides financial support for my research .039 .025 .047 .121  
Has policies to restrict publication of research results .081 .036 .066 .023 * 
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents -.008 .046 -.006 .857  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .075 .041 .060 .067  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.063 .032 -.060 .052  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT          
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies -.002 .001 -.090 .028 * 
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .006 .002 .087 .009 ** 
Current sponsorship: Foundations .002 .002 .038 .229  
Current sponsorship: University -.002 .001 -.052 .166  
Current sponsorship: Other -.001 .002 -.016 .598  
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.002 .058 -.001 .977  
Engaged Traditionalist -.007 .068 -.003 .924  
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.015 .062 -.007 .815  
New School .120 .061 .069 .048 * 
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)      
Engineering .012 .112 .004 .916  
Medical/ Health Sciences .153 .045 .131 .001 ** 
Physical Sciences -.015 .033 -.017 .648  
Biological Sciences .031 .024 .050 .191  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)      
Type-High research activity .019 .065 .009 .770  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ .008 .044 .006 .851  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government .000 .005 -.003 .973  
State Government .010 .006 .082 .104  
Industry .011 .007 .070 .099  
Institutional Funds .003 .006 .043 .556  
      
(constant) 1.270 .647   .050  
      
R2 0.131     
Adjusted R2 0.098     
Standard Error 0.939     
F 3.914   .000  







Appendix 10:  Regression Model Predicting Collaborate for Government Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender -.071 .085 -.027 .404  
CAREER      
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) -.155 .101 -.053 .124  
16-24 Years in academia -.096 .107 -.032 .370  
25-plus Years in academia -.058 .114 -.019 .608  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .177 .138 .038 .200  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry .202 .100 .060 .044 * 
6-plus Yrs worked in industry .257 .115 .071 .025 * 
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT      
Knowledge of Commercialization .254 .060 .156 .000 *** 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science -.007 .020 -.013 .715  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) .130 .107 .038 .225  
2 Commercial Science activities -.021 .059 -.011 .723  
3 Commercial Science activities .016 .049 .010 .746  
4-plus Commercial Science activities .005 .039 .006 .893  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT      
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential .030 .061 .022 .621  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.035 .041 -.031 .395  
Pressure: Commercialize research results .037 .066 .024 .576  
Pressure: Limit publication of results .026 .083 .010 .749  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research .068 .037 .058 .065  
My academic institution:      
Has entrepreneurial environment .011 .041 .009 .794  
Requires salary offset w external research funds .040 .025 .048 .116  
Provides financial support for my research .038 .032 .036 .240  
Has policies to restrict publication of research results .103 .047 .064 .028 * 
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents -.078 .060 -.045 .193  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .005 .053 .003 .922  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions .028 .042 .020 .511  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT      
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .002 .001 .063 .120  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .004 .003 .044 .182  
Current sponsorship: Foundations -.002 .002 -.029 .346  
Current sponsorship: University -.001 .001 -.026 .480  
Current sponsorship: Other -.006 .003 -.066 .027 * 
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.087 .076 -.039 .253  
Engaged Traditionalist .105 .089 .039 .238  
Reluctant Entrepreneur .037 .081 .014 .650  
New School .210 .079 .091 .008 ** 
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)      
Engineering .057 .146 .015 .698  
Medical/ Health Sciences -.050 .059 -.033 .393  
Physical Sciences .041 .042 .036 .339  
Biological Sciences -.010 .031 -.013 .738  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)      
Type-High research activity .081 .085 .028 .336  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ -.077 .057 -.041 .177  
Control (Ref = Public) -.054 .103 -.016 .603  
      
      
      
      
      




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government .007 .007 .078 .352  
State Government .000 .008 -.002 .972  
Industry .016 .009 .074 .077  
Institutional Funds .007 .008 .067 .353  
      
(constant) .156 .843  .853  
      
R2 0.142     
Adjusted R2 0.109     
Standard Error 1.225     
F 4.293   .000  







Appendix 11:  Regression Model Predicting Collaborate for Industry Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender -.038 .076 -.015 .618  
CAREER          
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) .061 .090 .022 .494  
16-24 Years in academia .047 .096 .016 .625  
25-plus Years in academia .042 .101 .014 .677  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .033 .123 .007 .788  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry .031 .089 .010 .726  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry .099 .103 .028 .337  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization .144 .053 .092 .007 ** 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science .025 .018 .046 .155  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) .135 .096 .041 .157  
2 Commercial Science activities .125 .053 .070 .018 ** 
3 Commercial Science activities .089 .044 .061 .043 * 
4-plus Commercial Science activities .156 .035 .169 .000 *** 
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential .001 .054 .001 .989  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.012 .037 -.011 .751  
Pressure: Commercialize research results .090 .059 .060 .127  
Pressure: Limit publication of results -.004 .074 -.002 .952  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research .054 .033 .047 .104  
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment .060 .037 .051 .103  
Requires salary offset w external research funds .013 .022 .017 .550  
Provides financial support for my research .064 .029 .062 .027 * 
Has policies to restrict publication of research results .046 .042 .030 .271  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents .038 .053 .022 .480  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .030 .047 .019 .528  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.105 .038 -.080 .005 ** 
SOURCE OF SUPPORT          
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies -.001 .001 -.037 .322  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .013 .002 .157 .000 *** 
Current sponsorship: Foundations -.003 .002 -.048 .093  
Current sponsorship: University -.002 .001 -.059 .085  
Current sponsorship: Other -.005 .002 -.059 .032 * 
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.029 .068 -.013 .674  
Engaged Traditionalist .124 .079 .048 .118  
Reluctant Entrepreneur .048 .073 .018 .510  
New School .062 .071 .028 .381  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)          
Engineering .402 .130 .109 .002 ** 
Medical/ Health Sciences .011 .052 .007 .839  
Physical Sciences .068 .038 .062 .073  
Biological Sciences .059 .027 .075 .032 * 
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)          
Type-High research activity .019 .075 .007 .800  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ -.044 .051 -.025 .385  
Control (Ref = Public) .013 .092 .004 .885  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)          
Federal Government .012 .006 .143 .066  
State Government .018 .007 .109 .018 * 
Industry .016 .008 .078 .045 * 




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
(constant) -.450 .753   .551  
      
R2 0.265     
Adjusted R2 0.237     
Standard Error 1.094     
F 9.237   .000  






Appendix 12:  Regression Model Predicting Compromise for Government Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .028 .084 .011 .744  
CAREER          
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) .222 .100 .078 .027 * 
16-24 Years in academia .075 .107 .025 .481  
25-plus Years in academia .150 .113 .049 .185  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .036 .137 .008 .794  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry -.039 .099 -.012 .694  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry -.211 .114 -.059 .066  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization -.142 .060 -.088 .018 * 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science .019 .020 .034 .338  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.147 .107 -.044 .168  
2 Commercial Science activities -.001 .059 .000 .989  
3 Commercial Science activities -.006 .049 -.004 .909  
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.058 .039 -.061 .137  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.101 .060 -.074 .095  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.094 .041 -.083 .023 * 
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.067 .066 -.044 .307  
Pressure: Limit publication of results .019 .082 .007 .821  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research -.005 .037 -.004 .902  
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment -.018 .041 -.015 .657  
Requires salary offset w external research funds -.075 .025 -.093 .003 ** 
Provides financial support for my research .040 .032 .038 .217  
Has policies to restrict publication of research results -.053 .046 -.033 .257  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents .020 .059 .012 .739  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .029 .053 .018 .583  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.031 .042 -.023 .457  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT          
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies -.001 .001 -.031 .443  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations -.003 .003 -.037 .266  
Current sponsorship: Foundations -.001 .002 -.011 .731  
Current sponsorship: University .000 .001 .005 .888  
Current sponsorship: Other .003 .003 .041 .175  
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES          
Old School .002 .076 .001 .975  
Engaged Traditionalist -.095 .088 -.036 .283  
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.227 .081 -.085 .005 ** 
New School -.012 .079 -.005 .881  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)          
Engineering -.171 .145 -.045 .238  
Medical/ Health Sciences .079 .058 .052 .179  
Physical Sciences -.006 .042 -.005 .884  
Biological Sciences .015 .030 .019 .625  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)      
Type-High research activity -.084 .084 -.030 .320  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ -.085 .057 -.046 .133  
Control (Ref = Public) .066 .103 .020 .519  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government -.008 .007 -.093 .274  
State Government -.012 .008 -.074 .140  
Industry -.003 .009 -.015 .728  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
(constant) 6.322 .839   .000  
      
R2 0.130     
Adjusted R2 0.096     
Standard Error 1.218     
F 3.864   .000  







Appendix 13:  Regression Model Predicting Compromise for Industry Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .162 .074 .068 .029 * 
CAREER          
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) .110 .088 .042 .214  
16-24 Years in academia .133 .094 .049 .156  
25-plus Years in academia .181 .100 .064 .069  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .048 .121 .011 .695  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry .021 .088 .007 .809  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry -.071 .101 -.022 .484  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization -.134 .052 -.091 .011 * 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science -.011 .017 -.022 .523  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.224 .094 -.073 .017 * 
2 Commercial Science activities -.103 .052 -.062 .047 * 
3 Commercial Science activities -.033 .043 -.024 .446  
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.090 .034 -.104 .009 ** 
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.003 .053 -.003 .949  
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.088 .036 -.084 .016 * 
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.168 .058 -.119 .004 ** 
Pressure: Limit publication of results -.086 .072 -.036 .235  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research .010 .032 .010 .746  
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment -.016 .036 -.014 .667  
Requires salary offset w external research funds -.025 .022 -.033 .263  
Provides financial support for my research -.044 .028 -.046 .118  
Has policies to restrict publication of research results -.074 .041 -.051 .070  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents -.001 .052 .000 .992  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .043 .047 .029 .356  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions .050 .037 .040 .176  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT          
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .000 .001 -.003 .946  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations -.002 .002 -.020 .533  
Current sponsorship: Foundations .000 .002 .000 .996  
Current sponsorship: University .003 .001 .075 .036 * 
Current sponsorship: Other .005 .002 .058 .045 * 
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.157 .067 -.078 .019 * 
Engaged Traditionalist -.158 .078 -.065 .043 * 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.067 .071 -.027 .349  
New School .011 .069 .005 .878  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)          
Engineering -.480 .128 -.139 .000 *** 
Medical/ Health Sciences .020 .051 .014 .703  
Physical Sciences -.041 .037 -.040 .266  
Biological Sciences -.028 .027 -.037 .306  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)          
Type-High research activity .067 .074 .026 .367  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ -.011 .050 -.006 .831  
Control (Ref = Public) .020 .091 .007 .822  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)          
Federal Government .004 .006 .047 .562  
State Government -.003 .007 -.022 .648  
Industry .008 .008 .042 .299  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
(constant) 5.284 .739   .000  
      
R2 0.196     
Adjusted R2 0.165     
Standard Error 1.074     
F 6.300   .000  






Appendix 14:  Regression Model Predicting Concession for Government Funding 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .054 .072 .024 .451  
CAREER      
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) .200 .085 .080 .019 * 
16-24 Years in academia .105 .091 .041 .248  
25-plus Years in academia .010 .096 .004 .921  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .072 .117 .018 .537  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry -.141 .085 -.049 .097  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry -.257 .098 -.082 .009 ** 
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT      
Knowledge of Commercialization -.109 .051 -.078 .032 * 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science .002 .017 .003 .925  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.040 .091 -.014 .662  
2 Commercial Science activities -.035 .050 -.022 .485  
3 Commercial Science activities .045 .042 .034 .286  
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.006 .033 -.008 .845  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT      
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.166 .051 -.139 .001 ** 
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.058 .035 -.058 .101  
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.060 .056 -.045 .283  
Pressure: Limit publication of results .001 .070 .001 .984  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research -.052 .031 -.051 .098  
My academic institution:      
Has entrepreneurial environment .003 .035 .003 .925  
Requires salary offset w external research funds -.071 .021 -.101 .001 ** 
Provides financial support for my research .062 .028 .067 .025 * 
Has policies to restrict publication of research results -.078 .040 -.056 .048 * 
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents .021 .051 .014 .676  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .036 .045 .026 .422  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions -.005 .036 -.004 .897  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT      
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .000 .001 -.013 .739  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .000 .002 .001 .966  
Current sponsorship: Foundations .001 .002 .023 .456  
Current sponsorship: University .001 .001 .025 .485  
Current sponsorship: Other .001 .002 .019 .513  
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School .084 .065 .044 .194  
Engaged Traditionalist -.041 .075 -.018 .584  
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.183 .069 -.079 .008 ** 
New School .022 .067 .011 .749  
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)      
Engineering -.202 .124 -.061 .102  
Medical/ Health Sciences .037 .050 .028 .455  
Physical Sciences .026 .036 .027 .464  
Biological Sciences .021 .026 .030 .420  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)      
Type-High research activity -.010 .072 -.004 .893  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ .069 .048 .043 .152  
Control (Ref = Public) .057 .088 .020 .517  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government .003 .006 .042 .615  
State Government -.003 .007 -.020 .689  
Industry .004 .008 .023 .569  
Institutional Funds .003 .006 .038 .598  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
(constant) 4.694 .716  .000  
      
R2 0.169     
Adjusted R2 0.136     
Standard Error 1.040     
F 5.244   .000  







Appendix 15:  Regression Model Predicting Concession for Industry Sponsorship 
 B SEB Beta Sig.  
DEMOGRAPHICS      
Gender .093 .071 .041 .191  
CAREER          
8-15 Years in academia (Ref = 0 -7) .105 .084 .042 .213  
16-24 Years in academia .097 .090 .037 .280  
25-plus Years in academia .097 .095 .036 .311  
Less than 1 Yr worked in Industry (Ref= None) .005 .116 .001 .962  
1 to 5 Yrs worked in industry -.017 .084 -.006 .841  
6-plus Yrs worked in industry .021 .096 .007 .824  
COMMERCIAL SCIENCE  INVOLVEMENT          
Knowledge of Commercialization -.124 .050 -.088 .013 * 
Highest Involvement in Commercial Science -.016 .017 -.033 .325  
1 Commercial Science activity (Ref = None) -.135 .090 -.046 .132  
2 Commercial Science activities -.087 .050 -.054 .081  
3 Commercial Science activities -.068 .041 -.052 .099  
4-plus Commercial Science activities -.063 .033 -.076 .054  
INSTITUTIONAL CS ENVIRONMENT          
Pressure Select topics  with commercial potential -.172 .051 -.143 .001 ** 
Pressure: Focus on applied outcomes -.027 .035 -.027 .441  
Pressure: Commercialize research results -.091 .055 -.067 .103  
Pressure: Limit publication of results -.044 .069 -.019 .528  
Pressure: Generate revenues from my research .003 .031 .003 .932  
My academic institution:          
Has entrepreneurial environment -.003 .035 -.003 .924  
Requires salary offset w external research funds -.039 .021 -.055 .068  
Provides financial support for my research -.002 .027 -.002 .946  
Has policies to restrict publication of research results -.054 .039 -.039 .166  
Has procedural support for licensing/ patents -.018 .050 -.012 .722  
Has policies to resolve conflicts of interest .057 .045 .040 .203  
Rewards commercial science activity in P & T decisions .064 .035 .054 .072  
SOURCE OF SUPPORT          
Current sponsorship: Government-Public agencies .000 .001 .002 .969  
Current sponsorship: Industry-Corporations .004 .002 .050 .122  
Current sponsorship: Foundations .001 .002 .009 .753  
Current sponsorship: University .003 .001 .076 .033 * 
Current sponsorship: Other .003 .002 .043 .132  
FACULTY TYPE PREFERENCES      
Old School -.068 .064 -.035 .287  
Engaged Traditionalist -.221 .075 -.095 .003 * 
Reluctant Entrepreneur -.114 .068 -.049 .095  
New School .136 .066 .068 .041 * 
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (Ref = Social Science)      
Engineering -.459 .122 -.139 .000 *** 
Medical/ Health Sciences .031 .049 .023 .535  
Physical Sciences -.015 .036 -.016 .666  
Biological Sciences -.011 .026 -.016 .665  
INSTITUTIONAL TYPE  (Ref = Very High Research Activity)          
Type-High research activity .047 .071 .019 .504  
Type – Doctoral/Research Univ .046 .048 .029 .332  
Control (Ref = Public) .021 .087 .008 .806  
Research Expenditures (Pctg.)      
Federal Government .002 .006 .023 .777  
State Government -.006 .007 -.039 .423  
Industry .003 .007 .015 .712  




 B SEB Beta Sig.  
(constant) 4.938 .708   .000  
      
R2 0.194     
Adjusted R2 0.163     
Standard Error 1.028     
F 6.245   .000  
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